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Abstract of thesis  
 
 
This thesis, The monster within: between the onset and resolution of the oedipal crisis, 
is located at the intersection between psychoanalysis, philosophy and myth, and builds 
on all three to look at the formation of the psyche.  
Drawing on Freudian and Lacanian theories, I interrogate the emergence of psychic 
structures that constitute subjectivity and argue that an un-theorised psychic structure 
operates at the level of the pre-oedipal and is not assimilated by phallic law. I suggest 
this element is a fully-formed transcendental ego that is overwritten but not annihilated 
in the oedipal phase, and continues to exist beneath the constituted ego. I term this 
a non-Symbolic subject, to show it possesses a transcendental ego and is a subject, 
but it has not been habituated into phallic norms. I argue the existence of the non-
Symbolic subject stems from the primacy given to the father as possessor of the 
phallus, and the secondary function the mother occupies in psychic development.  
To support my argument, I use an ancient Greek tragedy, The Bacchae, due to its 
compartmentalisation of sexual difference and almost dogmatically defined gender 
roles. Following Irigaray, I return to Greek tragedy to interrogate the male imaginary 
and identify the elements that structure the psyche. My aim is to argue that the 
conceptualisation of the subject with which Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis 
operates is historical, not universal; by positing a pre-phallic subjectivity, I seek to show 
that subjectivity need not be restricted to the replication of the image of the Father. 
Using the non-Symbolic subject as a critical tool, I attempt to expand the 
psychoanalytical theoretical language and help theory move beyond the oedipal, 
towards a space where subjectification around the Father becomes a historical 
occurrence, not a condition for existence as a subject to be possible.  
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Introduction 
 
The quest to uncover subjectivity, what it is that makes one a subject, has troubled 
thinkers throughout history, from ancient to modern times. If science has helped us 
come closer to understanding what the subject is, we are still to elucidate who, how, or, 
indeed, why he is. I do not claim to be able to answer any of these questions through 
this thesis; however, I hope to reframe the way we envisage the process of 
subjectification today to help think through the problematic mechanism by which an 
individual becomes a subject and exists in society.  
 
Overarching aims 
My thesis, titled The monster within: between the onset and resolution of the oedipal 
crisis, is located at the intersection of psychoanalysis, philosophy and myth, and draws 
on all three to look at the formation of the psyche. For the purpose of this thesis I 
employ the term ‘myth’ in the same sense as Amber Jacobs does in her book, On 
Matricide. Jacobs, following Levi-Strauss, defines myth as “a complex set of codes with 
a high degree of internal organisation that, under structural analysis, reveal the 
“unconscious truths” that “make...man aware of his roots in society.” This view, that 
myth is a receptacle for universal unconscious structures, makes the analysis of myth 
the key to revealing unconscious structuring laws, and, as a result, an indispensable 
tool in interrogating the psyche. For this reason, I use myth, as Levi-Strauss puts it, as 
“a musical score”, in which meaning is not given by the sequencing of events, but by 
their totality and variance. As Jacobs argues, employing this understanding of myth 
allows one to use “differential myth analysis...to challenge psychoanalysis’s unilateral 
approach to myth”, thus enabling the identification of universal unconscious structures.1   
Through this work, I aim to theorise what I see as an identifiable psychic structure that 
has not been theorised previously in psychoanalytic theory, and which, through its very 
existence, destabilises the psyche from within. I envision that such an intervention 
might not only develop the psychoanalytic theoretical body, but, by providing a new 
interpretation of psychoanalysis, it could also serve as a useful tool to interrogate 
literature and unearth meanings that had been hitherto hidden. Furthermore, my thesis 
                                                          
1 Amber Jacobs, On Matricide (New York, Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2007), 17. 
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might shed new light on the psyche by looking at its structures from an interdisciplinary 
perspective that is part philosophical and part psychoanalytical.2 
In this inquiry I am governed by my interest to undertake research into the theories of 
traditional (Freudian and Lacanian) psychoanalysis, more specifically, the idea of the 
oedipal complex as the necessary and sole foundation of selfhood, and the mythical 
instances where this dynamic is challenged. My main argument is that, in the course of 
the formation of the psyche, as theorised by Freud and, later on, Lacan, there is a 
residual element that fails to conform to the rules imposed by the patriarchal Symbolic, 
and therefore does not successfully transition to the post-oedipal organisation.3 As a 
result, this residual element acts beneath the constituted ego, as a continuous 
subversion of the phallic law, even after the subject has been habituated into norms 
and the patriarchal Symbolic.4  
The purpose of looking at the development of the psyche in such a way is to 
demonstrate the existence of this aforementioned residual structure, and the way in 
which it destabilises the psyche, leading to the creation of a ‘monstrous subject’.5 I 
argue that the appearance of the ‘monstrous subject’ at the core of the psyche reflects 
a failure of psychoanalysis to capture adequately the way the subject’s ego is formed: 
in theorising the development of the ego as primarily dependent on the figure of the 
father, theorists such as Freud and Lacan have fundamentally omitted the importance 
of the mother, and have created a theoretical model that excludes her. My aim is to use 
the theories of Luce Irigaray to challenge this model, and demonstrate it is no longer 
apt to capture the complexities of the modern subject.   
                                                          
2 Here I use the term ’psyche’ in a Freudian sense, and understand it as the sum of conscious, preconscious and 
unconscious elements made up by the id, ego and superego. Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, (The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-analysis, 1960), vol. XXIII. 
3 In following Freud, I look especially at On Narcissism, The Unconscious, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, 
Totem and Taboo – The Oedipus Complex and Society, The Claims of Psycho-analysis to Scientific Interest — Freud, 
The Standard Edition, (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-analysis, 1960), vol. VII, XIII, XIV, XVI 
and XIX, 2001. I also look at Jacques Lacan (Lacan, Écrits, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006); Lacan, The Ego in Freud’s 
Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis (Seminar II), (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991) and Lacan, The Ethics of 
Psychoanalysis. Book VII, (London: Tavistock/Routledge, 1992).) 
4 I use the term ‘phallic law’ in the same sense as Julia Kristeva in Powers of Horror and in New Maladies of the Soul. 
To Kristeva, the phallic law or phallic prohibition is that which regulates the taboos against murder and incest and 
ensures the continuation of the social organisation around the Father. As the phallus is what dictates social norms and 
rules, he who possesses the phallus also manipulates the dominating ideology. See Kristeva, Powers of horror, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1982) and Kristeva, New Maladies of the Soul, (New York, NY; Chichester: Columbia 
University Press, 1995). 
5 Following Barbara Creed I understand monstrosity as that which demarcates the boundary between human and non-
human – or, if we take the Irigarayan view and argue the subject position can only ever be male, monstrosity becomes 
the demarcation between human and female. In her analysis of female monsters in horror film, Creed works with a 
notion of monsters that lies precisely in that s/he/it threatens the safety of the phallic law and of the institutions of 
patriarchal capitalism. Understood this way, the monster is that which has either transgressed, or is causing others to 
transgress the limits of subjectivity, the boundaries of the phallic law, and the patriarchal institutions. Employing this 
definition touches on Kristeva’s work on abjection, and works with the idea that female violence, particularly when 
coupled with female sexuality, appears in literature as driven by forces beyond the woman’s control—vampires, 
demons, or external monstrous others. For a discussion of monstrosity in popular film and abjection, see Creed, The 
Monstrous-Feminine, (London: Routledge 1993) and Kristeva, Powers of Horror, 1982. 
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I start from the Irigarayan idea that Western culture is founded upon the murder of the 
mother.6 While bold, this is a claim Irigaray supports by means of sophisticated 
analyses of psychoanalytic and philosophic discourses. By associating women with 
materiality, with the baseness of the body and the substance that must be controlled by 
the higher faculties of the (male) thinking subject, Irigaray shows that the subjectivity of 
the mother, and of all women through her, is obliterated. The natural conclusion of 
Descartes’ cogito is that matter is designed to be studied, understood, classified and 
dominated by reason; extrapolated to the male/female dichotomy, the mind/body divide 
becomes the blueprint for the organisation and functioning of Western civilisation.7  
As the foundation of Western culture is the sacrifice of the mother, her murder 
becomes apparent at all strata—including, as Irigaray shows, at linguistic level. Sexual 
difference, especially the polarisation of masculinity and femininity and their 
presentation as complementary yet different, is apparent in language. Irigaray engages 
extensively with the theories of Lacan, and argues against him, demonstrating the 
phallus is historically constructed. While Lacan presents the phallus as a master 
signifier of the Symbolic order, Irigaray sees it as an extension of Freud’s one-sex view 
of the world, reinforced in the Western imaginary through the discourse of 
psychoanalysis. The phallus and its connection with male anatomy becomes irrefutable 
evidence that the signifier can be traced back to the male imaginary, and it is both 
historical and in flux.  
The problem that arises with the exclusion of the mother from the formation of the 
psyche is profound: I suggest that, in theorizing the oedipal stage, Freud and Lacan 
opened the possibility of mapping recurrent patterns in social organizations that, 
precisely because of their recurrence, act as quasi-transcendental elements and 
appear unchanged throughout large periods of history.8 I hope to show that the oedipal 
stage does not reflect a mechanism of the psyche that must exist for human 
development to be possible, but rather a mechanism of society that must be imposed 
on the psyche for the preservation of society as we know it to be possible. I will aim to 
demonstrate that such a move is unilateral, as it rests on the Father as the sole 
structuring element of the psychic life of the subject; in this scenario, the mother is 
                                                          
6 For a detailed discussion of matricide as foundational for Western civilisation, see Jacobs, On Matricide, 2007 and 
Alison Stone, Feminism, psychoanalysis, and maternal subjectivity, (London: Routledge, 2012). 
7 Throughout this thesis, I will use the term ‘male’ to signify subject-positions, and ‘masculine’ to denote extensions of 
maleness; as I wish to avoid suggesting that similar subject-positions can be occupied by mimicry—that is, that 
alternative subjectivities can exist in the Symbolic if they seem masculine, I use ‘female’ and ‘feminine’ to signal 
biological and socially-imposed difference in modes of existence. 
8 Foucault shows that the life and thought of humans is shaped by elements that precede them: life, language and 
labour. These, he argues, are quasi-transcendental, as they must exist for subjects’ development to have continuity—
and it is in this sense that I use ‘quasi-transcendental’ in this thesis. Following the same idea, I argue that Freud’s 
theorisation of the oedipal complex has a similar quality: it identifies patterns that must appear or be imposed on the 
development of the psyche for it to evolve in an ideologically-determined way. Michel Foucault, The order of things: an 
archaeology of the human sciences, (London: Routledge, 1989, c1970). 
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entirely erased from the picture of the psyche, and consequently silenced.9 In the 
current socio-historical context, the effect of this erasure can only be neurosis, which 
leads to an irreparable clash between the two structuring elements, and to the creation 
of a ‘monstrous subject’. 
Feminist theory has a long history of identifying psychic excess at the core of the 
subject and areas of the psyche that are foreclosed by the dominant order and limit the 
expression of the mother/feminine psyche. My thesis follows a similar path, and aligns 
itself with the feminist tradition, as I aim to theorise the existence of an additional 
psychic element with ‘monstrous’ characteristics, which could reread conflicting drives, 
intra-subjective aggression and oscillation from a new perspective. Yet my thesis 
fundamentally differs from previous theories concerning the foreclosure of the mother 
through the structure it proposes for this psychic excess: drawing on the theories of 
Freud and Lacan, I interrogate the creation of psychic structures that lead to the 
formation of the ego, and, like feminists themselves, I argue that there is a residual 
element that is not assimilated by the phallic law. Unlike feminist theorists, however, I 
maintain this residue is a structured subject. 
The thought that subjectivity cannot be reduced to the male imaginary is not new, and 
feminism has elaborated at length on the nature of the excess that cannot be 
assimilated into the phallic, its impact on the psyche and the traces it leaves in the 
male imaginary.10 Indeed, feminist theorists have long identified the need to go beyond 
the oedipal and uncover forms of subjectivity that are not predicated on structuring 
elements that exclude the mother from the psychic space. Yet the transition to (an) 
alternative model(s) of subjectification is difficult in the existing theoretical framework, 
which considers any attempts to bypass the phallus necessarily fated to end in 
psychosis. The current language of psychoanalysis, particularly Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, condemns the non-phallic to a space of un-representation, where only 
madness is possible. Moving towards such a place is tantamount to entering a space of 
non-Being. If subjects are to exist, they must do so around the phallus or cease being 
                                                          
9 Throughout this thesis, when I refer to the Father in his structuring capacity, I spell it with a capital letter to differentiate 
from the mundane ‘father’ – for example, Cadmus as Agave’s father. At the same time, I refer to the everyday mother 
and to the structuring mother using the more generic ‘mother’ written in lowercase. I made this choice as I felt that 
capitalising the word ‘Mother’ when referring to her role in structuring the psychic life of the infant would imply she fulfils 
the same function as the Father – which I do not believe to be the case, for a variety of reasons I will explore. 
10 See Luce Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985); Creed, The Monstrous 
Feminine, 1993; Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror, 1982; Judith Butler, Gender trouble: feminism and the subversion of 
identity, (New York: Routledge, 1990); Juliet Mitchell, Psychoanalysis and feminism, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975); 
Karen Horney, Feminine psychology, (New York; London: Norton); Joan Copjec, "Vampires, Breast-Feeding, and 
Anxiety," October 58 (1991): 25-43; Elizabeth Grosz, Jacques Lacan: a feminist introduction, (London: Routledge, 
Taylor & Francis Group, 1990); Susan Lurie, “The Construction of the ‘Castrated woman’”, Psychoanalysis and Cinema 
in Discourse, (Vol.4; 1981); Herta Nagl-Docekal, Feminist philosophy, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2004); Jane Todd, 
"The Veiled Woman in Freud's 'Das Unheimliche’”, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, (Vol.12, Issue 3, 
1986; 519-28); Marcia Westkott, The Feminist Legacy of Karen Horney, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986) and 
so on.  
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subjects. To circumvent the totalising and universalising account of subjectification 
proposed by phallocentric theories, many feminist theorists have demonstrated the 
existence of residual femininity at the heart of the psyche symbolised into phallic 
norms, and have shown this excess continuously influences and destabilizes the male 
imaginary. Feminist theory has broadly posited femininity as subordinated to the male, 
as something that exists in respect of male identity and can only position itself with 
regard to existence from the viewpoint established by the male imaginary. This 
approach has allowed for the multifaceted aspects of being woman to emerge and be 
debated: for example (to name just a few), Butler has explored the problematic links 
between gender, power and minority categories, while Irigaray has exposed the 
difficulty with articulating feminine difference; de Beauvoir has thought feminism in 
existentialist terms, while Kristeva has redefined the identity position of women in the 
Symbolic order. These theories broadly work within the constraints imposed by the 
male imaginary, and as such do not posit feminine traces (traces of excess) within the 
male imaginary as subjects-proper. In this thesis, I aim to do the Irigarayan project and 
reconfigure subjectivity away from the imposed dualism of male/female binaries. I 
propose that the feminine excess at the heart of the psyche is, in fact, a pre-oedipal, 
non-Symbolised subject, that has the same capacities as a ‘traditional’ subject, but is 
not confined by the structures dictated and shaped by the male imaginary. I suggest 
that this residual element is a fully-formed transcendental ego, a self-aware entity 
capable of deep introspection, that is overwritten but not annihilated in the course of 
the oedipal phase and continues to exist beneath the constituted ego.11 I term this 
subject a non-Symbolic subject, to show that it12 does possess a transcendental ego 
and is a subject, but also that it has not been habituated into the norms that pertain to 
the phallic law, meaning that it is non-Symbolic, and therefore has different responses 
                                                          
11 I take the transcendental ego to refer to the self-aware subject, following Kant and Foucault. Kant defines the thinking 
subject as one that can unify representations under concepts through the faculty of understanding. As Stone explains, to 
be a Kantian subject means “not just to undergo experience but to author its meaning” and thus acknowledge yourself 
as a unitary agent that can simultaneously have knowledge and understanding. Stone, Feminism, Psychoanalysis and 
Maternal Subjectivity, 53. To Foucault, the ego exists initially in a period of reflexivity, in the sense that it is aware of its 
surroundings, of others and of its materiality. However, it is only with self-awareness, which marks the beginning of the 
process of subjectification, that the ego can make the transition from reflexivity to reflectivity. In this context, reflectivity 
denotes a state of being that pertains to subjects who can interrogate the conditions of their own existence, their 
finitude, and the limits of their knowledge. It is with the idea of the transcendental ego in mind that Kant argues human 
finitude is the basis of knowledge, and it is the same notion I employ when discussing the moment when the infant 
becomes a subject. See Foucault, The order of things, 1989; Michel Foucault, Introduction to Kant's Anthropology, (Los 
Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e), 2008); Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: beyond structuralism and 
hermeneutics, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983); Béatrice Han, Foucault's critical project, (Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 2002), and Béatrice Han, “Foucault and Heidegger on Kant and Finitude”, Foucault and 
Heidegger: Critical Encounters, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003).  
12 Due to the way I position myself in relation to the process of subjectification, I will refer to subjects that have resolved 
the oedipal stage (whether successfully or not) as ‘he’. When speaking of the non-Symbolic subject generally, I will refer 
to this subject as ‘it’, to show that it has not yet been inscribed in the Symbolic and does not belong to gendered 
binaries. Given the grammatical nature of their names, I will refer to male characters in the play (such as Dionysus) as 
‘he’, and to female characters (such as Agave and Kybele) as ‘she’, although, as I will show, the positions they occupy 
are not this straightforward. 
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to the taboos meant to protect the male imaginary.13 I propose that the existence of the 
non-Symbolic subject is the result of the primacy given to the father as possessor of 
the penis/phallus and the secondary function the mother occupies in the development 
of the psyche. Throughout this thesis, I undertake an analysis of the way the non-
Symbolic subject appears and develops in the absence of a normative phallic 
superego, and how its defining characteristics manifest under these circumstances.14  
 
Main theorists 
This research is conducted at the intersection between philosophy, psychoanalysis and 
myth. To undertake such an exploration, I refer to several psychoanalysts who 
theorised subjecthood, namely Jacques Lacan, Luce Irigaray and Melanie Klein, whose 
theories I use to argue that the psyche is organised around the Father and the mother 
as structuring elements. 15 
To flesh out the characteristics of the non-Symbolic subject, I turn to René Girard’s 
work on sacrificial violence, while to understand monstrosity and its place in the 
psychic organisation of the non-Symbolic subject, I work with an ancient Greek 
tragedy, The Bacchae.16 In working with a Greek tragedy, I do not analyse the text from 
a classicist’s perspective, but look for the way myth is absorbed into modern thought, 
and how its patterns of organisation, such as the opposition of apparently distinct 
elements, are passed on as law. I seek to trace the limits of binary pairs of opposites, 
such as male/female, human/non-human and humane/monstrous, and apply the 
Irigarayan methodology to this end. Using both a phenomenological framework and 
Hegelian dialectic, Irigaray demonstrated not only that the two apparently opposing 
sides of the binary are linked, but also that they depend on each other to exist. 
                                                          
13 In speaking of the ‘male imaginary’, I use Luce Irigaray’s definition in Speculum of the Other Woman and This Sex 
Which Is Not One. Irigaray uses the male imaginary to explain how women have not had access to their own 
subjectivity, and have instead been described through the prism of the male understanding. Thus, the male defines, 
and, as a result, has monopoly over all the universal elements of the Symbolic world, making the Symbolic itself 
dependent on the phallus and the male’s subjective understanding of male and female individualities. Irigaray, 
Speculum of the Other Woman, 1985 and This Sex Which Is Not One, 1985. 
14 In defining the subject as non-Symbolic, I refer to the same notion of the Symbolic that Lacan employs. Lacan, 
Seminar II, 1991. One of the most important traits of the non-Symbolic subject, in this context, will be its propensity for 
extreme acts of violence. In the absence of a phallic superego that channels the subject’s libidinal energy into outlets 
that are non-threatening to the male imaginary and the Symbolic organisation (See Freud, The Standard Edition, vol. 
IX/XIV, 1960), the non-Symbolic subject will necessarily be capable of manifesting its primary drives, and will be able to 
display pure, unprovoked violence. I analyse the makeup of the non-Symbolic subject and its propensity for violence in 
Chapter 2, using René Girard’s theories on sacrificial violence. René Girard, Violence and the Sacred, (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1979). 
15 By this, I refer particularly to Lacan, Écrits, 2006 and Melanie Klein, The Writings of Melanie Klein, Volume 1-4, 
(London: Hogarth Press, 1975). In speaking of the mother and the Father as structuring elements, I use André Green’s 
understanding of structuring elements, and how the structuring around the Father differs from that around the mother. 
André Green, On Private Madness, (Madison, CT.: International University Press, 1972). 
16 I conduct this research mindful of research in subjectification, such as the work of Foucault, Lacan, Butler, and 
Kristeva. In positing the existence of such a subject, however, I do not seek to ‘rectify’ a blind spot in feminist theory; I 
work in a contemporary framework and, starting from the idea that different forms of subjectivity are historical and 
depend on the subject’s lifeworld, argue that now is the time to reconfigure subjectivity and move beyond the oedipal. 
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Irigaray’s method is to seek the feminine voice, that which has been silenced, 
murdered and overwritten by the male imaginary, and uncover it. The Irigarayan 
project, in short, is to expose the feminine other and challenge the polarisation of 
masculinity and femininity, and in so doing reconfigure subjectivity and move away 
from the imposed dualism of male-dominated discourses.  
Irigaray is not the only theorist whose work I use to interrogate the problematic pairing 
of opposites. Judith Butler also pays close attention to duality and its role in delineating 
kin relations; I will discuss Butler’s reading of the role of kin relations in Greek tragedy 
and in The Bacchae, and will look at the place subjectivity occupies in the nexus of 
kinship. I will engage with subjectification primarily from a psychoanalytic perspective 
and will use the lens of psychoanalysis to understand how the concept of the self 
manifests and is understood today. As I will discuss later, I argue for the historical 
character of subjectification, and employ psychoanalysis as a meta-language that can 
capture historical shifts in the elements that constitute the lifeworld of the subject.  
In redefining subjectivity, one of the most difficult questions theorists face is that of 
origin: what is the origin of subjectivity and how can we start to isolate the moment a 
(human) entity becomes a subject? And more difficult still: in theorising subjectification 
and attempting to pinpoint the birth of the “I”, are we going back to a moment in psychic 
life, or to a moment in history?  
It is at this problematic juncture that I propose to situate my thesis. 
 
The gap in psychoanalytic theory 
Recent and traditional Freudian psychoanalytic theories accept that the child enters the 
world in a state of awareness, although they disagree on its extent. Modern theories of 
subjectification, such as those of Foucault, suggest infantile awareness is reflexive, not 
reflective. In his analysis of Kant’s transition from the Critique to the Anthropology, 
Foucault envisages the subject as a ‘double’, constantly trapped in a circularity 
between his transcendental and empirical ego.17 By this token, infantile awareness 
pertains to the Unthought, the stage prior to the development of the transcendental 
ego, and is thus unable to explore the Symbolic value of objects, despite (potentially) 
realising their inscription in a temporal, spatial and causal network.18 It is in this context 
                                                          
17 Foucault, The order of things, 1989; Foucault, Introduction to Kant's Anthropology, 2008. 
18 Drawing on the work of Martin Heidegger, Foucault defines the Unthought as “the implicit, the inactual, the 
sedimented, the non-effected—in every case, the inexhaustible double that presents itself to reflection as the blurred 
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that the child becomes self-aware: with the onset of the oedipal crisis, the child is faced 
with prohibition, suffering, and the realization of his self-limitation; this, according to 
Kristeva, propels the infant outside the realm of the abject and into sublimation.19 The 
child is no longer able to secure the full attention of the mother, and is denied the initial 
omnipotence enjoyed in the mother-child dyad. Moreover, the infant must share the 
attention of the mother with the father, whom he grows to hate. Although Freud does 
not address the incipience of self-awareness, recent theories, such as those formulated 
by Slavoj Žižek and Judith Butler regarding the constitution of the self correlate the 
incipience of reflectivity with the realisation of one’s dependence on intersubjectivity: 
the self becomes self-aware when faced with the intervention of the father as normative 
element—and the first encounter the infant has with this type of normativity is the 
oedipal prohibition.20 This prohibition makes the child experience suffering, which, in 
turn, forces him to become aware of himself as powerless and dependent on the 
mother. As a result, Freud argues, the child begins to desire the destruction of the 
father for the return to the initial omnipotence to be possible; yet the way the oedipal 
crisis is resolved is not through the destruction of the father and the possession of the 
mother, but through the internalization of the father as normative principle (Father) and 
the (almost complete) renunciation of the mother. According to a Lacanian reading of 
Freud, the internalization of the Father enables the formation of the (phallic) superego, 
in itself a normative principle that serves as supreme moral rule, and keeps the realm 
of the abject and psychosis at bay.21 Through the resolution of the oedipal crisis the 
child is forced to renounce the relation he has with the world before the internalisation 
of the Father, and replace it with one of limited agency, in which he can only constitute 
himself intersubjectively. This picture shows a (reflective) ego that originates as a 
‘growth’ on the pleasure relation the child has with the world in his omnipotent state, 
and a superego that appears superimposed on the ego, in a further parasitical relation. 
The superego is the constant reminder of the subject’s dependence on intersubjectivity 
and his impossibility to transgress the norms that constitute his lifeworld.  
Consequently, the balanced, normal self Freud envisages is the self that has overcome 
the oedipal crisis and can now position himself in relation to the world by making 
reference to the internalized father-figure.22 Yet I believe there is a very important stage 
of development present in this picture that is not sufficiently emphasized in the analysis 
                                                                                                                                                                          
projection of what man is in his truth, but that also plays the role of a preliminary ground upon which man must collect 
himself and recall himself in order to attain his truth.” Foucault, The Order of Things, 356. 
19 Kristeva, Powers of horror, 1982. 
20 Slavoj Žižek, The Plague of Fantasies, (London: Verso, 1997); Judith Butler, The Psychic Life of Power: Theories of 
Subjection, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997). 
21 Lacan, Écrits, 2006. The Lacanian picture does not allow much space to discuss the presence of the mother and its 
structuring quality.  
22 The Freudian picture is heavily criticized for its phallocentrism by writers such as Irigaray and Horney, among others. 
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of self-formation, namely the period between the onset of the oedipal crisis and its 
resolution: this period of a self-aware ego that nonetheless exists in isolation of phallic 
structures only occurs between the incipience of self-awareness and until the 
appearance of the superego, and, I would argue, represents the self unmediated by 
social normativity.23 It is this particular stage that prefigures the radical value of Freud’s 
oedipal theory. The genesis of self-awareness and the subsequent development of the 
normative self gain quasi-transcendental value: the type of normative rule that the child 
internalizes as the father-figure must necessarily be transmissible. The father-figure, as 
Irigaray argues, becomes not the actual father, but a transferable, unwritten rule that 
acts as the axis around which the development of the self revolves.24 In the course of 
the oedipal complex and its resolution, therefore, the self discloses and re-closes itself: 
it discloses itself by revealing the existence of the mechanisms that generate self-
awareness, and it re-closes itself by the resolution of the oedipal crisis, which forces 
the ego into an organisation that ‘castrates’ the subject’s drives by filtering them 
through the civilising lens of normativity, and tailors them to neutralise any danger to 
the male imaginary. Thus, the subject becomes a Symbolic subject. 
I argue that the non-Symbolic subject is not annihilated, but rather concealed by 
normativity and misrepresentation to the point of becoming unknowable. The existence 
of the non-Symbolic subject itself points to an underlying problem regarding the 
structuring elements of the psyche: the rejection and disavowal of the mother, and the 
act of stripping her of the power to structure the infant’s psyche give rise to conflict 
between the subject created by the mother, and that (re)created by the Father. Using 
Klein’s theory of subjectification, I aim to show that the type of subjectivity the infant 
possesses rests always already on its relation with the mother and the psychic 
structures developed under her influence. Thus, the non-Symbolic subject, I maintain, 
exists qua subject before the oedipal crisis. The internal conflict of the adult subject, the 
Hegelian struggle between social submission and omnipotence occurs against the 
backdrop of this intra-subjective tension, which stems from the unresolved clash 
between the two structuring elements of the psyche.25 
                                                          
23 If we understand the existence of the infant before it becomes self-aware as a negative type of Being (i.e.: animal 
reflexivity, or non-Being), we can describe the state of Being as a transcendental ego as a positive type of Being. (see 
Heidegger, Being and Time, (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1962).) It is on this state of Being that the 
superego is imposed, and from this state of Being that a Symbolic subject, congruent with normative laws, is moulded. 
The implication of this claim is that the process of subjectification is not a direct result of the resolution of the oedipal 
stage, but occurs before it. The resolution of the oedipal crisis serves to habituate the subject into the phallic law and 
does not play a part in subjectification. Of course, in making such a claim I do not refer to the oedipal crisis, or even to 
the paternal prohibition, as fixed moments in time, but as an evolving process, a tentative discovery by the child of what 
is permitted and what needs to remain taboo.  
24 Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, 1985. 
25 When I speak of the subject’s conflict between social submission and omnipotence I draw on Jessica Benjamin’s work 
on subjectification, and her understanding of the role of the Other in this process. See Jessica Benjamin, The bonds of 
love: psychoanalysis, feminism and the problem of domination, (London: Virago, 1990). 
15 
 
The gap in current psychoanalytic theory, therefore, rests in its failure to identify the 
need for the existence of a fully-formed, self-aware subject, whose expression is 
hindered by normativity and the phallic law, and theorise it to intervene in the 
psychoanalytic theoretical body. 
 
The main claim of this thesis 
In the (Lacanian) phallocentric theorisation of subjectivity, we begin to talk of a self-
sustained subject (i.e.: a non-psychotic one) after the resolution of the oedipal stage. 
Other thinkers, such as Kristeva, have theorised a psychic residue that exists outside 
the confines of Lacanian subjectivity, but have stopped short of calling it a subject.  
In this thesis, I look at this psychic residue and make a stronger claim: that self-
sustained subjectivity exists outside oedipal structures, and that the oedipal paradigm 
is not the only one we can employ when theorising subjectification. In other words, I 
propose to do the Irigarayan project, and create a space for redefining the subject in 
terms that go beyond the oedipal model, that propose an alternative to it, and that do 
so without jettisoning the mother outside the social space.  
In terms of methodology, I use a mimetic approach, which is close to the method 
Irigaray advances for uncovering the female other. To Irigaray, it is only through acts of 
(sometimes exaggerated) mimesis that the binary oppositions that are perpetuated by 
the male imaginary can be challenged and ultimately dismantled. It is only by taking 
entrenched perceptions to their extreme that the perception itself can prove untenable.  
To undertake such extreme mimesis, I look at an ancient Greek tragedy, Euripides’ The 
Bacchae, which I treat as the skeletal framework of Western culture, due to its extreme 
compartmentalisation of sexual difference, and the near-dogmatic approach to defining 
gender roles. I would go as far as to claim that the play is the Irigarayan project: the 
mimesis of societal patterns, particularly those concerning the place of women and the 
legitimacy of rulers, and the exaggeration of traditionally celebrated aspects of the 
subject, such as the independence from the mother, reveal the gaping hole left by the 
erasure of women, of female subjectivity, and of the role women play in shaping 
subjectivity.26 In the play, we see a series of mimetic acts that appear to fulfil deep-
rooted desires of the male imaginary, but end up distorting the Symbolic and 
jeopardising the male imaginary. In the play, the desire of the male subject to bear 
                                                          
26 For discussions of matricide in Western civilisation, see Christina Wieland, The undead mother, (London: Karnac, 
2002); Jacobs, On Matricide, 2007 and Stone, Feminism, psychoanalysis, and maternal subjectivity, 2012.  
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children and attain independence (and protection) from the mother’s threatening body 
becomes both an erasure of the mother and parthenogenesis (Zeus giving ‘birth’ to 
Dionysus). The trope of the irrational woman, ruled by baseness, who needs to be 
contained by men is also present: women in the play begin by acting their parts 
faithfully, and even the maddened Theban women are seen performing traditionally 
feminine activities, such as dancing. However, they soon take their baseness to the 
extreme, becoming frighteningly violent (the Theban women tear cattle apart with their 
bare hands) and savage (they suckle wolf cubs and revert to a pre-linguistic state), 
eventually becoming not only ungovernable by the civilising male subject, but 
anathema to his survival.  
Following Freud and Irigaray, I return to ancient tragedy and attempt to reread it in a 
contemporary context to find examples of the way the non-Symbolic functions. Freud’s 
predilection for substantiating his theories through literary works, particularly myth and 
tragedy, prefigures an important insight into the significance of literature in self-
constitution, and I turn to the image of monstrosity in Greek tragedy to interrogate the 
existence of a pre-normative ego. As Creed shows, the monster represents that which 
subtracts itself from the unifying activity of the lifeworld. The image of the non- or 
poorly-Symbolised subject shows the boundaries of identity becoming superfluous to 
the point of self-annihilation, making the monster, or the idea of an ego-without-
superego, simultaneously appalling and fascinating. It is the monster, or the non-
Symbolic subject, who can never subscribe to the same empirical determinants as 
other subjects, and, consequently, the one who needs to be exorcised for others to be 
able to re-claim intersubjectivity. The non-Symbolic subject becomes the embodiment 
of lack, which causes misrepresentation in self-constitution and the inherent need for 
return ad-originem.  
I analyse Euripides’ The Bacchae and the triangular oedipal structure present in this 
tragedy (Zeus/mother goddess/Dionysus),27 and use the figure of Dionysus as it 
emerges from this structure as the skeletal framework on which the characteristics of 
the non-Symbolic subject can be fleshed out. The reason for such a return is complex: 
firstly, returning to Greek tragedy allows us to interrogate the Symbolic and the male 
imaginary, as, according to Irigaray, it is through transferable structures displayed in 
myths and returning tragic tropes that the fabric of the Imaginary can be woven. This 
                                                          
27 This triangular structure is interesting, as it appears to follow both Freudian/Lacanian and Kleinian psychoanalytic 
theory: on the one hand, it presents the existence of an infant (Dionysus) in its relation to his father (Zeus), and the way 
the infant Dionysus relates to the Father as a normative element. On the other hand, it also depicts the relation 
Dionysus has with the absent mother, represented in this context by the mother of all gods (I refer throughout this thesis 
primarily to Kybele, as a non-European mother of all gods, although the figure may differ depending on translation), and 
the way the infant attempts to recapture the presence of the mother by returning to a pre-Symbolic organisation. The 
triangular structure is mirrored in the relation Dionysus has with Pentheus (the representative of the phallic law), Semele 
(his dead mother), and Agave (the embodiment of the devouring mother).  
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does not mean that every mythical theme has structuring power, but that the Symbolic 
order is based on conglomerates of symbols that the male imaginary incorporates and 
treats as law. This implies that the skeletal structure of the (Western) psyche exists at 
its purest in myths, which, in being, as Freud argued, equivalent to dreams display the 
vicissitudes of the subject and interrogate the human condition. 
Secondly, returning to Greek tragedy will allow for the identification of more pivotal 
elements that structure the psyche. Irigaray writes that “our imaginary still functions in 
accordance with the schema established through Greek mythologies and tragedies,” 
suggesting that the return to Greek tragedy constitutes a return to the basic elements 
of the psyche, and is the most suitable place for an enquiry of the kind I intend to 
undertake.28 Irigaray understands Ancient Greece to be the cradle of Western 
civilisation: as Stone explains, “the culture of ancient Greece has exerted a founding, 
decisive influence on…the West” and helped articulate “male phantasies about the 
hierarchical split between the mother and father” and embed these into the social 
(Symbolic) order.29 
Finally, Greek tragedy is remote from current morality. As Foucault argues, Greek 
thought pertains to another épistéme, which hinges on similar quasi-transcendental 
elements as our lifeworld, but is different in its organisation.30 For this reason, 
interrogating psychic structures through tragedy and myth should help avoid disguising 
taboos through language, while retaining the historicity of subjectivity. As I explore the 
figure of an element that functions as discordance in the midst of the Symbolic, I turn to 
Dionysus, the character capable of unprovoked, unmotivated violence.31 While modern 
texts do present violence similar to that in The Bacchae, it is vitiated by attempts to 
make it acceptable by providing a reason for its existence.32 Such a move impedes the 
text’s ability to represent the unfathomable, and moves unthinkable psychic structures 
within the limits of representations, effectively castrating them. As a result, the type of 
non-Symbolic subject that can exist in modern texts will come close to the Dionysian 
structure, but remain a weaker version of the latter. To exist within the limits of 
                                                          
28 Irigaray, Luce, and Margaret Whitford, The Irigaray Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 36. 
29 Stone, Feminism, Psychoanalysis and Maternal Subjectivity, 48. 
30 Foucault, The Order of Things, 1989. 
31 Dionysus arrives in Thebes to exact vengeance on the city for having found his mother’s tomb destroyed by lightning. 
It is also suggested that Dionysus seeks to prove that he is a god, punish the House of Cadmus for having slandered his 
mother, and recover his mother’s good name. Nonetheless, the ‘vengeance’ of Dionysus lacks a direct object: he 
plunges Thebes into chaos, drives its female inhabitants to madness, upturns the social order, and causes the 
beheading of Thebes’ leader, Pentheus, at the hands of Pentheus’ own mother, Agave. He invokes the rites of the 
mother goddess to set the tone for his orgiastic revelries, but as the play unfolds it seems he uses them as a pretext for 
uprooting Thebes and un-structuring its citizens. After having caused a surplus of libidinal energy, which culminates in 
murder and, arguably, cannibalism, Dionysus leaves.  
32 Horror discourse, in particular, appears keen to motivate violence. Violent acts become ‘acceptable’ because they are 
perpetrated by non-human monsters (as in the texts analysed by Creed, including Dracula, The Exorcist, Carrie, Alien or 
Psycho); because their perpetrators are numb or completely desensitized to human norms and morality (such as in 
Marquis De Sade’s texts, or, more recently, in Bret Easton Ellis’s American Psycho); or even because the perpetrators 
of violent acts resort to violence to reform society (such as in Chuck Palahniuk’s Fight Club). 
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representation, monsters moulded on the image of Dionysus will fall short of the 
monstrous potential exhibited by Dionysus himself. Dionysus fits the description of the 
non-Symbolic subject, in the sense that he exists concomitantly in the Symbolic and 
the Real, is structured by both a mother (Kybele) and a father (Zeus), is androgynous, 
and exposes the male imaginary by causing its collapse from within. Yet I do not 
suggest that returning to myth to examine subjectivity can reveal ahistorical 
characteristics of subjectivity itself; on the contrary, I follow modern writers and use 
myth precisely due to its fluidity and its ability to help name the elements that constitute 
the lifeworld of subjects at particular points in time.  
Western civilisations return time and again to Greek myth, with an interest that appears 
to endure throughout the ages. From Daniel Mendelsohn’s An Odyssey, A. S. Byatt’s 
Arachne, Derek Walcott’s The Odyssey and Donna Tartt’s The Secret History, to Judith 
Butler’s Antigone’s Claim and Nietzsche’s A Genealogy of Morals, to name only very 
few, Greek myth continues to shape and define Western thought. Yet rather than 
merely noting the manifold ways in which myth resurfaces in literary and academic 
writings, it is important to consider how contemporary retellings use myth to think 
through and reflect on pressing social issues. For example, in his new book, Mythos, 
Stephen Fry charts the history of Greek gods, from Kronos and Ouranos, to the age of 
humans and the gods’ interactions with them. Fry’s gods are vengeful and vain, but 
refreshingly vulnerable, while his goddesses are intelligent, complex and fiercely 
independent—closer, indeed, to today’s understanding of femininity.33 Fry’s rereading 
makes the gods relatable, and thus suitable for modern audiences, but also alters the 
‘traditional’ understanding of femininity and its relation to patriarchy. In Fry’s retelling, 
Metis is not a helpless victim of male power, but a wise goddess, who tricks Zeus into 
allowing her to reside inside him, retaining influence over him long after his erotic 
interests have waned. Metis becomes not the rape victim whose abuse forms the basis 
of patriarchy, but the civilising influence that channels Zeus’ base passions into more 
intellectual avenues, helping him become the unchallenged ruler of the gods.34 
Similarly, Marcus Stevens’ and Oran Eldor’s recent musical, Mythic, reinvents Greek 
myth for modern audiences to tell the story of teenage Persephone, her struggle to 
cope with her overbearing mother, and her forbidden romance with Hades.35 
Persephone breathes new life in a depressing Underworld, where she eventually 
chooses to stay part-time by deliberately eating six pomegranate seeds. Persephone is 
strong willed and independent, a far cry from Bernini’s Proserpina; she deftly 
                                                          
33 Fry, Mythos, (Penguin Books Ltd., 2017). 
34 Metis’ civilising influence is not dissimilar to that of other powerful female figures, such as Rhea, Demeter, Kybele or 
the Queen Bee, to which I will return in later chapters.   
35 Marcus Stevens and Oran Eldor, Mythic, (London: Charing Cross Theatre, 2018). 
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manipulates a Pantheon of petulant, self-absorbed gods, and empowers unassertive 
deities like Demeter and Aphrodite to challenge the status-quo and take over Olympus. 
Rather than being a constant that echoes unchanged throughout time, the way myth is 
borrowed and moulded in literature shows it evolves with society, acting as a thread 
that links past and present, shaping subjectivity by absorbing and reflecting historically-
specific aspects of the time to which the subjectivity in question belongs. The way we 
read myth today can reveal important insights into the status of representation and the 
place of the subject in society; it is in this use of myth that I am particularly interested, 
and I explore throughout this thesis. Rereading myth through a contemporary lens 
helps demonstrate the historical character of subjectivity and provides us with the tools 
to articulate that which evolves, the historicity of subjectivity itself. Freud used Oedipus 
to illustrate a specific facet of the process of subjectification, necessary for subjectivity 
to develop suitably for 19th and 20th century societies. Yet as feminists have relentlessly 
shown, the cultural picture has shifted, and Oedipus cannot singlehandedly elucidate 
the subtleties of subjects today.  
Rereading myth from a modern perspective provides new tools to express subjects’ 
difference, as it becomes manifest at specific points in time. If psychoanalysis is, as I 
will argue in this thesis, a meta-language that captures the historicity of subjecthood, 
then a rereading of myth through a modern lens can enrich the vocabulary of 
psychoanalysis to revive it for contemporary use. In this context, I use The Bacchae as 
a tool to go beyond Oedipus, to help expand the language of psychoanalysis and 
ultimately express subjectivity more faithfully. Although I use ancient tragedy and 
Greek myth, my thesis is not about history, but the present; it employs a modern 
reading of the Bacchae to analyse the way patriarchy structures subjectivity and uses 
psychoanalysis to articulate the threads that constitute the male imaginary now. Using 
a modern interpretation of an ancient text to discuss subjectivity structurally is a 
gesture towards myth’s ability to explain and occasionally create social boundaries and 
serves to reinforce the historical nature of subjectivity. 
My textual choice to expand the vocabulary of subjectivity is not accidental, as The 
Bacchae is highly relevant in the current socio-political context. The play depicts a 
society that struggles between religion and secularism, order and chaos, tradition and 
change, tyrants and the role of chance (or gods) in an unpredictable world. Read 
through the non-Symbolic subject, it becomes a story of female agency, and a tool 
through which the phallocentric oedipal paradigm is not supplanted but complemented 
by an alternative model of subjectification. Through my use of myth and ancient 
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tragedy, I orchestrate a timely intervention in the body of psychoanalytic theory to 
demonstrate that a model beyond the oedipal paradigm is necessary and attainable.  
Throughout this thesis, I situate all commentaries and interpretations in a contemporary 
framework. While I do not provide a historical account of the evolution of the notion of 
subjectivity, my reading of The Bacchae is rooted in history, much like subjectivity itself. 
My argument that we need to articulate a model that allows for new expressions of 
subjectivity is, itself, driven by the limitations of theories of subjectification that claim to 
be ahistorical, and inadvertently trap subjectivity in an overly prescriptive framework. 
Subjectivity is structured by patriarchy and dependent on the historical determinants of 
patriarchy itself; yet recent events, from contemporary rereadings of myth to the 
#MeToo movement, suggest patriarchal structures and the oedipal paradigm have 
become inadequate. While going beyond Oedipus may not be enough to undo 
patriarchy, it seems to be a step one must take in that direction.  
 
The new theoretical model: non-oedipal subjectivity and the divine feminine  
Throughout this thesis, I will argue not only that subjectivity is possible outside of the 
oedipal, but that The Bacchae offers us the space for thinking how alternative 
subjectivities can become manifest. Through the concept of the non-Symbolic subject 
and the return to the importance of the feminine in subjectification, I will seek to 
demonstrate the play opens a previously un-theorised space where subjectivity is 
possible. According to Irigaray, the exclusion of the feminine from cultural life, and 
especially from the process of subjectification, has hidden the fact that subjectivity itself 
is fluid and dependent on quasi-transcendental elements. Subjectivity, Irigaray argues, 
has evolved and changed over time, but male dominance has not; as a result, it will be 
impossible to move away from the logic of male dominance and allow subjectivity’s 
fluidity to become manifest until we learn to allow the female other to surface. To do so, 
Irigaray proposes to use mimesis to allow the silenced female other to challenge male 
authority and, implicitly, the strict male/female binary: by tracing the way the female 
body has been excluded and unpacking the logic of this exclusion, we can reveal the 
exclusion itself as unfounded and allow the female a voice. By allowing the opposing 
term of the binary to speak, we force a shift in the perception that created the 
opposition and reveal the terms to be equal.   
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In this thesis, I use the play to search for the Other, and force it to reveal itself through 
mimesis as the female other, hitherto censured.36 Through the concept of the non-
Symbolic subject, I seek to show that subjectivity is not only possible outside the 
oedipal paradigm, but that it can revolve around the female other as structuring 
element.37  
Yet my interest is not to (re)define the feminine. In This Sex Which Is Not One, Irigaray 
argues that redefining femininity would hinder the act of women redefining themselves. 
Instead, what she suggests is to allow a new definition of womanhood to emerge out of 
collective acts of mimetic engagement with old notions, defined by and through the 
prism of the male imaginary. It is for this reason that I treat the play as a mimetic act, 
one that allows for a redefinition of the place of femininity at the core of the process of 
subjectification. I argue that femininity can only redefine itself if we move away from 
understanding subjectification as necessarily tied to the oedipal structure—a form of 
subjectification, that is, which replicates maleness, only producing male subjects. The 
claim of my proposed theoretical model is that the subject can become a subject before 
undergoing the oedipal phase—a non-Symbolic subject, but a subject nonetheless. I 
am not, however, suggesting that the process of subjectification is phased (i.e.: first 
revolving around the mother, then around the Father). Rather, I am saying that 
sustainable subjecthood can exist outside this oedipal conceptualisation, and that it 
does not necessarily end in psychosis. 
                                                          
36 When I speak of ‘the Other’ I do so in a phenomenological sense, and use Sartre’s take on the topic. Awareness of 
‘the Other’ can be broadly defined as awareness of the existence of other conscious beings, other subjects. While the 
awareness can be linked to positive emotions, such as in some moments of recognition, it is more often associated with 
shame, with being somehow found out by another, as demonstrated in Sartre’s account of shame. Jean Paul Sartre, 
Being and nothingness: an essay on phenomenological ontology, (London: Routledge, 1989, c1958). It is important, for 
the purpose of this thesis, to retain the focus on otherness as being something that has the potential to disrupt the 
subject, especially when discussing ‘the feminine other’. There is significant tension between the second-hand status 
traditionally assigned to women and the experience of interacting with an Other, especially when the Other is female. 
Note that I spell ‘the Other’ in capitals, but refer to ‘the feminine other’ in lowercase. This is deliberate: Sartre capitalised 
‘the Other’, as did Lacan when speaking of ‘the big Other’ qua Symbolic order, which I take to mean that those 
individuals who are subjects within the Symbolic are ‘Other’. Yet, as I will discuss later, I follow Irigaray and argue that 
the subject position the Symbolic allows for can only ever be male, which is why speaking of ‘the female Other’ would 
falsely imply the type of otherness femininity manifests occupies a subject-position.   
37I am aware that modern Lacanian theory is turning towards the late Lacan’s work and his conception of a fluid oedipal 
stage. In Seminar XVII, Lacan signals a change in the status of the Oedipus complex, and suggests that the Name of 
the Father is only one mode of binding the subject to the Symbolic order, but that there can exist a plurality of other such 
modes. Indeed, it is based on this Seminar that Geneviève Morel proposes the existence of a ‘law of the mother’, and 
argues that “the sinthome…is capable of separating the child from the mother, possibly even without the father, and 
sometimes more effectively than him.” To Morel, ‘the law of the mother’ consists of a series of equivocations transmitted 
to the child through the mother’s language “at the youngest possible age”. Composed “of words bound up with pleasure 
and suffering, in short, with maternal jouissance”, the ‘law of the mother’ “remain[s] imprinted in the [child’s] 
unconscious, forming the basis of fantasies and symptoms.” Morel, The Law of the Mother, (London & New York: 
Routledge, 2019), 2-3. Morel discusses the manifold ways patients cope with the ‘law of the mother’, reconcile it with 
their everyday lives, and translate it into a sinthome that is compatible with the Symbolic. Morel’s work tests Lacan’s 
thought in clinical practice and, in charting the different ways her patients work through neurosis and psychosis, 
proposes seemingly viable alternatives to the Name of the Father. It appears to me, however, that the alternatives Morel 
discusses do not represent different forms of subjectivity that exist outside of Symbolic constraints, but rather forms of 
subjectivity that cannot (for whatever reason) internalise the Father and must find surrogate images in order to exist in 
the Symbolic ‘normally’. The distinction is important, as I am interested not in the ways in which subjects can cope with 
the enduring but damaging influence of the mother, but with instances where they are able to bypass the oedipal and 
become independent subjects with the help of a different structuring element – such as the mother. For this reason, I will 
not pursue the late Lacan’s work in this thesis, although, at structural level, it would be interesting to consider what a 
relaxation in oedipal constraints may reveal about the male imaginary and its position relative to the mother today. 
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As Stephen Frosh writes, Lacan understands the psychotic state of mind as “the 
refusal to enter into the symbolic order in which one becomes a cultural and linguistic 
subject.”38 In the absence of the internalised father-figure and the superego that comes 
with it, the subject can only become a psychotic one—for outside the Symbolic lies only 
psychosis. And yet, The Bacchae paints a different picture through mimesis of the 
trope of the maladjusted subject: Dionysus is initially presented as the subject without a 
father, the one with several mothers, who displays a kind of subjectivity that is 
threatening to the ‘normal’ one and does not appear to have internalised a father-
figure. As we see through repeated episodes of needless violence, Dionysus seems to 
be amoral, suggesting he bypassed the internalisation of the Father. Nonetheless, we 
also see Dionysus is capable of functioning in the Symbolic and move between 
registers without fearing the dissolution of the self. Towards the end of the play, 
Dionysus actually appears to remain one of the few characters still capable of 
distinguishing between the Real, the Imaginary and the Symbolic. In contrast, 
Pentheus, who functions throughout the play as a distilled version of the male 
imaginary and the quintessential male subject, incorporating to exaggeration the traits 
of the Apollonian ruler, and Agave, who represents rebellion that becomes caricature 
submission, remain those unable to delineate the boundaries of the Imaginary.39  
Female identity is one of the key aspects of the play, and an idea on which I focus in 
this thesis. Femininity, especially insofar as female agency is concerned, starts in the 
play with the divine feminine, which becomes manifest in various guises: through the 
figure of the absent mother-goddess,40 the uncommonly-subjectified Dionysus, and the 
decidedly divine yet altogether unusual pregnancy of Zeus.  
The divine feminine is a topic on which Irigaray elaborates, and which she sees as key 
in disrupting the role of religion in the definition of male identity. Irigaray follows 
Feuerbach in reading divinity as instrumental in organising both identity and culture, 
and interprets religion as bound with both culture and power. To allow for a re-
evaluation of the centrality of Cartesian dualism, which distributes power along gender 
lines, Irigaray suggests replacing the traditional transcendental God with a divinity that 
is both sensible and transcendental.41 In The Bacchae, we see the creation of such a 
divinity, who claims her non-dualism by, paradoxically, mimicking the dualist aspects of 
                                                          
38 Stephen Frosh, For and against psychoanalysis, (London: Routledge, 2006), 117. 
39 Pentheus and Agave are key characters, and I will argue they represent tropes, whose characteristics are 
exaggerated to the point of collapse. I return to both of them throughout this thesis.  
40 To illustrate the characteristics of the mother-goddess, I turn to the figure of Kybele, the Anatolian mother of all gods, 
as her exoticism highlights her difference more readily. The mother-goddess changes with translation, but her primary 
function remains unchanged. 
41 When speaking of identity and the creation of the ego-ideal in relation to God, I refer to the Christian God; however, I 
would argue the traits of the Christian God that are at the basis of this type of identification (punishing aspects 
underlined by omnipotence, omnipresence and omniscience) can also be found in Greek male (and, occasionally, 
female) gods and goddesses.  
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the ‘classic’ transcendental God: Kybele is human (she has an affair, suffers for her 
lover and acts out of passion), but is also transcendental, and mirrors aspects of male 
gods in both monotheistic and polytheistic cults. Kybele is a violent, punishing, 
demanding and jealous goddess, who nonetheless is mostly absent. Unlike the male 
(Christian) God, however, Kybele does not impose a hierarchical structure on the 
subject’s psyche, and does not become a feminine ego-ideal. To a great extent, Kybele 
is deeply engaged in the Irigarayan project, and a key player in mimicking the workings 
of the male imaginary to their collapse. As divinity plays a crucial role in defining the 
relation of the subject with his lifeworld, I will return to the problem of female divinity in 
a later chapter. 
The main argument of my thesis is that we can speak of subjectivity without having to 
inscribe it in the oedipal model. In Speculum of the Other Woman, Irigaray argues that 
theories of the subject have become intrinsically linked to being male. Not being male, 
in a way, equates to being a lesser subject (or, as Freud has argued, to having to work 
extra-hard to overcome your lack of a penis). In this thesis, I will show that it is possible 
to theorise subjectivity not necessarily outside of the masculine, but in such a way so 
as to allow for the expression of feminine subjectivity in addition to the expression of 
masculinity. I would like to emphasise, however, that I resist simply theorising 
femininity outside the masculine, as such a move would risk re-inscribing the single-
sidedness of subjectivity in a female-centric as opposed to a male-centric system, thus 
merely displacing the problem and coming nowhere near a new theoretical model.  
Irigaray questions the split between the knowing subject, the Kantian transcendental 
subject, and the object of knowledge, that which is put to the subject to be scrutinised 
and ‘taken in’ through understanding. In exerting his capacity for understanding, the 
thinking subject is synthesising the data he receives from his field of experience and 
holding it into a unified concept. Irigaray’s claim in relation to this (generally accepted) 
position of the thinking subject in philosophy is, however, that in exerting this critical 
difference, the subject is removing himself from the field of experience. Irigaray shows 
an interesting and complex shift in the relationship between the male subject and the 
surrounding world: on the one hand, all thinking subjects are male, and by virtue of 
being male, they possess a type of rationality that allows for a great degree of 
anthropocentrism, that is, a world view in which all objects are to be studied and 
understood by the rational (male) subject. And yet, the way such distance from the field 
of experience is imposed is through Cartesian dualism and through the positioning of 
the male I in a hierarchical relation with God and women, with desired pure rationality 
on the one hand, and inconvenient materiality on the other. In effect, the male subject 
becomes caught in a relationship of inferiority towards his ego ideal, one he 
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consistently seeks to surpass by distancing himself more and more from the field of 
experience; and yet, in so doing, he comes no closer to embodying the ego ideal, but 
cuts himself off "from his empirical relationship with the matrix…he claims to survey".42  
The Bacchae presents an alternative model, in which the thinking subject can still exist, 
but not by virtue of the same mechanisms that led to the creation of the ‘traditional’ 
male subject. The claim here is that the play can produce a model that will help us go 
beyond the traditional Kantian (and oedipal) paradigm(s) and move towards an 
alternative model of psychic functioning that allows female subjectivity to manifest 
itself, in addition to, or alongside male subjectivity. The claim is not that subjects have a 
choice, that they can follow either Oedipus or Dionysus in their road to subjecthood; 
rather, the thought is that theorising subjectification from the perspective of the oedipal 
model only allows a glimpse into the richness of subjectivity and reduces the argument 
to male subjectivity alone. Tragedy, and Greek tragic myths, show us the male lens 
may be too focused to allow for a sophisticated understanding of subjects, of what it is 
that constitutes their subjectivity, and the space in which this subjectivity is allowed to 
exist. The Bacchae, like many ancient tragedies, depicts a space in which this single-
sided view of subjectivity proves inadequate. Tragedy is not the space for self-
expansion, of broadening of horizons through introspection and self-knowledge, but the 
space for suffering, death and endless sorrow; yet we can use tragedies to think 
through the types of spaces that can hold such suffering at bay and expand the 
subjects’ fields of experience enough to allow for the understanding and theorisation of 
other subjectivities.  
Irigaray sees such a model as crucial if feminine subjectivity is ever to express itself; 
she proposes some non-prescriptive methods through which feminine subjectivity can 
escape the male paradigm, amongst which is the idea of a female divinity, on which I 
briefly touched in this introduction. My claim is that The Bacchae provides us with the 
model Irigaray seeks: a skeletal framework of subjectivity not founded on the phallic 
paradigm, expressed through the figure of Dionysus. However, I do not wish simply to 
claim that the model that goes beyond the oedipal configuration accidentally arises in 
The Bacchae; rather than suggesting the model Irigaray discusses is a fluke, I propose 
this structure already exists in current subjects’ psychic configuration.  
Throughout this thesis, I will claim: 
● that the infant becomes a subject before the oedipal stage, and its subjectivity is 
not dependent on internalising the Father; 
                                                          
42 Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, 134. 
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● that we can speak before the oedipal stage of a fully-formed subject that is not 
psychotic; and 
● that proof for this subject’s existence is the possibility of existing in the Symbolic 
in ways that defy the Symbolic order and that, most importantly, can destabilise 
it. Following Irigaray, I wish to show that the fact that a secondary order can 
destabilise a primary one shows the secondary order can exist independently. 
In other words, by virtue of being deemed impossible, psychotic, abject, other 
by the male imaginary, the female imaginary becomes not-that: not impossible, 
not psychotic, not abject.  
 
I will argue that the whole play can be read as an act of mimesis of the male imaginary, 
which serves to show the possibility for existence of an alternative, female way of 
structuring the subject. My argument is that this is possible by virtue of the subject not 
being conditioned to be male, but rather containing a plurality of subjectivities. While 
the oedipal (male) paradigm is one route the developmental process can take, there 
are others, to be explored and theorised. I follow the play’s structure and interpret it as 
a mimetic act of the male imaginary, highlighting its inconsistencies to show where it 
differs from the object it mimics and where it starts to become a structure of its own. 
I employ the psychoanalytic discourse as a methodological tool that aids the mimetic 
process, as, in Irigaray’s view, psychoanalysis is an extension of the paradigm of the 
transcendental subject, who wishes to filter reality through understanding. This way, I 
explore The Bacchae and imitate the process of becoming the play espouses to the 
point that the imitated object unravels and the imitator’s difference is exposed. 
The theoretical model I envision serves a dual purpose: on the one hand, through the 
theorisation of the non-Symbolic subject, it provides a new lens to examine and expand 
the body of psychoanalytic theory by creating a new term to inform the discussion 
around subjectification. I hope that, through theorising an additional psychic structure, I 
may be able to explain the reasons behind the tension that arises from the clash 
between the mother and the Father as structuring elements, and interrogate their 
impact on the psyche. To further this intervention into psychoanalysis, I analyse the 
notion of monstrosity and set it in both phallic and maternal contexts to map their 
common elements, and the discrepancies between the two theoretical frameworks. 
Such an analysis can encourage further inquiry into the creation of intra-subjective 
monstrosity and the mechanisms that drive it. As I will show in later chapters, I use 
psychoanalysis as a linguistic framework, and through this thesis I hope to contribute a 
new term to an already established linguistic body. 
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On the other hand, the idea of the non-Symbolic subject can serve as a tool to re-read 
literary texts and unearth new meanings. In exploring the rift between the mother and 
Father through the prism of the non-Symbolic subject, we can argue that the clash 
between the two becomes manifest as intra-subjective tension, directed at the threads 
that hold the two structural spheres separate but linked.  
If I am correct, such a structure could exist in every contemporary subject failed by the 
oedipal paradigm and would become manifest as a drive towards un-structuring the 
(phallic) Symbolic, whose constraints are too extreme to contain the psyche 
indefinitely.43 In literary and artistic texts, the non-Symbolic subject would appear as a 
threat to the boundaries of subjectivity and selfhood.  
Ultimately, I propose a theoretical-conceptual approach to examine the contemporary 
critical framework, and provide an alternative to the question of self-constitution and the 
role of the phallus in this process. 
 
Chapter structure 
Chapter 1 
 
I will begin by tracing the evolution of the status of representation and the way the 
subject positions himself in history, and will argue subjects established themselves as 
objects of their own knowledge. In getting to know themselves, subjects deploy a 
complicated and ever-morphing critical tool—language—through which they carve out 
a totalising account of what it means to become a human subject; yet they universalise 
historical occurrences and allow only one subject-position to be representable. 
Chapter 2 
 
I will move from the problem of the historicity of subjectivity to the moment when 
subjecthood becomes confused and violent, and the remedies available to restore 
peace. Using Girard’s understanding of sacrifice, I will flesh out the characteristics of 
the non-Symbolic subject, an un-theorised form of subjectivity that precedes the 
oedipal. I will argue that, in The Bacchae, the role of the non-Symbolic subject is 
occupied by Dionysus, and that the construct can help us explore the process of 
subjectification and the left-behind subject.  
                                                          
43 With this idea, I am veering close to Laplanche’s notion of a process of ’unbinding’ that which has been ‘bound’ by the 
ego with the help of Symbolic constraints. Nonetheless, my idea differs from Laplanche’s in that it argues for the 
existence of an actual subject, a (hidden) transcendental ego, as opposed to a drive that facilitates the process of 
unbinding. Jean Laplanche, Essays on Otherness, (London: Routledge, 1998). 
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Chapter 3 
 
The problem of subjectification and of the structuring of the subject is difficult, and I will 
explore the place of the mother in the psychic life of the infant. Although the mother is 
theorised out of the Symbolic, I will argue that it is possible to theorise a new form of 
subjectification when operating with a particular understanding of structure, one that 
draws on both Kleinian and Lacanian thought.  
Chapter 4 
 
Mothers and women occupy complicated positions in The Bacchae; in this chapter, I 
will argue that the complex nature of the relationships between women, men and 
divinity makes binaries in the play untenable. I will show that the mother plays a crucial 
part in the play, revealed through her absence, and that she has structuring capacity.  
Chapter 5 
 
In my final chapter, I will interrogate the conditions that made possible the exclusion of 
the mother from the space of representation, and suggest her figure has been 
repressed by the male imaginary. I will argue that the non-Symbolic subject enables 
the repressed figure of the mother to be identified and attacked, thus opening the 
space from which a more flexible understanding of subjectification can emerge.  
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Chapter 1 
Methodological considerations: 
psychoanalysis, philosophy and myth 
 
In this chapter I will look at the structures that constitute the subject’s psychic makeup, 
and specifically at the moments in the subject’s psychic life that make it possible for the 
individual to become a transcendental subject. My main interest is to undertake the 
Irigarayan project, and I engage with the three discourses she identified as 
instrumental in the creation and perpetuation of the male-dominated Symbolic: 
psychoanalysis, philosophy and myth.44 
 
Psychoanalysis  
I start to explore the processes that culminate in the emergence of subjectivity by 
looking at psychoanalysis, whose main theoretical contribution is the universalisation of 
the forces that produce social subjects. As a discipline, psychoanalysis can capture 
changes in the psychic makeup of subjects due to its ability to function as a meta-
language and trace behavioural patterns that are then elevated to the status of quasi-
transcendental elements. The way these are imposed on the psyche in specific socio-
historical contexts dictates the range of subjectivities that are possible at a given time 
in history. It is the identification of these patterns, I would argue, that was 
psychoanalysis’ significant contribution to deciphering the psyche, and their naming 
that contributed to the (false) universalisation of the discourse of subjectification. I 
propose to bring Freudian and Lacanian theories together into a narrative of psychic 
development, and subject these to an Irigarayan lens to expose their historicity and 
complicity to propping up the male imaginary. 
 
                                                          
44 When I speak of psychoanalysis, I mostly refer to Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis and these strands’ take on 
subjectivity; by philosophy, I mean specifically the Kantian approach to subjectification and the way it has been 
interpreted phenomenologically, primarily by Foucault and Heidegger; finally, I make use of some Greek myths that 
concern mothers, mother goddesses and the civilising influence of (godlike) females and situate these in the wider 
context of The Baccahe.  
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Philosophy 
In addition to looking at psychoanalysis, I will also introduce philosophical discourse 
into the picture of the psyche—in particular, Kantian philosophy and the later strands of 
structuralism and phenomenology that help unpick some of Kant’s radical, yet 
fundamentally gendered claims. Eminently a discourse of male dominance, philosophy 
is similar to psychoanalysis, in the sense that it maps recurrent patterns of thought to 
distil transcendental elements, which can then function as meta-rules for the 
organisation of the subject’s Being-in-the-World.45 Nonetheless, in identifying set 
patterns, philosophy appears more attuned to the fragility of cultural fashions; for this 
reason, any recurrences can be regarded as quasi-transcendental at best and the 
organisation of the psyche as a social construction, not a given that remains 
unchanged through time. In other words, philosophy is well suited to de-universalise 
psychoanalysis’ universal claims. 
If psychoanalysis is instrumental in naming the elements of the psyche and provides 
the meta-language to manipulate these elements into a ‘cohesive’ picture of it, 
philosophy proves equally instrumental in tempering psychoanalysis’ radical claims by 
helping integrate it in a social system that is susceptible to change. Philosophy 
provides the framework to account for changes in ideology, and the impact these may 
have on psychic organisations, the process of subjectification, and the underlying 
structure of the subject himself. Throughout this work, I will refer to the work of 
Foucault and the way his understanding of the quasi-transcendental elements of a 
subject’s life (life, language and labour) shape the reading of subjectification from a 
psychoanalytic viewpoint.  
 
Myth 
Finally, I will also engage with myth through ancient Greek tragedy. Myth will add a 
third, more palpable dimension to this work, and provide a narrative of the working of 
the psyche that will highlight the theoretical framework. This is not to say that myth or 
literary works that employ myth are used as case studies, but that through myth one 
can more readily understand the structure of what Foucault terms ‘life’, and what 
Dreyfus and Rabinow term the “social aspect of the subject.”46 Like philosophy and 
psychoanalysis, myth can identify patterns; however, unlike the first two, it identifies 
repetitions or breaks in language (Foucault’s quasi-transcendental element that refers 
                                                          
45 See Heidegger, Being and Time, 1962. 
46 Dreyfus and Rabinow, Michel Foucault: beyond structuralism and hermeneutics, 17. 
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to the reservoir of shared meanings among subjects), and signals the shortcomings, 
tensions, and silences in the current ideological system. Most importantly, by helping 
interrogate ideology, myth can identify its breaking point, raising one’s consciousness 
about changes in thought systems, and, implicitly, in psychic organisations.  
I will attempt to show how these discourses paint a cohesive picture of the subject 
(which they also disrupt irremediably), and how their overlaps reveal the existence of 
an un-theorised space where we can locate a differently structured form of 
subjectivity—one dissimilar to the Lacanian Symbolic subjectivity, but functional and 
self-sustained.  
 
Allowing the psyche to speak—Freud, Lacan and the unconscious 
The problem with mind dualism  
Freud’s clinical studies led him to assert that the gaps and inconsistencies in conscious 
data and subjects’ inability to account for a significant proportion of their actions were 
reason enough to consider consciousness unable to encompass the entirety of mental 
life. Freud brought forward the existence of an unconscious dimension of mental 
processes.47 Yet in elaborating a theory of the unconscious, Freud also created a new 
model of the mind: structurally, he divided mental activity between three systems: the 
unconscious, the preconscious and the conscious (Ucs, Pcs, and Cs). Broadly 
speaking, the unconscious stores most primary processes, and in being a reservoir for 
repressed wishes, it acts as the link between infancy and adult life, thus exerting 
permanent influence over one’s conscious mental life and behaviour.48 To expand his 
theory of the unconscious, Freud drew on the thoughts of Aristotle, Locke and Kant. He 
remained faithful to his predecessors’ distinction between thought and sense and 
introduced a striking dichotomy between the conscious and the unconscious as parts of 
the mind responsible for sensation and thought, which in turn gave rise to problematic 
discussions of dualism. 
The unconscious/conscious binary mirrors the intellectual/material binary that Irigaray 
argues constitutes the foundation of the male imaginary. The language of 
                                                          
47 Freud’s reasons for positing the existence of something that transcended consciousness, however, were not reduced 
to the existence of occurrences that are temporarily forgotten; Freud saw the unconscious as a medical innovation 
capable to account for the shortcomings of neurological explanations, which failed to provide causal explanations for 
conscious mental processes. 
48 As Freud stresses in his second topography, secondary processes can also be unconscious. However, these are 
“redirections of the primary processes.” Alasdair MacIntyre, The unconscious: a conceptual analysis, (London: 
Routledge & K. Paul, 1958), 30. Not all that is unconscious is a reservoir of repressed memories: Freud agrees there is 
content in the unconscious that was never repressed; however, as far as unconscious wishes are concerned, these are 
primary processes that have been repressed as dictated by secondary processes. 
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psychoanalysis generates structures rooted in phallocentrism, and can only be 
navigated from within the psychoanalytic discourse/male imaginary. In making the 
unconscious conscious and bringing unarticulated drives into the space of language 
and logic, Freud transferred the unconscious into the male imaginary, thus (perhaps 
unwittingly) eliminating the possibility for femininity to become manifest in the social 
sphere. The discourse of psychoanalysis employed philosophy to this end, and made 
use of texts that were instrumental in laying the foundations of dualism, thus reinforcing 
the structuring role of the male imaginary. Kant, Descartes and Aristotle, along with 
other philosophical figures, were key in institutionalising the primacy of the phallus, in 
the sense that their philosophy advocated for dualism, and for the triangular relation of 
the male ego with his ego ideal (God) and inferior point of reference (woman) that 
Irigaray critiques.  
The unconscious becomes particularly problematic when inscribed in the 
conscious/unconscious dichotomy and understood as an entity of its own. Philosophers 
such as Jonathan Lear and İlham Dilman support viewing the mind as a whole, in 
which the conscious and the unconscious coexist in a permanent, dynamic relation. 
This view is not without its merits: in the preface to Freud’s paper on the unconscious, 
it is noted that the German words for ‘conscious’ and ‘unconscious’ have passive 
connotations, suggesting that the unconscious should not be regarded as an 
independent entity, but part of the mental system.49  
A monadic understanding of the mind pushes one towards regarding the unconscious 
as a language of psychic organisation that places hidden thoughts at its centre. Freud 
himself considered the unconscious to be a reservoir for thing-presentations, while the 
conscious system was one for word-presentation. In perception, both thing-
presentations and word-presentations are registered simultaneously, each by its 
corresponding system, and hypercathected. It is when the process of hypercathexis is 
hindered, Freud argues, that thing-presentations are stored in the unconscious and 
repression ensues. However, Freud also argues that there is a certain amount of 
sense-data present at the level of thing-presentations and word-presentations alike, 
suggesting there is common ground between word- and thing-presentations, and that it 
is on the basis of this common ground that thought-processes pass into the conscious 
system. The play between the idea of common ground and the sliding of thing- and 
                                                          
49 “The German words ‘bewusst’ and ‘unbewusst’ have the grammatical form of passive participles, and their usual 
sense is something like ‘consciously known’ and ‘not consciously known’. The English ‘conscious’, though it can be 
used in the same way, is also used, and perhaps more commonly, in an active sense: ‘he was conscious of the sound’ 
and ‘he lay there unconscious’. The German terms do not often have this active meaning, and it is important to bear in 
mind that ‘conscious’ is in general to be understood in a passive sense in what follows. The German word 
‘Bewusstsein’, on the other hand (which is here translated ‘consciousness’), does have an active sense.” – Freud, The 
Standard Edition, 1960:XIV:164. 
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word- presentations over each other and over the common ground in the creation of 
meaning is very Lacanian in nature, which could suggest that the Lacanian 
interpretation of the unconscious as hinging on linguistics may prove more conflict-free. 
 
Moving on to understanding psychoanalysis as a language 
Psychoanalysis has become in the past century a fragmented discipline—countless 
branches have emerged, each drifting further away from the original Freudian position. 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, as much as Lacan might have rejected the categorization, 
appears to follow the same lines, as it re-reads Freudian concepts to the point of 
altering them completely. Nonetheless, Lacan considered his work to be a return to 
Freud and the first accurate reading of psychoanalysis. Yet his linguistic 
reinterpretation of the Freudian unconscious and his psychoanalytic reading of 
linguistics seem attempts to refashion an entity driven by instinctual drives into one 
shaped by language. Lacan argues the mechanisms through which ideation is possible 
are (almost) identical to symbol-formation in language, thus enabling symptoms to 
surface in the Cs by means of language, and be pinpointed linguistically. Lacan’s 
linguistic take on Freud explains how subjectification is precipitated in the not-yet-
subject, bypassing the problems traditional psychoanalysis encounters, the coming to 
life of the subject. Freud was unable to identify an actual moment when the infant 
becomes a subject and considered subjectification to occur with the resolution of the 
oedipal crisis, when the infant is habituated into norms through the assimilation of the 
paternal figure. The Lacanian reading follows a similar path, but treats the subject as a 
conglomerate of linguistic entities. While the coherence of the Freudian picture is 
difficult to maintain due to the unsatisfactory explanations that surround the different 
processes that occur in boys and girls in the oedipal stage, Lacan’s translation of 
subjectification in linguistic terms seemingly avoids the gender-bias inherent in the 
Freudian account and supports a stronger universal claim. 
In the early Freudian model of the unconscious, sensorial impingements must go 
through a series of stages to be consciously registered, namely to be perceived by 
sense organs, filtered through a series of mnemic systems, which act in a cross-
referencing fashion, and translated into psychic terms. If the sensorial 
impingement/psychic impulse is not repressed by the censor, it passes into the Pcs 
and the Cs respectively; however, if repressed, the impulse is denied passage into the 
Pcs and Cs, and can either briefly surface with the relaxation of the censor (in dreams), 
or sublimate, as apparently unconnected compulsions, fixations and obsessions. The 
seeming incompatibility between the physicality of the Freudian system and the way in 
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which energetic inputs are translated into linguistically-inscribable entities, such as 
dreams, jokes or parapraxes, makes Lacan’s approach to unconscious processes, 
particularly his appropriation of linguistics, appear a legitimate attempt to correct a 
slippage in Freud’s thinking. 
Freud’s account of thought-formation, however, is where the similarity between him 
and Lacan is evident: to Freud, thing-presentations and word-presentations are 
registered simultaneously in perception and hypercathected. It is when the process of 
hypercathexis is hindered that thing-presentations are stored in the unconscious and 
repression ensues. Freud argues that thing-presentations and word-presentations 
share a common amount of sensorial data, which suggests that it is based on this 
correspondence that psychic energy can breach the censor and enter consciousness. 
This model is similar to the signifier/signified correspondence, particularly in terms of 
separating the two categories into word- and thing- presentations; Freud apparently 
argues for regarding the unconscious as structured like a language, dispelling the 
difficulty posed by the topographic model of the mind. If we accept this hypothesis, then 
the Lacanian move to use Saussurean linguistics to decipher the workings of the 
unconscious is legitimate, although in his transition an interesting inversion occurs: in 
the Lacanian reading, it is word-presentations, not thing-presentations, that are stored 
in the unconscious. 
Lacan’s description of the unconscious and of the passage of thoughts from one 
system to another is identical to Freud’s, with two major differences: firstly, Freud 
oscillated between linguistic and physical systems without explaining the mechanisms 
by which the transition is made, while Lacan remains in a linguistic system that allows 
for the materiality of the letter, a concept which proves essential to his project; and 
secondly, different types of presentations are now stored in the unconscious. Lacan 
focuses almost exclusively on dreams and regards them as capable of providing 
access to the unconscious and the apparatus through which primary and secondary 
repressions ensue. The insistence on dreams is an indication of the primacy of 
language: to Freud, dreams create connections in the same way language does, by 
using dream elements like words; dreams, to Lacan, do not mimic reality, but articulate 
it. They do not show a picture of the repressed content, but encode it, using linguistic 
methods to connect its elements; the language-like quality of dreams is achieved by 
means of subtle intensities within the dream, such as recurring patterns, dream 
sequences or over-emphasized elements—through condensation and displacement. 
Nonetheless, dreams do not tell the story of an unconscious wish; dreams, formed 
around oedipal and pre-oedipal fixations, represent an individualized way of building on 
and around the oedipal crisis, creating an intricate nexus of wishes. Through dreams, a 
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narrative of a conglomerate of wishes emerges, the result of successive processes of 
displacement, condensation and overlapping of impulses that make them non-
threatening to the conscious mind. As Lacan explains, the interpretation of the manifest 
content of the dream does not reveal a clear wish structure, but a nexus of terms that 
contain different manifestations of a primal wish or its ramifications. Being regulated by 
the rules of logic to a lesser extent than waking life, the dream displays flexibility in the 
directionality of letters, or signifiers, and the work of the analyst is to decipher the 
dreams of the analysand to the letter. As a result, the unconscious is not ordered 
linguistically in the sense that it follows grammatical rules; the unconscious does not 
function like propositional content, but is driven by the internal logic that leads to the 
creation of a context of signification for a particular (repressed) wish. This is an 
important clarification Lacan makes, necessary for his project of putting the 
unconscious into a linguistic framework.50  
I would like to make two points regarding Lacan’s interpretation of Freudian theories:  
● Firstly, that through the translation of theories into linguistic terms, Lacan 
achieves an almost complete shift in focus in what concerns the unconscious. If 
earlier theories allowed for some degree of flexibility in thought formation and 
invited a monadic interpretation of the unconscious, Lacan takes this monadic 
view to the extreme. The linguistic reading of the unconscious denies the 
possibility of non-phallic intrusions in the unconscious. The materiality of 
thought is translated into a male system (language), and filtered through its 
prism to the point that binary descriptions become almost impossible. In the 
linguistic translation proposed by Lacan, an opposition such as 
conscious/unconscious, taken to equal rational/sensorial or even 
masculine/feminine becomes nonsensical. The materiality of the subject, of the 
unconscious and of thought itself is translated into male terms, nullifying the 
binary and expulsing materiality, and with it, the female voice, from the system 
in which subjectivity is possible. The feminine is allowed back into the Lacanian 
                                                          
50 To Lacan, the dream displays the same mechanics as language, and its primary processes, condensation and 
displacement, are reinterpreted as metaphor and metonymy. This, as Fink shows, is something analysts have failed to 
grasp, and have instead attempted to reconstruct a narrative in dreams, as opposed to deciphering the signification of 
dream-play, of the latching of signifiers onto signifieds. Fink, Lacan to the letter, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2004). This is not to say that there is no narrative structure in the play that takes place in the dream; on the 
contrary, the narrative structure must be there for the dream to be comprehensible. However, this does not mean that it 
is the dream that has the narrative structure generally ascribed to propositional content, but that the dream-play must be 
ascribed this structure in waking life to be able to make sense of it. I use ‘narrative’, therefore, in the same sense as 
Lyotard, as a series of patterns of thought necessarily arranged in a logical, time-sensitive order that 
communities/groups of subjects use to create a reservoir of shared meanings. Lyotard is concerned with the temporal 
sequence of narratives and meta-narratives, and argues that it is only in its presence that ‘shared meanings’ can 
become ‘knowledge’; when the temporal sequence is removed, what one has is but an occurrence, a temporal 
singularity that Lyotard translates as the Sublime. Lyotard’s reading is close to Foucault’s, in the sense that these 
conglomerates of shared meanings can be seen as quasi-transcendental elements, arranged on a temporal scale 
retrospectively. Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), 
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system through jouissance and discussions of the Real, that is, through 
elements that find an ill fit in the Symbolic. This point is particularly relevant 
when employing psychoanalysis to unearth the female voice: having made itself 
alien to female subjectivity and the materiality of its body, psychoanalysis will 
not be able to give females a voice, which will then necessarily become visible 
as silences, omissions and pauses that invite closer scrutiny.  
● Secondly, that the confines of subjectivity are arbitrary and culturally-
constructed. The Lacanian exercise shows that culture, and the primacy of the 
phallus, have been translated into the language of the unconscious and instilled 
in subjects: subjectivity is, as Irigaray demonstrated, not ahistorical, but 
ahistoricised. Lacan also makes the process of subjectification dependent on 
literalization: becoming a subject is only possible once all traces of femininity 
have been eliminated, and the male imaginary allows the subject to enter the 
Symbolic only once female subjectivity has been contained. The idea that 
psychoanalysis captures the working of the male imaginary and replicates the 
dominant discourse is important: it means the psychoanalytic discourse, for 
example, the one elaborated by Freud then Lacan, becomes the ‘voice’ of the 
male imaginary and only speaks for male subjects. As my argument will be that 
we can speak of subjects that can exist outside the confines of the space 
delineated by Lacan, it is essential to differentiate between the subject in 
Lacanian theory (always male), and other types of subjects. In this chapter, I 
am looking at the process of subjectification in Lacanian theory to illustrate the 
context in which I plan to argue for the existence of a space where different 
subjectivities can emerge. Outlining the space of psychoanalysis as 
fundamentally male is the first step in identifying the circumstances that must 
change for alternative subjectivities to exist. 
 
From field of study to discourse of the self: the hold of Lacanian psychoanalysis 
One of the first steps Lacan takes towards shifting the focus of the unconscious from 
archaic drive to linguistic construction is to literalize the subject; yet to resist 
transferring the problem from one register to another, Lacan also materializes the 
letter. As Fink writes, Lacan’s main thesis in The Instance of the Letter in the 
Unconscious “is that the Unconscious is not merely the seat of the instincts or 
drives…[but] of…the whole structure of language.”51 The Lacanian unconscious 
captures the complexity of the Freudian unconscious without the risk of being conflated 
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with the id and reduced to a (neo-romanticist) notion of irrational depths of the psyche; 
it becomes the discourse of the Other, modelled on the desire or lack instilled in the 
subject by the presence of the Other. Yet the Lacanian unconscious also inscribes the 
Other into a discourse that is created and manipulated by a male subject. The 
unconscious is a necessary formation that permits repression and inscription into a 
certain social order. To argue such a point successfully, Lacan first shows how the 
subject is dependent on language by literalizing him.  
The literalization of the subject, Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe explain, is achieved by 
introducing the concept of the letter, which “designates the structure of language 
insofar as the subject is implicated therein.”52 The Lacanian ‘language’ refers to a 
system that precedes the subject, existing always-already before the subject’s entry in 
the Symbolic, and whose origin cannot be traced in relation to subjects themselves. 
The letter appears to be equated by Lacan to the signifier itself, a supposition 
strengthened by Saussure’s similar connection between the sound-impression of words 
on the psyche and materiality.53 Nonetheless, an in-depth analysis of the letter, 
particularly with a view to the idea of phonemes, or, as Lacan puts it, “the synchronic 
system of differential couplings that are necessary to discern vocables in a given 
language (langue),”54 reveals the letter as what permits semantic differentiation, and 
which, by its directionality and temporal movability, gives the signifier its materiality. 
The letter becomes paradoxical: located between signifier and that which constitutes it, 
the letter is material insofar as the signifier itself is material, yet also immaterial, insofar 
as it constitutes the microstructure of the signifier, without referring to the ink on paper, 
or the “kilos of language” in books.55 Being both, the letter becomes a stepping stone in 
the correspondence between the material and the immaterial. The subject is shaped by 
the letter, as he exists in a pre-determined linguistic structure and depends on the 
material support provided by language. The implication of the materiality of language 
on the subject with a view to these prerogatives of the signifier is that the subject finds 
himself always-already in a linguistic system and his integration in this system is the 
very condition of possibility of transindividuality.  
Having reified language, Lacan also attempts a redefinition of the unconscious: he 
derives an ‘algorithm’ of linguistics from the Saussurean equation of the 
interchangeable relation between the concept and the sound-image that is 
fundamentally different from Saussure’s initial postulate and, as Fink notes, not 
confirmed by any linguist. If, to Saussure, there is a reciprocal relation between signifier 
                                                          
52 Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe, The title of the letter, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 27. 
53 Fink, Lacan to the letter, 76. 
54 Lacan, Écrits, 501. 
55 Lacan, Écrits, 282. 
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and signified, between the sound-image and the concept, which constitutes a fixed 
sign, to Lacan this reciprocity does not exist. Rather, the signifier and the signified are 
independent, and do not call each other to mind. This modification makes the sign both 
more fixed and more flexible: fixed, in the sense that reciprocity cannot exist between 
its two components, the signifier perpetually dominating the signified (i.e., being above 
the bar in the hierarchical relation), and flexible, in the sense that the totality of the sign, 
its holistic character, is abandoned in favour of a movable meaning. Furthermore, Fink 
points out, Lacan subverts the Sausurrean sign with the abolition of the original 
purpose of the bar: if, to Saussure, the bar denominated the signifier and signified as “a 
two-sided psychical entity,” to Lacan, it becomes a bar-rier that resists signification.56 
This suggests that signification can never be self-evident and that resistance itself (the 
bar) is instrumental in the creation of meaning. The signifier becomes, as Nancy and 
Lacoue-Labarthe note, “the order of spacing, according to which the law is inscribed 
and marked as difference.”57 
The linguistic structure of consciousness is defined by the signifier/signified relation, 
with its meaning created by the gliding of one chain over the other. In the unconscious, 
signifiers are repressed and prevented from reaching consciousness; the gliding of the 
chains of signifiers and signifieds is halted, fixating meaning and attaching it to 
particular elements, which results in compulsions and obsessional behaviours that are 
perceived as symptoms of underlying pathologies. Lacan conceives of the chain of 
signifiers as quasi-transcendental elements that regulate everyday life, the chain of 
signifieds becoming that by virtue of which the chain of signifiers becomes 
comprehensible. Lacan sees the signifier as that which enables the creation of the 
subject, in the sense that the subject finds himself in a world pre-determined by the 
chain of signifiers, and given meaning by their interplay with a chain of signifieds; yet it 
is not the subject who creates or transmits signifiers, but signifiers that enable the 
formation of the subject. The subject postulates meaning in relation to existent 
signifiers, which is to say that the subject is shaped by discourse and cannot exist other 
than in relation to the Other, to a chain of signifiers that endow him with meaning. “The 
subject”, Elizabeth Grosz writes, “is the effect of discourse, no longer its cause.”58 
Lacan uses this modified version of the Saussurean algorithm to also explain 
repression. Initially identified as taking place through displacement and condensation, 
or, in Lacanian language, through metaphor and metonymy, repression is now defined 
                                                          
56 Ferdinand de Saussure in Fink, Lacan to the letter, 80. 
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58 Grosz, Jacques Lacan: a feminist introduction, (London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 1990), 98. Throughout 
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38 
 
as either vertical or horizontal oscillations in relation to the barrier. Thus, metonymy (or 
displacement) consists of the shifting of the signifier to a different signified, which could 
elude the censor and present a sufficiently altered signification so that the initial 
meaning is not grasped. Metonymy is also the main representation of desire, as the 
barrier between signifier and signified and the shifting of signifiers also point to the 
underlying lack in the subject that prompted the repression of the (primal) impulse in 
the first place; this lack, both Grosz and Fink argue, is what further generates the 
endless slippage of signifiers, the desire for something else. Metaphor, on the other 
hand, represents the substitution of one term for another, while still maintaining the 
metonymic chain; metaphor freezes signifiers, but confines them within the 
unconscious, while their connection to the metonymic chain allows them to resurface 
as symptoms, condensed and displaced. The Lacanian equations are important due to 
their hierarchical structure: as I will show in chapters 3 and 4, the construction of the 
subject in layers has deep implications for the possibility of femininity to enter the 
Symbolic and become manifest in subjectification.  
Lacan translates primal impulse into lack/desire, effecting a secondary translation—that 
of instinct into language. Lacan postulates human desire as enabled by language; the 
mechanics behind the constitution of a sign allow for the linguistic organization of 
desire and the resurfacing of primal instinctual drives into day-to-day behaviour. Desire, 
the driving force behind repression and thus, the unconscious, and what enables 
metonymy (and, implicitly, the precipitation of the ego), is the basis on which the 
transition between instinct and language can occur. From this viewpoint, Lacan 
remains close to the Freudian unconscious, insofar as he, too, postulated the existence 
of common ground between thought- and word-presentations; to Lacan, this common 
ground is represented by desire, which can be configured in linguistic terms, linking the 
instinctual and the symptomatic; like the subject himself, desire is connected to the 
letter and shaped by its directionality.  
If we start with Freud’s description of the unconscious (a reservoir for repressed 
drives), then it follows that the unconscious itself can only come into being once 
repression (or entry into the Symbolic order) has been achieved. In other words, the 
unconscious becomes a (symptomatic) manifestation of repression. Yet, in depicting 
the unconscious as the discourse of the Other, Lacan suggests that for the infant to 
repress an oedipal wish, the infant must have both overcome primary narcissism and 
have come to an awareness of the existence of (at least) a triangular oedipal structure, 
and must already implicitly be part of a linguistic order. Lacan thus uncovers a further 
layer of this equation, that awareness of the Other is a condition of possibility for the 
existence of the unconscious; moreover, the unconscious as entity can only appear as 
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a(n) (infantile) response to the existence of the Other, and linguistic organization must 
be presupposed in the infant at this stage, before subjectification. The subject emerges 
in language, which is a quasi-transcendental empirical determinant of human 
existence: the subject is always a social subject and subject to communication.59 This 
means that transindividuality, recognition, and ultimately subjectification take place not 
in relation to an Other as a point of origin, but as a pinnacle of linguistic organization; 
the subject, Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe write, is “installed by the Other in the midst of 
language as ‘signifying convention’.”60 To Lacan, the process of becoming a subject, 
therefore, rests on literalization as a condition of possibility. 
Lacan attempts neither to subvert Freudian psychoanalysis, nor to present it as a 
language; to Lacan, language is not meant to represent reality, but rather signify by 
means of its capacity to constitute subjects as conditioned by their empirical 
determinants. The Lacanian reinterpretation of the psychic apparatus provides a 
description of the means by which the subject qua subject enters the world, and of the 
mechanics that facilitate subjectification. Lacan’s reinterpretation of Freud sets in place 
an immensely complex system of reference that helps navigate the many recurrent 
patterns of psychic organisation. Lacan paves the way towards using psychoanalysis 
as a system of thought that helps organise retrospectively that which occurs before 
concepts can be entertained. This understanding of psychoanalysis will be helpful 
when interrogating the gendered historicity of subjectivity and exploring bursts of 
femininity that germinate in the wholly-male Symbolic. By using Lacanian 
psychoanalysis to search for traces of femininity in The Bacchae, it will be possible to 
unpack the system that made it impossible for the subject position to be occupied by 
anyone else other than the male subject, and propose alternatives to this (oedipal) 
model of subjectification.  
 
The birth of the subject—Kant, Foucault, Freud and Lacan on 
subjectification 
In establishing the subject qua (male) subject, one of the most important moves made 
by philosophy (through Kant) and by psychoanalysis (through Lacan) was to redefine 
the place of the subject in discourse. In The Order of Things, Foucault shows he is 
aware of the importance of discourse in subjects’ relation to their own identities, and he 
charts the way subjects refer to knowledge and the implicit changes in the subjects’ 
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position caused by the shifting definition of knowledge. Foucault suggests that, in the 
current ideological system, human knowledge revolves primarily around three elements 
(life, labour and language), which act as quasi-transcendental elements, in the sense 
that they exist unchanged in the life (and, implicitly, psychic makeup) of every subject 
until a turn in ideology occurs. In a sense, Foucault is close to Irigaray in arguing for the 
historicity of quasi-transcendental determinants (which include the Symbolic) and 
demonstrates that the role of language and Man’s relation to it are historical.61 
 
Using discourse to become a subject: man’s claim to knowledge 
In tracing the evolution of knowledge, Foucault is interrogating the mechanisms by 
which the subject becomes a subject. The ability to analyse and comprehend the 
process of subjectification is what Kant sees as the possibility of universal knowledge, 
and the great innovation he introduces through the Critique with what is known as ‘the 
Copernican turn’. The Copernican turn redefined the status of representation and 
turned human finitude—the mark of human inferiority in attaining universal 
knowledge—into the condition of possibility for knowledge. For the first time in the 
history of human inquiry, Foucault argues, Kant questioned not representations, but 
what makes representations possible, and moved away from systems that inquire why 
things happen in a certain way, towards a truly transcendental question of what it is 
that enables things to happen at all. The move Kant makes is from the post hoc to the 
a priori.  
Following Kant’s Copernican turn, Foucault analyses finitude and the way Kant 
established it as foundational for universal knowledge. In The Order of Things, 
Foucault assesses Kant’s distinction between the empirical and the transcendental, 
and shows how the two cannot exist independently, but coexist in a state of permanent 
oscillation. Foucault uses the idea of finitude to show the way Modern Thought, due to 
the decline of discourse and the change in the status of representation, was forced to 
acknowledge the duality of man and attempted to make it foundational for the claim to 
absolute knowledge to be meaningful. Yet the elements of man’s duality are never 
separate, giving rise to anthropological finitude and making it impossible to maintain 
the empirico-transcendental doublet while, at the same time, holding empirical finitude 
to be foundational for the possibility of knowledge. Foucault’s work is particularly rich 
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when read in conjunction with Irigaray, as it allows for deep probing in the systems that 
create a close yet ultimately impossible bond between man and God on one side, and 
exclude femininity yet make it essential for man’s self-definition on the other.  
In The Order of Things Foucault undertakes a methodical analysis of the social, 
political, institutional and discursive spheres, which, Dreyfus and Rabinow argue, 
stems from a reduction of his anthropological method so that it addresses solely the 
rules that govern discourse.62 In analysing the mechanics of discourse, Foucault turns 
his attention towards the “sciences of man”, seeking to understand the means by which 
man understands and refers to himself. He does so by scrutinising the methods that 
encompass the kernel of thought, that is, life, language and labour, or, as Dreyfus and 
Rabinow put it, “the social, the embodied individual and shared meanings.”63 This 
inquiry into the production of meaning within discourse is, in fact, a search for the 
conditions of possibility for knowledge: Foucault writes the aim of his project is “to 
rediscover on what basis knowledge and theory became possible”, which he 
undertakes by introducing the notion of épistéme, the ideological setting that prompts 
and supports the development of a field of study in one way or another.64 
To carry out his project, Foucault identifies the systems of thought and different types 
of épistéme that underlie the history of thought, and distinguishes between the 
Classical Age, Renaissance and Modernity. What is crucial in all three is the status of 
representation: by focusing on the way the Classical notion of representation has 
shifted in the Modern age, Foucault can highlight the development of the “sciences of 
man” towards regarding man as a double, “a special kind of total subject and total 
object of his own knowledge.”65 
In the Classical Age, the status of representation was such that representation could be 
broken down into its constituting parts, which would be assigned an almost narrative 
structure through which the constitution of an object could be achieved in one form or 
another. Its parts could be ordered in a “system of grids, which analysed the sequence 
of representations…arresting its movement…and redistributing it in a permanent 
table…”66 Discourse was the “last ‘bastion’ to fall”: by destabilizing the system of 
language, the Classical system of representation based on ordering and classification 
collapsed. “[W]hen words ceased to intersect with representations and to provide a 
spontaneous grid for the knowledge of man”, the shift in épistéme was complete; this 
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bought about a new outlook on language, one that would assign it a broader, but more 
unstable role, in which it becomes objectified, formalized and entrenched.67 With the 
decline of discourse, the épistéme was directed towards anthropocentrism, and 
language was exorcised from the field of thought until the 19th century, when its 
disjointed status came to the fore.68 Language, Foucault explains, could no longer 
function as a closed system, meant to explicate representations; from sign, language 
had become a signifier devoid of signification.69 Language thus loses its status of unity 
that can capture unequivocally the signifier-signified relation, becoming a being in 
itself.70 This shift is important, as it facilitates the emergence of the language that 
enabled the Lacanian unconscious to exist. The emergence of language-as-Being 
marks the birth of the subject of psychoanalysis—the subject that situates himself in a 
triangular relation with God and woman in a (male) Symbolic.  
With the decline of discourse that marked the shift from a classical to a modern 
épistéme, the status of representation changed. Foucault turns to Velasquez’s Las 
Meninas, and argues it captures the status of Classical representation, the impossibility 
of representing the act of representation. Las Meninas displays the limits of Classical 
representation by showing the subject who acts as the organiser of knowledge can 
never be shown in the act of representing; the picture is dominated by lack—the lack of 
its principal subject.71 This manifestation of lack testifies to the impoverished status of 
the subject: man, in the Classical age, has no place on the grid that he organises, as if 
he did not exist. While man has been the object of inquiry in the Classical age, he was 
only studied through the prism of his relation to the sciences of man. Yet once the 
correlation between linguistic signs and nature is questioned, “the positive relation of 
nature to human nature begin[s] to take shape,” and, along with it, a change in the 
mode of representation occurs.72 Language, the act of naming, becomes insufficient for 
knowledge, as simply inscribing things into a system does not capture the 
transcendental dimension of man, his need to identify the conditions of possibility of the 
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43 
 
existence of things: if man is solely an organiser of knowledge and plays no part in its 
production, universal knowledge is closed to him. Without transcendental activity, man 
cannot be both object and subject of knowledge, meaning he exists outside the space 
of representation. By assigning him a place, the Classical épistéme makes room for the 
Modern man. Now, the idea of the cogito enters the picture, and an appropriate 
épistéme replaces the classical one, allowing for the articulation of the “interrogation as 
to the mode of being implied by the cogito.”73 
 
Both subject and object: the difficulty with (self)representation  
When the natural sciences of man become objects of knowledge, Foucault explains, an 
“archaeological mutation” occurs, and man suffers a transformation from actor external 
to the stage on which knowledge is produced, to an ambiguous creature that is at once 
“an object of knowledge and…a subject that knows”.74  Man is now created, and 
occupies the place that Las Meninas seemed to have reserved for him: that of the King, 
hitherto only reflected in the mirror, enjoying a centrality that was not quite central. 
However, now the paradoxical duo that is man, “enslaved sovereign, observed 
spectator”, replaces the lack that had been central to the space of thought.75 The 
epistemic shift that substantiates the need for this new position can be described as a 
transition from the need to understand the empirical conditions that shaped life, to the 
conditions of possibility of those epistemic givens: “…life…should itself define, in the 
depths of its being, the conditions of possibility of the living being;… labour…[should] 
provide the conditions of possibility of exchange, profit and production;…languages 
[should explain] the possibility of discourse and of grammar.”76 The picture of 
representation as the origin of life, labour and language ceased to be meaningful, and 
called for a turning towards transcendental inquiry. Yet this new approach reveals 
man’s paradoxical nature and his ambiguous relation with the empirical determinants of 
his life: in discovering himself as both object and subject of knowledge, man is in fact 
charting his own finitude.77 On the one hand, man is subject to the empirical 
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determinants of his life (life, labour and language) and finds his existence shaped by 
them, as it is in these three spheres that his daily activity takes place. In this sense, 
man’s existence is shaped and dictated by the empirical conditions of his existence. 
However, on the other hand, Foucault shows the subject to exist in a paradoxical 
relation with his empirical determinants: the moment the subject moves towards 
transcendental reflection and considers the conditions that shape his life in a positivist 
manner, he gives way to his dual nature as oscillation between the empirical and the 
transcendental egos. The reason for this is that reflection on one’s condition 
necessarily implies reference to temporality and to the way the subject relates to 
himself in a temporal framework, and forces the subject back to a point of origin that 
marks the genesis of dependence on empirical determinants. However, such a point 
cannot be identified: man is already born in a relation of dependence to the empirical 
determinants of life, labour and language, and cannot extricate himself from this 
relation. From this perspective, a point of origin can only be identified in relation to the 
genesis of self-awareness, that is, the moment in which the subject ceases to be 
merely reflexive and becomes reflective—the moment of subjectification.78  
The Unthought, that which preceded self-awareness, constitutes the pre-history of 
consciousness: it cannot be dated, and can only be apprehended retrospectively, from 
without, rather than perceived as it happens, from within. Consequently, since the 
genesis of the birth transcendental ego arises from the pre-existent (and necessary) 
foundation laid by the empirical determinants of life, it follows that these empirical 
conditions have primacy over transcendental reflection. The positivity of these empirical 
determinants highlights the finitude of man; and yet, despite their primacy, it cannot be 
argued that life, labour and language have priority over the existence of man, as they, 
too, are dependent on it.  
Finitude becomes foundational and can illuminate the universal structures of 
experience. This move, Foucault argues, changes the history of Western thought: 
finitude, to Kant, becomes what Dreyfus and Rabinow call “the basis of all 
factual,…positive, knowledge.”79 Kant’s analysis of the conditions under which 
representation is possible becomes an analytic which looks at the way things are 
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inaccessible past of human reflexivity that is devoid of reflectivity is what Foucault terms an ‘irreducible anteriority’. 
Perhaps an argument could be made that psychoanalysis sees this as infantile omnipotence, and that the struggle 
Jessica Benjamin, following Hegel, observes between omnipotence and subjectivity prefigures a wider, conceptual 
struggle between the transcendental and the empirical subjects. If so, anthropological finitude is replicated in current 
thought, making us unable to understand intersubjectivity if we regard subjects as closed systems. 
79 Dreyfus and Rabinow, Michel Foucault: beyond structuralism and hermeneutics, 28. 
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presented in experience. Kant ascribed the empirical limitations on knowledge, such as 
contingency and obscurity, to its content, and argued for the pure form of knowledge. 
Translated into psychoanalytic terms, the possibility of pure knowledge equates to the 
possibility of inquiring into man’s own origin, into the originary itself, or as much of it as 
may be comprehended within the constraints of empirical determinants. In this sense, 
psychic structures (named by psychoanalysis as a system of reference and 
orchestrated by language) become themselves quasi-transcendental elements that 
exist by virtue of (and also enable the existence of) the empirical determinants of life, 
language and labour. Psychic structures are marked by the same finitude of the 
subject, and their recurrence throughout generations is strictly dependent on a) the 
status of representation, and b) the empirical determinants of life, language and labour.  
The new status of man as actor and orchestrator of knowledge is characterized by 
paradoxes, which is how man becomes ‘enslaved sovereign’ and ‘observed spectator’, 
prefiguring a dichotomy that must exist for the production of knowledge to be possible, 
and gives rise to an internal conflict that must be perpetuated for the quasi-
transcendental elements of human life to continue to exist.80 By virtue of his limitations, 
man can claim absolute knowledge, as these limitations are no longer imposed on him, 
but by-products of a discourse created by him: it is because he is finite that he can 
understand and chart his own finitude against positive forms of knowledge.  
Man is, thus, posited as an invention of modernity; Foucault analyses three dyads that 
ratify Man’s status as empirico-transcendental doublet, the empirical/transcendental, 
the Cogito and the Unthought and the Return and Retreat of the Origin, which, 
ultimately, prompt man to both affirm and deny his finitude in a constant oscillation81 
between the extremes of each binary, and give rise to anthropological finitude.82 By 
describing the three pairs of doubles, Foucault is trying to show how empirical finitude 
returns time and again within transcendental finitude, and how the clean-cut distinction 
attempted by the Copernican turn can never be regained.  
In the Anthropology, a paradoxical pair emerges: that of the fundamental and the 
originary. As Han explains, the idea of the originary undermines the Copernican turn by 
making the distinction between the transcendental and the a priori difficult, generating 
the interplay of epistemic and empirical finitude in the Analytic of Finitude. “The 
                                                          
80 Foucault, The Order of Things, 340. 
81 The need for permanent redefinition, however, weakens the claim of finitude to being fundamental; moreover, Dreyfus 
and Rabinow explain, the existence of the double(s) also weakens the explanatory claim of archaeology as a method. 
82 “The blurring of the empirico-transcendental divide within man’s “doubles” repeatedly defeats the foundational core of 
the Kantian strategy by generating a new inability to sustain the a priori perspective necessary for securing a universal 
epistemic ground. Because of man’s dual nature (both transcendental and empirical), the transcendental subject, the 
former a-priori and self-transparent condition of possibility of knowledge, now appears as “already” determined by the 
empirical background of Life, Language and Labour.”—Han, “Foucault and Heidegger on Kant and Finitude”, 129. 
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thematic of the originary is introduced through a reflection on the relationship between 
Geist and Gemüt”, the element that “generates the possibility of (noumenal) 
spontaneity” and “the purely empirical object of psychology”.83 The Geist, Han 
continues, generates a problem, as it is through its existence that an “originary 
passivity” can become manifest at the level of the transcendental; thus transcendental 
finitude “is suddenly folded back upon man’s empirical limitations:”84 by constituting 
itself as a condition of the possibility of knowledge, yet not as something that can be 
known, it undermines the Copernican turn, and thus invalidates the possibility of 
“overcoming the limitations of anthropological finitude by shifting to the epistemic 
primacy of its a priori counterpart…[since] the latter reveals itself as contaminated from 
the start by empirical determinations.”85 It is by means of this movement that the idea of 
the return of origin is introduced: by understanding himself as shaped by the empirical 
determinants of the world, man must see himself as existing in an empirical space that 
he does not fully understand. Not only has he no choice with regard to the empirical 
conditions that shape his existence, but once immersed in these conditions, he is 
forced to find that the conditions themselves precede him, having existed before him in 
an un-datable anteriority: “as soon as the ‘I think’ has shown itself to be embedded in a 
density throughout which it is quasi-present…it is no longer possible to make it lead on 
to the affirmation ‘I am’. For can I say…I am this language I speak?”86 To capture this 
‘irreducible anteriority’, Foucault borrows Husserl’s theory of the Unthought.87 Modern 
man needs to think the Unthought, an act which would reconcile him with his essence, 
which underlies his constitution; however, such a move is impossible without becoming 
trapped in the circularity of anthropological finitude, as understanding the originary and 
secondary passivity that shape the ego is dependent on empirical determinants.  
Yet despite failing to regain the Unthought, the need to return to the origin still exists, 
but man finds himself in the midst of empirical determinants, which are bound to a 
temporal framework that can only be temporalized in relation to man.88 Foucault writes 
that despite not being able to identify the point of origin of things at an empirical level, 
man can constitute himself as the point of origin. However, this temporal duality proves 
unstable: in this double, man is shown to become the point of origin of an untraceable 
anteriority, which becomes inscribable into a temporality only with a view to the 
                                                          
83 Han, “Foucault and Heidegger on Kant and Finitude”, 132. 
84 Han, “Foucault and Heidegger on Kant and Finitude”, 133. 
85 Han, “Foucault and Heidegger on Kant and Finitude”, 134. 
86 Foucault, The Order of Things, 353. 
87 The Unthought is “the implicit, the inactual, the sedimented, the non-effected—in every case, the inexhaustible double 
that presents itself to reflection as the blurred projection of what man is in his truth, but that also plays the role of a 
preliminary ground upon which man must collect himself and recall himself in order to attain his truth.”—Foucault, The 
Order of Things, 356. 
88 In this sense, Dreyfus and Rabinow argue that it is Heidegger who shows that “the origin…of temporality can…be 
understood by understanding the structure of the authentic Dasein.”—Dreyfus and Rabinow, Michel Foucault: beyond 
structuralism and hermeneutics, 39. 
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constitution of man as the point of origin. The fundamentality of finitude lies in that 
man’s status of being already there is necessary for the apprehension of a temporality 
of empirical determinants. Yet this is unstable because the origin identified with respect 
to man as a starting point will always retreat further back in time for man as he existed 
at the identified point of origin; consequently, despite man being essential in 
establishing an origin, this origin can only hold true for a specific time and context. The 
retreat of the origin culminates with what Heidegger terms ‘the essential mystery’, a 
moment in time that remains fundamentally unknowable.89   
The problem of origin, Dreyfus and Rabinow explain, is that “the source of man’s being 
is unobtainable, and this truth itself can only be learned by seeking and failing to find 
any source.”90 Although it is to do with the subject’s inscription into a temporal 
framework, the source can be found neither in the past nor in the present, suggesting it 
must, paradoxically, lie in the future, as an unavoidable, yet ungraspable possibility that 
reveals itself through “recession into the future.”91 This argument is crucial for my 
thesis: the need to uncover the originary, to return to the moment of subjectification and 
risk transgressing into the ‘just-before’ of this moment, is fundamental to subjects, and 
becomes manifest as the death drive. Yet the paradoxical argument is that ‘living out’ 
the death drive by regressing to the stage prior to subjectification is impossible—the 
subject qua subject cannot experience that which came before he became a subject. 
The experience of the originary therefore only becomes possible by looking towards a 
moment in the future, when one’s subjectivity can be altered, taken to the brink of 
collapse and experienced as if one emerged as a subject again. It is possible to 
imagine an event in time (or, indeed, crave and thus position oneself towards the 
possibility of such an occurrence) in which the subject almost ceases to be. This may 
be achieved through doubling, through seeking out instances of uncanniness and 
through phantasies of multiplication and parthenogenesis that threaten the subject by 
pushing him to the edge of the limits of his subjectivity, but nonetheless allow him to 
come as close as possible to experiencing his own not-Being, or before-Being and 
grasp the originary—it is in this sense that the experience of the originary retreats into 
the future.92 I will explore the idea of gearing one’s existence towards the future with 
                                                          
89 Dreyfus and Rabinow, Michel Foucault: beyond structuralism and hermeneutics, 40. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Foucault, The Order of Things, 362. 
92 Some artworks, for example, can allow the subject to transgress the limits of the Symbolic and momentarily 
experience a state close to the dissolution of the self—such is the case, I would argue, with Marcel Duchamp’s Étant 
donnés: 1° la chute d'eau / 2° le gaz d'éclairage: by recreating a primal scene which drawn the subject in, the 
installation enables the viewer to initiate an aesthetic experience from the Symbolic, only to be immediately ab-jected 
from it. Like a child spying on his parents, the viewer walks tentatively through the room until he reaches the imposing 
Spanish doors, which, like the doors of the parental bedroom, remain forever closed. The viewer cannot open them, but 
must hover in the threshold and peep through the holes to discover the splayed, naked body of a woman. The sight is 
surreal yet clinical: the woman is not a being, but a body—her genitals are thoroughly lit, as if on an examination table, 
and she is shaved and unresisting. In a reversal of the mother-child power relationship, the viewer can subject the 
woman to his gaze, taking her in with no fear of retribution—for she is headless, and cannot reciprocate the sexual 
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the purpose of experiencing one’s point of origin when looking at The Bacchae, but it is 
important to emphasise that the experience of the death of the subject (or of the just-
emergence of the subject) is only possible through the creation of new forms of 
subjectivity. My argument is that the forms of subjectivity explored through The 
Bacchae point to the existence of a plurality of paradigms, rather than the singular, 
oedipal one, that allow us to understand the psyche (or, in Foucauldian terms, the 
language that makes up modernity).  
Foucault’s argument concerns the finitude of man and the difficulty associated with 
universalising historical and cultural processes. He shows that, while psychoanalytic 
theory may uncover quasi-transcendental patterns, it remains ill-suited to the task of 
making universal claims about subjects. Even when understanding psychoanalysis as 
a system of reference, and the psyche itself as a series of patterns that organise 
themselves in accordance to the laws of linguistics, the picture is not simple. For a 
question always arises as to the origin of these patterns of psychic organisation, and 
the reason they are precisely that—patterns; what is it that makes them repetitive? The 
problem is that these theories hinge on the idea of knowledge and the way it is 
produced and disseminated; moreover, they appear valid only if one considers 
knowledge fixed. If knowledge is regarded as a moveable entity, whose prerogatives 
fluctuate with ideology, the patterns of psychic organisation risk becoming obsolete—
or, as I aim to show, being exposed as historical. 
There is value in analysing the way psychoanalysis gives voice to the male imaginary 
in an épistéme where man is both object and subject of knowledge and comparing it to 
an épistéme where such a voice was silent. In this thesis, my main methodological tool 
will be to take the discourse of the male imaginary out of context and reread it from a 
modern perspective, to show that modern language, the language-as-Dasein93 that 
Foucault argued was crucial for fashioning the modern man—indeed, the language of 
subjectivity, is not a closed system, but a permeable, fluid one. The épistéme only 
allowed for the expression of the male imaginary, which, in turn, permeated language, 
became male language, and turned into a quasi-transcendental element—aided, 
through psychoanalysis, by models of organisation centred on the oedipal paradigm. 
Yet reading texts like The Bacchae through a contemporary framework shows that the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
gaze. And yet, as soon as the viewer assumes this (Symbolic, male, active) position, he comes to realise his own 
vulnerable, passive voyeuristic state. He is at once gazing-subject and object-to-be-gazed-at, active and passive, 
omnipotent and powerless, subject and non-subject—a duality that is so unstable that it can jettison him out of the 
Symbolic. The artwork-as-primal-scene in this context enables the subject to reexperience his powerlessness relative to 
the mother and imagine the possibility of regression to a state prior to subjectification. In recreating the primal scene, the 
artwork allows the subject to position himself towards the experience his own (near) not-Being and come as close as 
possible to capturing the originary. Duchamp, Étant donnés, Philadelphia Museum of Art, 1946-66.  
93 In Being and Time, Heidegger uses the term Dasein to refer to the mode of Being that characterises the human 
condition. The term does not have biological, but ontological nuances, and seeks to capture the type of entity that 
human beings are. 
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translation of Oedipus into a paradigmatic model of subjectification is only one form of 
translation that language-as-Dasein allows; other translations are possible and can 
reveal a plurality of forms of subjectivity existent in the language of modernity. 
What I hope to show is that the transition from Classical thought to modern thought 
effected, as Foucault shows, primarily through language, opened the way for a 
multiplicity of subjectivities to exist. In this context, the insistence on the oedipal 
paradigm as the only model for subjectification is reductive (and unsatisfactory), and I 
will use The Bacchae to explore other possible models. By entertaining this line of 
thought and using psychoanalysis as a system of reference, I hope to be able to go 
beyond the oedipal and uncover a form of feminine subjectivity left behind following the 
shift in épistéme.  
Using the Foucauldian critique of Kantian philosophy, I will pursue the possibility of a 
feminine subjectivity, by which I understand a type of subjectivity that can exist 
alongside male subjectivity and is created through an alternative to the oedipal model. I 
do not wish to suggest that subjectivity, or subjectification itself, follows one of two 
models, that it can be ‘male’ or ‘female’, or that the process should be inscribed in a 
binary construction. On the contrary, my argument is that modern subjectivity, as a by-
product of language-as-Dasein, is fluid, and the oedipal paradigm is insufficiently 
flexible to allow for a plurality of subjectivities to become manifest. I refer to ‘feminine 
subjectivity’ as an alternative to ‘male subjectivity’ only in terms of modes of 
organisation, and use ‘male’ and ‘female’ to define their roles as subject positions in 
language. Using these tools, I will argue for alternative modes of subjectification that 
can exist despite the male-centric language of psychoanalysis.  
 
To love and be loved by oneself: modern subjects as products of narcissism  
Since man became both object and subject of knowledge, the process of 
subjectification has ceaselessly concerned psychoanalysts, philosophers and 
anthropologists alike, particularly due to the process’s inability of being ascribed an 
originary. It seems impossible, therefore, to answer all questions the ontological nature 
of the subject poses, especially those that concern the time that preceded the subject’s 
notion of time, that is, the period of infant reflexivity; yet in theorizing subjectification as 
a stage of identification with a specular image based on narcissistic cathexes, Lacan 
appears to provide a smoother transition between the (unknowable) infantile psyche 
and the mature ego, constantly plagued by repressed drives and reminiscences. 
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Freud’s understanding of the subject through the lens of psychoanalysis is a prime 
example of language-as-Dasein working to establish man as both subject and object of 
knowledge, and of accounting for the process of subjectification through a 
universalizing theory. Fascinatingly, Freud not only crafted a theory of the self that 
claimed universal value, but also identified narcissism, the love of the (male) self, as 
foundational in the genesis of the subject. Lacan took Freud’s account of narcissism 
and incorporated it in his theorization of subjectification, the mirror stage, maintaining 
the centrality of narcissism, but bridging the mature and infantile egos towards a more 
coherent picture of the birth of the subject.  
Freud, as Grosz explains, held two different views on ego development for the better 
part of his life, never prioritising one over the other: the realist and narcissistic views. 
According to the realist view, the psyche is driven by its neuronal/neuro-psychological 
agencies, with an ego meant to regulate the demands of the id and mediate between id 
and reality. This model envisages the ego as the true form of the self, as something 
that must be strengthened in analysis by making it sensitive to cultural prerogatives, 
but gives no account of its genesis.  
The narcissistic view argues the ego does not exist from the beginning of the subject’s 
life, but is precipitated into being. In this sense, Rosine Perelberg writes, “new 
psychical action has to take place to bring about narcissism”, which, as Laplanche 
suggests, could be considered the image of the self provided by the Other for the self 
to identity with and love.94 The narcissistic ego takes itself as the object of its affection, 
splitting the subject into active and passive parts, into subject and object, and investing 
the object with libidinal energy as if it were external. In this scenario, narcissism is the 
“amorous captivation of the subject by this image,” the linchpin without which the ego 
could not come into being.95 Primary narcissism is different from auto-erotism, and is 
dominated by fantasy, modes of identification and introjection, and thus “amenable to 
the desire of the other.”96  
To illustrate the links between subjecthood and narcissism, Freud identifies four main 
characteristics of narcissism: libidinal withdrawal, idealization, the loss of self in the 
relation with an ideal twin and the dilemma created by the existence of the object. 
While all are essential in subjectification, the relation with an ideal twin seems to be 
paramount, particularly with a view to Lacan’s theorization of the mirror stage.97 In the 
relation with an ideal image of the self, any sense of difference is abolished, and the 
                                                          
94 Rosine Perelberg, Freud: A Modern Reader, (London: Whurr, 2005), 76. 
95 Laplanche and Pontalis, The Language of Psycho-Analysis, 256. 
96 Grosz, Jacques Lacan, 31. 
97 Perelberg, Freud, 73. 
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subject loses himself in the object, as if there were nothing beyond the relation with the 
specular image; the concretization of the self, however, requires awareness of the 
existence of the Other as a condition of possibility for the occurrence of the stage itself. 
For the ego to emerge, the not-yet-subject must abandon pure narcissism and take the 
first (tentative) steps towards object love by acknowledging dependence on the Other 
for subjectification. This is achieved by means of splitting, of renouncing the omnipotent 
ego in favour of an intersubjective one. 
Lacan oscillates between regarding the mirror stage as an internal biological process, 
or a (socially-regulated) linguistic one. He does not argue that by identification with a 
specular image, the ego is lost to itself; rather, he suggests that there exists a naturally 
social side to the ego that allows the infant to ‘fill’ the lack generated by his biological 
prematurity by identification with a gestalt image. Lacan’s argument is 
Heideggerean/Foucauldian, in the sense that he regards the baby as existing always-
already in a pre-given network of quasi-transcendental determinants. Despite not 
formulating it in Foucauldian terms, Lacan places the baby in a socio-linguistic system 
that precedes him, a system whose point of origin eludes the baby, acting instead as 
web of (necessarily social) empirical determinants that shape the existence of the 
subject. Furthermore, the social and linguistic orders in which the subject finds himself 
function as the instinctual; if, for animals, survival is dependent upon instinct, for 
humans, it is dependent on being part of the socio-linguistic orders and attuned to their 
demands. The identification with the twin image is that which generates the narcissistic 
response of identification, and, consequently, part of the human makeup that dictates 
subjectification; by highlighting the importance of fascination with the specular image, 
Lacan singles out narcissism as a human predisposition, and a key element in an 
ontological account of subjectification.  
In effect, Lacan inquires into the conditions of possibility for the birth of the subject; this, 
in Kantian/ Foucauldian terms, equates to splitting the subject into two—the empirical 
and transcendental subjects. The empirical subject, the subject given in experience, is 
the subject as he hears, sees, perceives, feels, etc. himself. The transcendental 
subject is the underlying condition for the existence of the empirical subject: it is the 
subject that makes self-consciousness possible through the three faculties (judgement, 
understanding and imagination) and the condition of possibility for subjectification. Yet 
the Lacanian account does not pay sufficient attention to the quasi-transcendental 
elements that shape the subject’s lifeworld, and to the role of history in creating 
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subjects.98 He identifies the mechanisms that must exist for subjectivity to develop in 
the normal (male) way, but does not consider the reciprocal, interdependent relation 
between subjectivity and society. As I argue throughout this thesis, it is precisely the 
historical nature of subjectivity that allows us to go beyond the oedipal now. 
For both Freud and Lacan, narcissism entails the internalization of the image of the 
self, the identification with the self-as-object. For the mirror stage to take place, the 
infant must go through a series of stages, the first of which is the disruption of the 
mother-child monad. As Perelberg argues, the early infantile mother-child relation, 
which has been described as a dyad, is better portrayed by Grunberger as monadic 
and characterized by pure narcissism, in which the baby’s omnipotence encompasses 
the mother. For the mirror stage to be initiated, a separation between mother and baby 
must occur to end the baby’s omnipotence. This separation threatens the baby with 
imminent disintegration and acts as the catalyst towards the baby’s realization of a lack 
(of the (m)other, of instant gratification and of the yielding of the environment to the 
baby’s needs, characteristic of omnipotence), making way for the mirror stage, which 
provides compensation for the lack-of-being the baby experiences: by identifying with 
his specular image, the baby is embracing the promise of future self-mastery. The 
emergence of the ego, Grosz writes, “coincides with the emergence of…the first 
psycho-sexual drives”, and marks the incipience of awareness of space, distance and 
differentiation between the self and the other; moreover, it helps the baby in identifying 
himself as a cohesive, independent unity, separate from the mother.99 The identification 
of the baby with its mirror image creates the illusion of corporeal unity, and helps it 
establish itself as an object of the (m)other’s  desire. Additionally, since Arnold 
Rothstein shows that the stages of psychosexual development can be associated with 
loss, it may be that the onset of the mirror stage is caused by the loss of object.100 It 
can be inferred that the mirror stage encompasses early psychosexual stages, 
culminating with the threat of castration that generates the resolution of the oedipal 
stage and the acceptance of the regulating influence of the Name-of-the-Father. 
                                                          
98In “Science and Truth”, Lacan discusses the importance of history in the definition of the subject and the issues that 
stem from the Cartesian splitting of the subject. He understands psychoanalysis as always bound with history, and 
rejects the idea that it can reveal universal truths. From this perspective, it would be wrong to suggest that Lacan is not 
attuned to the part history plays in shaping the subjects of psychoanalysis. Lacan, “Science and Truth”, Newsletter of 
the Freudian Field, Spring/Fall 1989. However, what I am suggesting is that he does not consider sufficiently the way 
psychoanalysis, in adopting a male subject-position, perpetuates a certain type of history, becoming divorced from the 
historicity of the quasi-transcendental elements that constitute the lifeworld of subjects. To an extent, universal truths 
shape history from without, as they exist independently of history. Psychoanalysis is different, as it does not seek to 
make universal claims about the scientific nature of subjects. Yet, in allowing for the existence of only one subject-
position (male), psychoanalysis imposes fixity in the process of subjectification from within: it becomes a universalising 
metalanguage that only allows one form of subjectivity to speak, thus instilling rigidity at the core of the subject similar to 
that inherent in axiomatic propositions.  
99 Grosz, Jacques Lacan, 32. 
100  The oral stage with the loss of object, the anal stage with the loss of love, and the phallic stage with castration. 
Rothstein, Making Freud More Freudian, (London: Karnac Books, 2010), 24. 
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In the first months after birth, the baby is an uncoordinated mass; although responsive 
to external stimuli, it is not yet an agency in its own right. In Foucauldian terms, the 
newborn is in a state of reflexivity, capable of registering sensorial and perceptual 
impingements, but lacks reflectivity, and cannot see itself as separate from the 
surrounding world and dependent on intersubjectivity for self-constitution; the newborn 
is more ‘it’ than ‘he’ at this stage. However, despite existing in a fragmented state and 
lacking the sense of bodily cohesion, the infant does not experience this lack as lack. 
The inability to represent boundaries, and to perceive oneself as socially-determined 
pertains to the Real, and is what Lacan terms ‘the lack-of-a-lack’. In the Real, the child 
experiences no separation; both animate and inanimate objects are regarded as 
extensions of the self in a form of ‘primal unity’, and the universe is yielding to the 
baby’s desire.101 Lack is non-existent, as even when unable to find satisfaction, the 
baby hallucinates the desired object.  
When absence is felt by the baby, this blissful state ends, and the mirror stage is 
precipitated: once the child realises it lacks something, it can also create a plethora of 
new associations. With lack comes the awareness of the self, of the self-that-lacks-
something; the baby experiences absence, and with it, the idea of temporal succession 
and causality.102 Through the experience of lack, the baby understands it is separate 
from his main provider, the (m)other, and that he exists as an independent entity, who 
nonetheless relies on the (m)other for care and nourishment; the mother-child dyad is 
broken, and the child moves from primary narcissism to object love. The awareness of 
lack enables the emergence of reflectivity (subjectification-proper) and encourages the 
structuring of the world around binaries that govern adult life. However, the recognition 
of lack has another implication: the child comes to realise that the (m)other is not his to 
control; the absence of the (m)other signals the rupture with the Real and leaves 
behind a gap that the child seeks to fill for the remainder of his life by creating specular 
images with which he attempts to identify. Awareness of lack, therefore, also propels 
the child into the orders of the Imaginary and the Symbolic.  
                                                          
101 Grosz, Jacques Lacan, 34. 
102 At this point Lacanian terminology proves fruitful: the stark contrast between the Real and the Symbolic is useful in 
marking the transition from the absence of the transcendental ego to its existence, which, implicitly, brings with it the 
necessity of temporal succession and logical sequencing. The Real represents the period when concepts such as time, 
causality and succession do not yet exist, and neither does the subjective transcendental apperception of the subject-
qua-subject (the ‘I think’). By contrast, the Symbolic is the network of social elements that make up the lifeworld of the 
subject; yet the existence of the Symbolic is only possible because of the appearance of the transcendental subject. The 
Real-Imaginary-Symbolic, however, are not solely developmental stages. In this context, they refer to the transition from 
reflexivity to reflectivity (in Foucauldian terms), or from the empirical ego to the finite duality that marks human existence 
(the empiric and transcendental egos together, in Kantian terms). This process is what Lacan and Kristeva (in a sense) 
investigate; it is also this transitional space that makes the subject of this thesis. Oscillation between register is possible 
post-subjectification, and the threat of expulsion from the Symbolic into the Real remains present throughout the 
subject’s life. 
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The first encounter of the baby with lack takes place at a minimum of six months, and 
lasts for approximately one year, being dissolved, Grosz writes, “if ever, with the 
Oedipus complex.”103 The identification with the gestalt image is reflective, an act of 
(re-)cognition: the child is subjecting his specular image to a complex mental process, 
as he takes it in with great pleasure, registers it as an external stimulus, and 
apperceives the complex factors that make up the image itself. At this point, the 
difference between animals and humans is most evident: while an animal would lose 
interest in its image, the human is fascinated by it, signalling his linguistic organization 
and appurtenance to the Imaginary and the Symbolic. This fascination, Grosz argues, 
is what reifies the infant’s lack, as it fails to prompt immediate identification, instead 
allowing it to take place over time. At the beginning, the child is more likely to recognize 
the image of the other in the mirror, as he already has an awareness of the other’s 
physical body. When it comes to his own body, the child recognizes himself tentatively 
as the one reflected and needs encouragement to do so, as recognition in the mirror is 
only the first step in acknowledging himself as both subject and object. 
As soon as the child understands the image in the mirror to be an image of himself, he 
becomes enamoured with it, and fixates on it (fixations which resurface in adult 
libidinal/erotic relations). The specular double provides the child with the means to 
manipulate himself, to position himself in relation to the world and gradually allow 
himself to become part of the Symbolic. In identifying with the specular double, the 
child assumes agency over himself (as object), in the sense that he is permitted to 
exert on the specular image the (self-)mastery he lacks. Emphasis, Grosz argues, is 
placed at this point on the visual side of identification: looking/gazing becomes a form 
of control that allows the subject to dominate the object without being dominated in 
return. There is a degree of (scoptophilic) search for pleasure, as the child attempts to 
distance himself from the object, yet holistically take it in, subjecting itself to the 
primacy of visual perception.104 However, the identification also generates regression: 
enthralled by the unity of the mirror image, and aware of his own fragmented state, the 
child attempts to return to the omnipotence enjoyed prior to the mirror stage, while 
simultaneously anticipating the unity the mirror image promises, in a Hegelian struggle 
between omnipotence and submissiveness, translated into Lacanian terms.  
To Lacan, the ambivalence towards the mirror image gives rise to subjectivity-proper: 
by being and not-being the mirror image, the child manages to maintain an 
autonomous self, while becoming socialized into norms and ideology; however, while 
                                                          
103 Grosz, Jacques Lacan, 35. 
104 Yet the congenitally blind have egos, too; see Grosz, Jacques Lacan, 1990 and Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology 
of Perception, (London: Routledge, 2005). 
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this splitting of the ‘I’ points to its permanence, it also gives rise to what Lacan terms 
intra-subjective aggressivity, the oscillation between the ego’s affairement jubilatoire 
and connaissance paranoiaque.105 The mirror stage becomes a phase of narcissistic 
infatuation with the self, but one that generates aggression: the image created to 
account for the lack-of-being is attacked, because the image the child identifies with is 
both twin and foreign, outside of his control, and thus intangible. The subject, Grosz 
writes, “recognizes itself at the moment it loses itself in/as the other,” which is the 
reason the specular image acts as both the axis around which self-identity is created, 
and what destabilizes it.106 The mirror stage becomes an alienating experience, as it 
forces the rupture of the child from the mother, paralleling the incoherent image of the 
child with the plenary one of the mother; it instils tension in the baby, maintained in the 
mature ego as oscillation between activity and passivity, omnipotence and submission. 
From a phenomenological perspective, the mirror stage is the stepping stone in 
creating the body-subject, the lived body, governed by its own subjectivity. Following 
the body-schema, it could be argued that the body gains an agency of its own, 
requiring the subject to permanently reclaim (through narcissistic cathexes) the image 
of the body, in a quasi-neurotic struggle for self-assertion.107 
In identification, the subject internalizes the specular image; nonetheless, as Lacan 
points out, the image he internalizes is different from the self—it is, in fact, (an)other. 
This implies that in identifying with the specular image, the subject splits himself into 
active and passive parts. The self that does the identifying is active, it incorporates, 
through a cannibalising act, the other, it takes it in and makes it like the self. To put it in 
a plastic description, it appears there is a ‘real I’ and a ‘specular I’ that need to be 
brought together for the ego to emerge. It would, however, be an oversimplification to 
say that the ‘specular I’ is an object external to the ‘real I’ that simply exists to be taken 
in by the ‘real I’, as an inanimate object. Had this been the case, the baby would have 
been capable of incorporating this object without breaking the state of pure narcissism; 
in fact, since the primary narcissism of the baby already encompasses all external 
objects as extensions of the self, had it been entirely passive the ‘specular I’ would 
have already been part of the baby’s self with no need for the mirror stage to occur. 
The ‘specular I’ is only passive to the extent that it allows incorporation. Further than 
that, it is active: it represents the image of the (m)other, which the child must internalize 
and regard as an image of himself; it also represents an attempt to relate to an external 
self as if it were an object, and yet wish to internalize it for its subjecthood, for being a 
                                                          
105 Grosz, Jacques Lacan, 40. 
106 Grosz, Jacques Lacan, 41. 
107 See Merleau-Ponty’s argument for bodily-consciousness, and his reinterpretation of the Cogito. Merleau-Ponty, The 
Phenomenology of Perception, 2005. 
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holistic version of the ‘real I’, an ego-ideal. As Grosz has shown, the baby comes to 
have an ambivalent relation towards his specular image, based on idealization and the 
realization of the specular I’s otherness. 
Nonetheless, despite the (ambivalent) relation between the baby and his specular 
image, the image’s passive quality remains: even if briefly, the image must be regarded 
as an object, to allow the baby to exert dominance over it and internalize it. The 
(specular) self, always the Other, becomes external to the (real) self: it is othered by 
the baby, reifying its Otherness. Yet this relation to the specular self has a further 
implication, that the self must have awareness of the Other to be able to identify with 
that which is external to his own self; in other words, His Majesty the Baby must have 
been forced into recognizing his own intersubjectivity to transcend his omnipotence and 
identify with something external by something other than the mirror stage itself. This 
idea raises a question about the mirror stage and subjectification: if the baby must have 
awareness of the existence of the Other to identify with what is Other, then awareness 
of the Other occurs before the mirror stage, once the mother-child monad is replaced 
by the mother-child dyad.  
This problem can be solved if we return to the centrality Freud awards narcissism: to 
Freud, primary narcissism is essential in precipitating the ego’s development. Through 
primary narcissism, the child can have his libidinal energy turned onto himself from 
without, both as object and subject, and more-or-less will himself into being.108 In the 
narcissistic ego-view, the child can manipulate the libidinal energy that was initially 
turned onto himself and direct it towards other objects, establishing a 
phenomenological relation with the exterior. This ‘turning on itself’ of the libido enables 
the emergence of the ego by allowing the subject to step outside himself and take 
himself as an object; arguably, since such a turning of libidinal energy requires outside 
influence, it may be what ends primary narcissism and encourages the mother-child 
dyad. Once the mother-child dyad established, the child can begin to learn the dual 
structure of identification and enter the mirror stage.  
Yet the return to Freud does not provide an entirely viable solution, as it does not 
explain why a turning on itself of libidinal energy occurs, or why narcissism is so 
important in psychic organization. Lacan’s answer is his departure from the zoological 
study of Caillois: unlike other animals, humans single themselves out by taking 
themselves as their own libidinal objects. The answer, in other words, is that it is the 
human equivalent of instinct to position oneself as an independent, albeit 
                                                          
108 “The development of the ego consists in a departure from primary narcissism…brought about by means of the 
displacement of libido on to an ego ideal imposed from without…” Freud, The Standard Edition, 1960:XIV: 99, my italics. 
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interdependent entity among other similar (not identical) beings. The human equivalent 
could be translated as the need for recognition: as the need to recognize and be 
recognized by others is what generates internal struggles for submission and 
dominance, social struggles, gender differences, and even libidinal preferences, it 
seems that the human ‘drive’ towards subjectification is fuelled by such a need. As 
Benjamin points out, however, the need for recognition is not a product of habituation: 
while culture influences the way we construct our ego-ideals, the need to construct 
them is present from birth. Although its motor and neuronal capacities are limited, the 
child can still behave in relative awareness of its surroundings, discern the voice of its 
mother and manifest preference for the mother over other members of the family; this, 
to Benjamin, is a manifestation of the baby’s recognition of the mother. In turn, the 
mother recognizes the baby as baby, as well as its autonomy, granted to it by the 
physical act of separation from the mother’s body.  
Yet this has a deeper implication for subjectification: if the baby is born needing 
recognition for it/himself, it follows that the baby also can discern the mother. This 
suggests that the omnipotent state of the mother-child dyad becomes impossible: if the 
child can recognize the mother, then it cannot also regard her as an extension of the 
self. As Benjamin points out, it is more plausible to understand the initial omnipotence 
of the mother-child monad, as well as their dyadic relation, as episodic lapses into 
complete fusion, in which the child’s needs are so completely met by the mother that 
he feels as if she were part of him.109 As the child matures, the need to be recognized 
grows, and fusion with the mother becomes rarer; the child gradually concentrates its 
libidinal energy on the relation with the (specular) twin and learns to internalize the 
image, thus creating his ego ideal.110  
This view challenges the traditional Freudian view of the subject as a closed system of 
libidinal flow, which becomes open with the (inexplicable) emergence of a new psychic 
agency. Rather than seeing the baby’s subjectification as a sudden occurrence, it 
connects the Freudian idea of an emergence of the ego with Lacan’s view of an innate 
social drive, providing a cohesive picture of subjectification. From this perspective, 
considering the driving force behind the baby’s fascination with the specular image to 
be the need for recognition, the subsequent identification with the gestalt twin—the 
result of the baby’s ability to cathect narcissistically onto objects—would remain in line 
with Lacan’s theorization of the mirror stage.111 Nonetheless, it poses a problem to the 
                                                          
109 This solution is similar to the one proposed by Lear for the paradox of unconscious mind(s). See Lear, Freud, 2005. 
110 Benjamin, The Bonds of Love, 1990. 
111 Furthermore, acknowledging the existence of an embedded social character in humans is also congruent with 
Lacan’s literalization of the subject, and its necessary inscription into a social order by means of the letter. – See Fink, 
Lacan to the Letter, 2004 and Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe, The title of the letter, 1992. 
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Freudian understanding of primary narcissism: if the newborn needs recognition, it 
must have a modicum of understanding of the existence of the Other. Although the 
extent of this awareness is limited and not conceptual, the baby must nonetheless be 
able to understand, to an extent, that the Other is.  
In theorising the mirror stage, Lacan not only fills the gap between the infantile and 
mature egos by describing the mechanisms by which the self comes into being, but 
highlights the paramount importance of narcissism in self-constitution. In describing it 
as the ability to take oneself as the object of one’s libidinal cathexes, Freud had already 
shown narcissism is critical in subjectification, as it is by means of narcissism that the 
subject can understand his own subjecthood and ties to culture; Lacan elevates 
narcissism to the status of axis around which subjectification revolves. Yet Lacan’s 
account also points to an underlying tension in the Freudian theorization of the 
concept: in arguing that the birth of the subject takes place with the turning of libidinal 
cathexes onto oneself, it follows that a splitting of the ‘I’ is presupposed in this turning 
of libidinal cathexes, which also presupposes an existence of the subject. For the 
subject to take himself as an object of libidinal investment, he must be able to 
differentiate between an active (libidinally-investing) part of himself, and a passive 
(libidinally-invested) one. Moreover, regardless of whether the baby willingly turns 
libidinal cathexes onto himself, or an outside force faces the baby with his image from 
without, a question remains, which points to an underlying self-referential problem: how 
can one turn libidinal energy towards himself to bring about self-constitution, if one is 
not? 
In addressing the process of subjectification, Lacan shows the mechanisms by which 
the coming-into-being of the subject distorts the picture-perfect view of the ego 
psychoanalysis had held. Lacan exposes the genesis of the subject as tortured, as the 
subject must gradually renounce his comforting lapses into unity with the mother and 
face his disjointed self. From then on, Lacan shows the self permanently striving to 
maintain an acceptable degree of self-coherence by identifying with the (m)other and 
subjecting himself to the desire of the Other, whilst also repressing resurfaced infantile 
drives. The Lacanian view of the subject suggests a feasible psychic organization that 
can address the gap between the infantile and the mature. While still incapable of 
pinpointing subjects’ Origin, the Lacanian explanation avoids becoming self-referential, 
and paves the way for further inquiry into the psychic makeup of the social subject and 
the degree to which he is tied to others. This understanding of the coming-to-be of the 
self is rooted in history (and destabilised by it) and espouses the primacy given to the 
male imaginary, which is why I will employ it going forward to contrast it with instances 
when alternative forms of non-oedipal subjectivity can become manifest.  
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Summary of Chapter 1  
In this chapter I have traced the evolution of the status of representation and the way 
the subject positions himself in history. In transitioning from the Classical to the Modern 
period, the subject has morphed into both object and subject of knowledge—an 
essential move in establishing himself as capable of attaining pure knowledge, but one 
that signals a deeper shift, from a monadic understanding of the subject, to a dyadic, or 
split conception. After the change in épistéme, the subject becomes subject to his own 
probing, and establishes himself as object of his own knowledge. In getting to know 
himself, the subject deploys a complicated and fluid critical tool—language-as-
Dasein—through which he carves out a static, totalising account of what it means to 
become a human subject. The way this modern language is used to explain the 
genesis of the subject is fascinatingly rich, but its claim to universality is not 
unproblematic: despite intricate attempts to show the unique human subjectivity as 
enduring through time and space, this account of what it is to be a subject is revealed 
to be fundamentally historical, and to fall short of the plurality of which a fluid language 
is capable. In this chapter, I have sought to show that the concept of a unique subject-
position is historically determined, and not universally true. With the splitting of the ‘I’, 
the subject has opened the possibility for the existence of varied forms of 
subjectification, but has left these un- or under-explored. I will approach the subject 
henceforth as always-already encapsulating a plurality of different subjectivities and the 
potential for multiple modes of subjectification. From the following chapter onwards, I 
will discuss subjectivity in the context of The Bacchae and will interrogate 
subjectification through the prism of one of the play’s key characters, Dionysus.   
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Chapter 2 
Violence shall set you free: 
Eleutherios112 as the non-Symbolic 
subject 
 
In the previous chapter, I have shown that the linearity attached to the formation of 
psychic structures is historically determined and a product of the shift in épistéme that 
occurred with the transition to modernity. I used the theories of Freud, Lacan and 
Foucault to present a holistic picture of the psyche and argued that its coherence is 
historical and symptomatic of the male imaginary’s project to create a discourse that 
universalises and unifies the formation of the psyche. Despite theoretical 
inconsistencies, these works can function as a meta-narrative of the psyche and bring 
together the various guises of male discourse. This is not to say that the narrative 
structure is inherent in psychic structures, but that current understanding of the 
formation of the psyche necessarily takes narrative form and speaks to the phantasies 
and fears of the male imaginary. 
As shown previously, this understanding of the psyche presents the child entering the 
world as a blank slate, in a state of dependence on the mother and with little more than 
just spatial awareness. However, a change suddenly occurs: when entering the 
process of subjectification, the child transitions from reflexivity to reflectivity. The 
process of subjectification is the most important the child undergoes and opens the 
possibility for it to become a subject. Once a subject, it becomes impossible for the 
child to remember, date, or make sense of what preceded subjectification—this period 
is marked not by presence, but by lack: of psychic structures, differentiation, logic, 
discourse, linearity, narrative structures and time.  
The lack of temporality is an especially interesting aspect of what precedes 
subjectification: it is only when temporality becomes possible that the empirical 
determinants that shape the existence of the subject can become manifest. The period 
that precedes subjectification/reflectivity can be described in Lacanian terms as 
                                                          
112 Eleutherios is another name for Dionysus, meaning ‘the liberator’.  
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pertaining to the Real: the child exists in monadic, and, later, dyadic union with the 
mother, in a space that is characterized by omnipotence and lack of Being.113 Crucially, 
the non-subject cannot assign these ‘negative’ connotations of the attributes of the 
Real to this state of Being (or non-Being) until after the process of subjectification has 
been completed, as before it the non-subject would have no means to conceptualise 
either negativity or positivity, as it would not be able to employ language or concepts. 
Furthermore, as I will suggest later in this chapter, these negative connotations are 
dependent on the type of morality that governs a certain ideological climate; in the 
modern era, in a Nietzschean framework, we speak of Christian morality, an ethical 
system based on guilt, as opposed to Classical ethics, which revolve around displays 
of power.114 
However, once the subjectification process has been completed, the subject’s world 
opens to a series of possibilities: discourse, language, linear temporality and 
repression are enabled to exist. In other words, knowledge becomes possible by the 
transcendental ego, and with it, so does the necessity to chart one’s finitude and 
interrogate the conditions of one’s existence. The process of subjectification 
precipitates the birth of psychic structures, as the id, a left-over of the child’s period of 
reflexivity, becomes subordinated to the ego, the more sophisticated psychic structure 
that is the essence of reflectivity. At this point, an interesting development occurs: in 
the course of the transition between reflexivity and reflectivity, the child had been 
caught in a state of (non)-Being that required him to internalize the image of the mother 
for any type of self-reference to become possible. This means that the non-subject is 
necessarily one that internalizes the image of the mother, and uses it for self-definition 
post-reflectivity. Following subjectification and the birth of the ego, the now-subject 
undergoes another transformative process—the internalization of the Father, as part of 
the resolution of the oedipal crisis. The internalization of the Father enables the 
subject’s entry in the Symbolic order, and, in Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis, 
the appearance of a third and final psychic structure, the superego, which can be 
defined as a super-stratum of abstract concepts and ideals that regulate the relation 
                                                          
113 I would like to highlight two important aspects: firstly, I do not suggest that the Real is separate from the Symbolic, in 
an early-Lacanian fashion. It is more plausible to understand the Real as a passivity (in a Merleau-Pontian sense) that 
encapsulates the Symbolic, allowing for occasional lapses into the Real. Yet, while the late-Lacan’s view of the Real is 
preferable, I also argue that the non-subjectified infant cannot lapse into the Real, but exists in it, as access to the 
Symbolic is not yet possible, not having been eased into the phallic law through the oedipal stage. Following 
subjectification, return to the Real becomes a possibility, and, more importantly, a constant attraction and threat. 
Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, 2005. 
Secondly, I find Benjamin’s explanation of the monadic/dyadic union with the mother not as a continued state, but as 
periodical return to a specific type of Being most convincing. I am therefore not arguing that prior to subjectification the 
child is one with the mother, following to ‘break free’ suddenly once he has become reflective. Rather, as the child 
approaches subjectification, the returns to this union become rarer and rarer. As an adult, omnipotence is craved and 
resisted at the same time, as giving into its possibility would mean returning to a state of non-Being. Benjamin, The 
bonds of love, 1990. I use the term ‘Being’ and ‘non-Being’ in the same sense as Heidegger, to denote an ontological 
status of the subject. Heidegger, Being and Time, 1962. 
114 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy & The Genealogy of Morals, (New York: Anchor Books, 1990).  
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with the Symbolic. Following this process, the subject can be said to have internalised 
both the images of the mother and that of the Father. The figure of the mother is one 
that perpetually haunts the subject, becoming the Lacanian petit objet a, a double form 
of loss that never leaves the subject. The figure of the mother, however, is not defined 
as a structuring element, which is problematic for the existence of the subject in the 
Symbolic. I will return to this idea in Chapter 3 when discussing the sterile separation 
from the mother and Butler’s use of kinship, but it is important to emphasise that we 
can understand the process of subjectification as being interwoven with the rules that 
govern kin relations, as subjectification itself is based, like kinship, on the continued 
influence and ‘taking in’ of others.115  
If the charting of this developmental progress is correct, then it follows that, prior to the 
internalization of the Father, the subject exists in a unique state of Being with the 
internalized figure of the mother, which differs from the state of non-Being with the 
internalized figure of the mother prior to subjectification. This state of Being appears 
nowhere else in the subject’s life but can be described as similar to the subject’s adult 
state, yet, crucially, without the ‘civilising’ influence of the Name of the Father. 
Consequently, the subject in this state will have the potential to exhibit intra-subjective 
aggression, but without the ability to repress it and allow the violence to resurface in 
different guises, non-threatening to the male imaginary. 
Imagining a subject that has somehow failed to internalise the Father is impossible, as 
psychoanalysis shows the resolution of the oedipal crisis takes place even if there is no 
father-figure to guide the infant through it.116 A subject that has self-awareness, and 
benefits from the epistemologically-inquisitive nature of the transcendental ego, but 
lacks the civilizing influence of higher psychic structures, such as ethics and inviolable 
social rules, should not be able to exist. Indeed, it can be argued that the type of 
subject described is the psychotic subject, one that lacks any psychic structure to 
regulate his subjection to reality. Yet it is important to reemphasise that the type of 
claim I make is radical: while, as I argue in Chapter 4, the element thus born will be 
psychotic, it would not be a psychotic subject. The subject structure I propose, which I 
term the ‘non-Symbolic subject’, would not be, like the psychotic subject, unable to 
make decisions that conform to the cultural and ethical standards of phallic society. If 
we consider the ‘normal’ subject accedes to the Symbolic by undergoing some form 
(even partial) of prohibition, we can argue that the psychotic subject undergoes a 
failed, partial, or even defective oedipal stage, while the non-Symbolic subject is a type 
                                                          
115 See Henry Krips, “The Politics of the Gaze: Foucault, Lacan and Žižek”, Culture Unbound—Journal of Cultural 
Studies. 2010. Vol.2 and 77; and Lacan, Seminar II, 1991. 
116 See Freud, The Standard Edition, 1960:VII. 
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of subject for whom the oedipal stage is not ever initiated. The subjectification process 
is halted before the subject has the chance to internalise the Father.117 
If such a non-Symbolic subject were to exist, I believe it could be argued that it would 
be a creature capable of extreme acts of violence: in the absence of the process 
through which one becomes part of the Symbolic, the non-Symbolised subject would 
lack the normalising influence of the superego. If the superego is the psychic structure 
that forces the ego into moral, as opposed to utilitarian, rational or instinctual patterns 
of behaviour, then its absence is not sufficient to reduce one to reflexivity (as the 
absence of a transcendental ego would), but would simply render the person amoral.118 
Thus, whilst capable to delay gratification and use its ego to the full extent of its 
capabilities, including intellectual pursuits and abstract reasoning, the non-Symbolic 
subject would be unable to comprehend the necessity of a third entity that is meant to 
dilute intra-subjective aggression and force it into channels of expression harmless to 
the male imaginary. Here, I am still working in a Freudian/Lacanian framework, and 
speak of two psychic structures, and a missing third one (the superego). In the third 
chapter, I address the formation of psychic structures from a Kleinian perspective and 
situate the violent tendencies of the Kleinian subject in relation to both the barriers 
instituted by the male imaginary and the (existent) persecutory superego. It is for this 
reason that, in addressing the mother, I speak of her as a presence comparable to that 
of the Father but not, in the Lacanian picture, a structuring element. I will return to the 
figure of the mother and argue for her structuring capacity, as theorising subjectification 
without accounting for the place of the mother means theorising kinship without 
acknowledging the maternal plays a part in the process. 
If only two psychic structures (the id and the ego) act to shape the livelihood of a 
subject, significant changes occur: most importantly, in the absence of guilt, there can 
be no consideration for others—which is to say that the subject would lack the ability to 
empathise.119 Empathy is a by-product of one’s ability to form narcissistic cathexes, 
which, in the absence of an internalised Father-figure, become meaningless. Without 
the common ground that this image provides (a central internalised icon, which can be 
                                                          
117 I will use The Bacchae to explore this alternative type of subjectification and show that Dionysus, who I use as the 
skeletal structure of the non-Symbolic subject, enters the Symbolic clandestinely.  
118 Although in normally habituated individuals the influence of the superego is not easily seen, it is present, and the 
rules set in the Symbolic have become so ingrained (i.e.: the influence of the superego over psychic structures so 
strong), that they are common sense, as opposed to morally-guided actions. It is when acting against the rules of the 
Symbolic that a clash between the ego and the superego appears, in the form of guilt: as Anna Freud explains, "…our 
picture of the superego always tends to become hazy when harmonious relations exist between it and the ego. We then 
say that the two coincide, i.e. at such moments the superego is not perceptible as a separate institution either to the 
subject himself or to an outside observer. Its outlines become clear only when it confronts the ego with hostility or at 
least with criticism. The superego, like the id, become perceptible in the state which it produces within the ego: for 
instance, when its criticism evokes a sense of guilt." – Freud, Anna, The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense, (London: 
Karnac Books, 1936), 5. 
119 Greenson, “Empathy and Its Vicissitudes”, International Journal of Psychoanalysis,  XLI:418-424. 
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understood as the core of the Symbolic), the subject cannot form narcissistic bonds, as 
there exists no appeal in the image of the Other for the subject to be drawn into forming 
them: although the child has also internalised, and perhaps even absorbed by this 
stage the image of the mother, the incomplete separation from her makes her image 
unsuitable for forming narcissistic cathexes. Since she is a doubly menacing element, 
one that threatens the dissolution of the self, abjection and death, it is counterintuitive 
for the subject to cathect onto and replicate an image that arouses such anxiety. 
Without narcissistic cathexes, another essential ability disappears, that of forming 
relations with others. The non-Symbolised subject can, from this viewpoint, only exist 
on the outskirts of society, as its inability to fashion itself through the Other’s desire 
excludes it from human society. Finally, the amoral character of this type of subject 
necessarily implies the existence and exertion of extreme levels of violence. Combined 
with the remaining inter-subjective aggression, particularly directed against the mother 
and the self, the subject’s amorality empowers it to manifest the aggression that, in 
normal subjects, would be repressed and diffused into different outlets. This adds 
another important trait, which is the propensity for unmediated, pure violence.  
 
Why posit the existence of such a subject? 
Despite the impossibility of an adult non-Symbolic subject to exist in everyday life, we 
cannot assume that the influence of the non-Symbolic subject is completely lost once 
the image of the Father is internalised. Indeed, the non-Symbolic subject can be seen 
as the first (and only) moment in the infant’s life when it can attain some degree of 
omnipotence whilst in the possession of an ego. Up to this point, the degree of 
omnipotence allowed to the not-yet-subject was limited to lapses into union with the 
mother, which, in turn, were translated into perfect, or near-perfect control of the 
physical environment.120 However, once the infant becomes a subject, it exists for a 
brief time in a period of self-awareness, but unrestrained by the mediating influence of 
the superego. This translates into complete freedom, in the sense that the subject can 
reason and act upon its desires without feeling guilt and without having to subject itself 
to the rules of the Symbolic.121 I would argue that this state of Being comes close to, if 
not embodies, the omnipotence the adult subject craves once he begins the permanent 
                                                          
120 Here I refer to the fact that, in the monadic and dyadic stages, the mother anticipates the infant’s needs without the 
infant being required to do anything. Once the separation between the mother and the child begins, and frustration 
invariably appears, the degree of omnipotence of the baby decreases exponentially. Mahler, The psychological birth of 
the human infant, (London: Karnac, 1989). 
121 At this point, I am still employing a Lacanian framework. Although Klein pinpoints the emergence of the superego far 
earlier than Lacan, I now argue from a phallocentric perspective, in which the superego serves to protect the male 
imaginary from the destructive influence of the id. The Kleinian superego is a far darker structure, which does not serve 
the same purpose. I will return to this idea in Chapter 3. 
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oscillation between the extremes of social domination and submission. The most 
significant element in this context is that this omnipotence, even if short-lived, is 
superimposed on a mode of Being of the subject, as opposed to its usual mode of 
(quasi-omnipotent) non-Being, as is the case prior to subjectification. Consequently, 
when attaining omnipotence as a non-Symbolic subject, one has far less cause to fear 
the dissolution of identity inherent in attaining omnipotence by return to the 
dyadic/monadic (abject) state; furthermore, it implies that the omnipotence of the non-
Symbolic subject is, while not necessarily exempt, at least shielded from the 
annihilating influence of the Real. The non-Symbolic subject must necessarily have ties 
with both the Symbolic, by virtue of its being self-aware, albeit not yet in the image of 
the Father, and the Real, as the non-Symbolic subject retains its links with the 
elements that pertain to the mother and are cast out of the Symbolic by the male 
imaginary. While the oscillation between the Real and the Symbolic reinforces the non-
Symbolic subject’s liminal character, it also points to the reason the image of such a 
subject may appear as a cultural product throughout time: a completely self-sufficient, 
rational subject, who can allow its id free reign without fearing social retribution or guilt 
captures the omnipotence the adult subject craves, yet can never achieve for fear of 
dissolution of identity and return to non-Being. For the regular subject, the dread of the 
Real forever lurks outside Symbolic boundaries. 
To explore the non-Symbolic subject and its manifestation in contemporary culture, I 
turn to literature: the literary medium, René Girard explains, is one of the most prolific 
grounds for the study of human typologies, peculiarities, and customs. Literature allows 
one to chart the recurrence of patterns, whether in the presence of characters or types, 
or in their absence. I hope that, through a return to ancient Greek tragedy, I could 
provide a modern rereading of subjectification, one that could propose an alternative to 
the oedipal model. As outlined earlier in this thesis, I use literature as a tool to identify 
and trace the evolution of quasi-transcendental elements, as well as changes in 
épistéme, the status of representation, and the place of the transcendental subject in 
his lifeworld.  
 
The problem of violence and its links to sacrifice 
To explore the non-Symbolic subject in more detail, I concentrate on the figure of 
Dionysus in The Bacchae. I use this tragedy to propose that the non-Symbolic subject 
as a structure is connected to the figure of the mother as structuring element (although 
not reduced to it), and serves to stretch, test and threaten the boundaries of a male-
only Symbolic. As the non-Symbolic subject’s existence is inherently violent and deeply 
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dangerous for the Symbolic, I will use Girard’s theory to interpret the type of violence 
we see in The Bacchae and show that literature has the potential to contain (and 
psychosocially manage) violence to allow for a non-annihilating breakdown in the 
Symbolic. Through the non-Symbolic subject, we witness the exposition of a lack at the 
heart of the Symbolic (the mother), which, in the play, is brought forward through a 
rupture amid kinship.  
My main proposal is that the non-Symbolic subject is a structured form of subjectivity at 
the heart of the psyche that allows us to experience (and, in the play, precipitates) the 
dissolution of the Symbolic. I argue that the existence of this type of subjectivity opens 
the way for us to begin to think of alternative, more inclusive, forms of psychic 
structuring, which go beyond the oedipal model and do not expel the mother from the 
psychic space, but instead acknowledge her. I will show the non-Symbolic subject 
represents a collection of elements the everyday subject craves (self-sufficiency, guilt-
free life, complete omnipotence), but which, through their existence, threaten the 
Symbolic. The dissolution of Symbolic boundaries the non-Symbolic subject announces 
is mirrored by a similar dissolution in the play: that of kin relations, which, following 
Butler, I understand to be a “set of relationships of dependency”, recognisable through 
time and space, which are to do with life and death.122 In this thesis, I will take kinship 
to reveal the subject’s inner development, and regard it as regulatory of the way the 
subject orients itself towards life and death. 
I will return to Butler’s theorisation of kinship in Chapters 3 and 4 and will argue that the 
existence of the non-Symbolic subject shows the failure of the relations of dependency 
at the heart of kinship to organise kin relations in a categorical way and delineate the 
limits of kinship. Yet it is important to briefly consider kin relations and their links to the 
non-Symbolic subject now. If kin relations are modelled on the psyche and the psyche 
reflects the way kinship works, their fluidity will necessarily be translated into similar 
fluidity at the heart of the psyche, which the non-Symbolic subject shares. I do not wish 
to posit the existence of a fixed structure and suggest that the psychic apparatus would 
be complete if only for the inclusion of reference to the non-Symbolic subject. On the 
contrary, I argue that it is this very fixity associated with the makeup of the psyche that 
is problematic; I propose we need to move beyond it and define the organisation of the 
psyche in a way that recognises and allows for fluidity. My reading of psychic structures 
is based on the idea that both the structures and the spaces in which these exist are 
moveable; attempts to pin them down in immovable boundaries are inherently 
destructive exercises, and what constitutes the hubris in The Bacchae. Working against 
                                                          
122 Butler, “Kinship Trouble in The Bacchae”, 2017. 
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the fluidity of structures and registers would only re-inscribe the problems generated by 
fixity, and would fail to go beyond its limits, thus also failing the Irigarayan project. 
Considering psychic structures and the spaces in which they exist to be fluid, however, 
would allow us to show where constraints upon fluidity result in damage being done to 
the way the subject exists in the world, and would encourage us to consider an 
alternative understanding of structure.  
As outlined in Chapter 1, psychic structures, and, in particular, their immovability, 
protect the (male) Symbolic from destruction; similarly, kin relations seek to ward off 
violence at the heart of the family and preserve its integrity. In this context, the non-
Symbolic subject becomes the manifestation of the vulnerability of the Symbolic, of the 
violence amidst kin relations, and of the way the subject positions himself towards life 
and death. The non-Symbolic subject, and, in The Bacchae, Dionysus and the 
destruction he brings, are reminders of the reason safeguards are needed to protect 
the ego; yet by facilitating a rift so dangerous as to threaten the integrity of the subject, 
they also reveal that its vulnerability lies in its immovability.  
Violence, however, is fundamental to the subject, and is, in many ways, its driving 
force, as Hobbes suggested in relatively recent philosophical history. From the 
viewpoint of psychic development, Freud pioneered a similar idea by charting infantile 
sexuality, strengthened, later on, by Klein through her theory of the paranoid-schizoid 
and depressive positions, which situates violence at the core of psychic development. 
Similarly, Lacan proposed the notion of intra-subjective aggression, manifested as 
affairement jubilatoire and connaissance paranoiaque, and suggested that the 
existence of the Real, with the Maternal Thing at its centre, poses a constant threat to 
the subject, to which the natural response is tension that evolves in violence.123 
Through violence, one allows more primal instincts to resurface and degenerate into 
mindless bloodshed, which is why the possibility of violence generates negative 
responses. It is therefore interesting that Girard124 differentiates between two types of 
violence, pure and impure, both connected to sacrifice. It is important to consider 
sacrifice when discussing violence at the heart of the psyche, especially when the 
violence proves indiscriminate enough to transgress Symbolic boundaries and threaten 
the integrity of the Symbolic. Sacrifice helps neutralise violence and diffuses it to 
reinstate the boundaries that protect the male imaginary. All violence, Girard argues, 
has a sacrificial aspect attached to it, much like all sacrificial acts are violent in nature. 
                                                          
123 See Hobbes, The Leviathan, (St Ives: Oxford University Press, 2008); Freud, The standard edition, 1960); Klein, The 
Writings of Melanie Klein, Volume 1-4, 1975; Lacan, Écrits, 2006; Kristeva, Powers of horror, 1982.  
124 Throughout this chapter, I will make reference to the theories of René Girard to explore the place of violence in 
society, particularly its purifying aspects. I do not intend, however, to chart the history or theory of sacrifice, and do not 
engage with the concept further.  
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While impure violence is mindless, self-perpetuating aggression that threatens to 
destroy communities, pure violence (sacrifice) is the kind of aggression that can end all 
violence and restore peace. It is meant to appease violence that cannot find its true 
victim: as it is unable to attack the real object of ire, violence finds a surrogate victim, 
chosen because of its vulnerability and proximity. 
“[S]ociety”, Girard writes, “is seeking to deflect upon...a “sacrificeable” victim the 
violence that would otherwise be vented on its own members, the people it most 
desires to protect.”125 In choosing the victim of a sacrifice, one must look towards those 
who have a liminal character; in Greek tragedy, these would be those who live on the 
fringes of society: uninitiated children, unmarried adolescents, prisoners of war, and the 
King.126 For a human or category to become sacrificeable, they must have no ties to 
the wider community, to avoid fear of retribution, or volunteer to be sacrificed. Sacrifice 
must also distance itself from the idea of vengeance, which is seen as self-perpetuating 
violence, and draw participants in a mutually accepted act of sacrificial substitution, 
through which the characteristics of the object of anger are transferred onto the victim. 
Sacrificial substitution “must never...cease to be aware of the act of transference from 
[the]...object to the surrogate victim; without that awareness, no substitution can take 
place and the sacrifice loses all efficacy.”127 The sacrificial victim is always a substitute 
for all members of a community, offered by members themselves, to protect the 
community from its own violence: “[t]he elements of dissention scattered throughout the 
community are drawn to the…victim and eliminated…by its sacrifice.”128  
The most prominent context in which the need for a sacrifice is felt is that of a specific 
type of crisis, which Girard terms sacrificial. Going back to Greek tragedy, he argues 
each tragic instance depicts such a crisis by illustrating the dangers of allowing chaotic 
violence to spread through the community, threatening it from within. By portraying 
events that take place at the top of the social hierarchy, the tragedy paints a situation 
that pervades the whole community: when characters’ motives can no longer be easily 
quantified as ‘legitimate’ or ‘illegitimate’, the violence each inflicts is legitimate and self-
perpetuating. In this context, only sacrificial violence can purify and restore order.  
The dissolution of boundaries and identity threatens violence, as it prefigures the 
dissolution of a cultural order, of the boundaries of Symbolic rationality and logic. To 
Girard, it is this dissolution and the perpetuation of ‘sameness’ that Greek tragedies 
                                                          
125 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 4. 
126 The King, Girard explains, is on the margins of society, escaping it “via the roof”, just like the Greek pharmakos 
escape through the cellar. Although the King has a double (the fool), who serves a semi-sacrificial purpose in the sense 
that he is vulnerable to the King’s own aggressive tendencies, the King himself is sacrificeable to a far greater extent 
than the fool. Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 5. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 8. 
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analyse: they explore instances of duality in which tragic characters become ‘twins’ and 
make claims to violence that are legitimate to the point of becoming identical, and thus 
impure. We see this confusion of identity and perpetuation of sameness in the case of 
Antigone: in trying to fulfil her familial duty, she becomes a mirror image of Polyneices, 
the brother decreed by Creon to be in the wrong. As a result, she is exposed, left to 
die. However, the similarities between characters make both Antigone’s and Creon’s 
claims founded, and the two characters alike. By attempting to kill Antigone, Creon falls 
prey to the violence set in motion by the appearance of a double, and the play 
culminates in bloodshed, in undifferentiated violence that contaminates the whole 
community.129 The proliferation of the double is associated with the dissolution of the 
self and threatens to allow violence to spill into the community and plunge it into chaos, 
or undifferentiatedness: in The Bacchae, the arrival of Dionysus, the double of 
Pentheus and his kin, followed by the violence initiated by Pentheus against Dionysus, 
is what leads to the tragic outcome of the play. Some reparation is done through the 
sacrifice of the twins: Pentheus is killed (a scapegoat elected from within the 
community), while Dionysus leaves Thebes as a god. Pentheus becomes an ideal 
(eminently sacrificeable) leader, who values order and rationality, and who suffers to 
make these a possibility.  
Undifferentiatedness is, perhaps, the most threatening aspect of a sacrificial crisis: the 
loss of distinction between individuals leads to the homogenisation of the community, 
jeopardising language, rites, thinking and rationality itself. Uncontained sameness also 
threatens kin relations, the relations that exist to protect those who belong to them, and 
makes it impossible for kin to tell kin apart, rendering prohibitions against violence and 
incest moot. In the absence of difference, a suitable victim cannot be chosen, and the 
sacrificial act only perpetuates impure violence. It this context, the need for an outsider 
is felt, one that can appal through his/her non-conformity, but also enchant through 
his/her presence and similarity to the members of the community. Through the 
disruptive presence of an outsider, a scapegoat can be identified from within the 
community and sacrificed so that the necessity for rules, rationality and reason can be 
reasserted. In The Bacchae, it is interesting that the scapegoat, Pentheus, should be 
the outsider’s, Dionysus, double; the killing of Pentheus has strong echoes of a ritual 
sacrifice, yet is unwilling—Pentheus is murdered when mistaken for a mountain lion. I 
will return to the relationship between Pentheus and Dionysus in Chapters 3 and 4, but 
it is worth noting that, although duality is present in the play, these double strands are 
not narrative structures, and do not order the plot; as Butler shows, in being 
delineations of kinship, they become constitutive binds, definitive and approximate, and 
                                                          
129 Sophocles, The Three Theban Plays, (New York: Penguin Books, 1984). 
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constitute the lives of those enmeshed in them, but their punishments and boundaries 
remain fluid.130 
Sacrifice, as defined by Girard, serves a cathartic function; once this function is lost, a 
crisis occurs that renders void both the purpose of sacrifice and cultural distinctions. 
This crisis is ended by the collective directing of violence towards a surrogate victim, 
someone whose death restores difference and the cultural order and makes sacrifice 
meaningful again. The sacrifice of the surrogate victim begins a new sacrificial system, 
whose point of origin is itself. This implies that the surrogate victim cannot fully pertain 
to the society plunged in a sacrificial crisis; s/he must have connections to the outside, 
or at least have some trait that renders her/him different from the homogenized 
masses; otherwise, the ritual sacrifice would not be distinguishable, and the surrogate 
victim’s death would be another act of impure violence. At the ritualistic moment of the 
sacrifice, the victim is considered a receptacle of all the ills that plagued society, a 
polluted object whose death would purify the community. Yet the sacrificed object is 
dual in nature, both polluted and venerated, as it is through her/his death that purifying 
violence can be reinstated.131  
The sacrificeable outsider must possess traits that alter his/her condition as member of 
society. Although different, the victim must belong to the community, but have suffered 
some form of crucial modification, such as having been in contact, cursed by, or 
targeted by an outsider. Pentheus, the leader who opposes the god Dionysus, is the 
pillar of the community. His strong and sudden obsession with Dionysus, his desire to 
be close to him (initially to enact violence, then to revel in his power), and the taboos 
he breaks in achieving this desire make him unrecognizable. Being a leader, he is 
sacrificeable, as he is on the fringes of society; in stark contrast to Dionysus, he stands 
for everything rational, while Dionysus stands for everything instinctual; finally, after his 
‘contamination’ by Dionysus that leads to transgression into taboo and 
undifferentiatedness (ecstatic revelry and cross-dressing), Pentheus becomes both 
outcast and integral part of the community—the ideal sacrifice. At the very least, the 
sacrificial victim shares its liminal character with the outsider, both existing on the 
fringes of society, never fully embedded in its fabric. In enacting sacrificial violence the 
transition from the chaotic violence of the sacrificial crisis to the order restored by the 
targeted act of sacred violence is displayed: the victim is abused, special emphasis 
being placed on his/her genitals, as recognition of the intrinsic link between violence 
and sexuality. Following this abuse, the victim is honoured and treated with reverence, 
                                                          
130 Butler, 2017. 
131 In Greek, pharmakos, the sacrificeable population, means both ‘sickness’ and ‘cure’, both ‘poison’ and ‘antidote’, 
making sacrifice an ambiguous act best left to those specifically trained: shamans, priests, magicians, doctors. 
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allowing him/her to finally come to embody both toxic, indiscriminate violence, and the 
beneficial, purifying kind. In The Bacchae, Pentheus is murdered by the women he had 
considered powerless, in a ritual act of castration: the fir tree (axis mundi) in which he 
had climbed to escape them is uprooted, and Pentheus falls to the ground, where he is 
dismembered by the crazed Bacchants. It is his mother who beheads him, and carries 
his head mounted on a staff, having mistaken him for a mountain-lion. The person who 
performs the sacrifice in this situation is compelling: sacrifices are traditionally 
performed by the initiated, which Agave is not; nonetheless, she is initiated in the 
Bacchic rites and the best equipped to sever the ties of kinship from within. Once the 
ecstatic revelry is over, the remains of Pentheus are honoured, although not as if they 
had been an intended sacrifice. Interestingly, in the play the sacrifice happens 
suddenly, and is never marked as such; in the end, it can only be identified from a 
third-person perspective, retrospectively, like the process of subjectification itself. 
The hostility the members of a community feel for one another is concentrated against 
the scapegoat; the community is attracted and repelled by its origins, and feels the 
need to re-experience them, which results in overabundant aggression towards the 
Other. Yet the elusive nature of the Origin suggests that “the source of the evil is the 
community itself”, Girard writes, as the only way it could witness its origins would be to 
allow violence free play, in a reiteration of the original human condition.132  
Yet allowing violence free play would only succeed in returning the community to an 
(original) state of non-Being, without allowing its members to re-experience it. Subjects 
are unable to trace the origin of their own empirical determinants, despite being aware 
that a point of origin must exist. Thus, subjects’ attempt to succumb to violence to 
return to their point of origin is destined to fail: subjects’ origin remains fundamentally 
untraceable, as any return to origin can never go beyond the constitution of the first 
subject. Thus, the Origin remains fundamentally unknowable. Although Foucault (and 
Heidegger) speak of the origin of language, the fact that Foucault identifies language 
as an empirical determinant suggests that language encompasses rationality, logic and 
cultural boundaries, and, along with other empirical determinants, describes the 
condition of the subject as transcendental ego. A return to the point of origin of quasi-
transcendental elements would entail the dissolution of the transcendental ego and an 
exercise to which subjects could not be privy.133 
                                                          
132 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 99. 
133 Arguably, this impossibility is something early communities have long understood: as the point of Origin lies outside 
the Symbolic and pertains to an ‘untraceable anteriority’, they have tried to capture a surrogate Origin through ritual. 
See Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 1979 and Eliade, The Sacred and The Profane, (Orlando: Harcourt, Inc., 1959). 
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The desire to return to the point of origin is, according to Girard, but also Freud, 
Kristeva, Lacan, Foucault, and Heidegger, a very potent one, but one that cannot ever 
be fulfilled. One type of wish-fulfilment that could provide a modicum of relief is, I would 
suggest, the doubling of the self, and the scapegoating of the double. The double is 
already a threating presence, one that forebodes the dissolution of the self by means of 
its presence. To Freud, the double is a means of distancing oneself from death, and a 
harbinger of death itself. This idea is taken further by Girard, who argues that the twin 
is a harbinger of violence, someone who can collapse the world into a sacrificial crisis 
and whose sacrifice can purify the community. For this reason, the scapegoat can be 
read as a twin image of the average member of the community, his double; the original 
oppressor is always the member of the community, as the evil comes from within, and 
the victim is the spitting image of the original oppressor. His creation momentarily 
satisfies the wish for return ad-originem, as through the presence of the double the 
boundaries of selfhood are dissolved, while its sacrifice enables the purification of 
society and the return to ‘normality’. For the scapegoat to function as a double, all 
members of the community must participate in the ritual sacrifice; otherwise, the 
sacrifice becomes murder and loses its purifying function. In The Bacchae, the revenge 
of Dionysus takes the form of an act of sacrifice—the killing of Pentheus. As a double 
of Dionysus, the stranger who brought chaos and had to be destroyed, Pentheus too 
causes chaos by intruding in a god’s religious rituals. His murder comes at the hands of 
maddened Bacchants, who act as a religious ecstatic community. 
If the quintessential trait of the scapegoat is the dilution of violence, then that of the 
non-Symbolic subject will be its proliferation. An essential element in violence, Girard 
argues, is desire, not for an object, but for violence itself: desire desires violence 
because violence comes to symbolise the prerogative of the divine being.134 In other 
words, the perfect act of violence (spontaneous, unprovoked and extreme) is the mark 
of the divine, of the one who requires no Other for self-constitution, and thus need not 
act in response to any external event. As a result, the non-Symbolic subject will 
necessarily display propensity for extreme violence by virtue of its being independent of 
Symbolic constraints and not reliant on intersubjectivity.  
In the mechanisms of desire, Girard identifies three elements: the subject and the rival, 
which are of primary importance, and the object, which is of secondary importance. 
The rival occupies the most prominent role, as he desires the same object as the 
subject, thus lending the object its desirability. Girard’s argument is Lacanian, in the 
sense that he argues desire always arises as a result of the Other’s influence and 
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cannot exist in the absence of the Other. Desire becomes a mimetic act, directed at 
imitating the desire of the Other to mask the subject’s own lack of Being. This implies 
that there is no original desire, other than that of covering up the subject’s lack of Being 
through mimesis, and that, consequently, all subjects are the same; by this token, any 
community can collapse into violence, as the endless repetition of the same typology of 
subjecthood annuls identity and gives rise to a sacrificial crisis. The outsider who can 
break the crisis must therefore be different from the other subjects, in the sense that 
s/he cannot be driven by the same mimetic need. At the same time, s/he can also be 
almost identical, but threatening in his/her potentially un-structuring quality, as shown in 
both Freud’s narrative of uncanniness, and Lacan’s exploration of Das Ding.  
The outsider (such as Dionysus) calls to the subject because s/he has managed to fill 
his/her lack of Being, and no longer needs to replicate a subject-typology (the image of 
the Father) to maintain his/her desire; at the same time, the outsider is seen as 
abhorrent, as s/he has transcended the limitations imposed by his/her lack of Being, 
and is not dependent on intersubjectivity for self-constitution. The outsider can appear 
a monstrous double, both in him/herself, in the form of two characters (human and 
animal, possessed, etc.), and the double of the (future) scapegoat. This type of 
monstrous duality announces indiscriminate violence and the sacrificial crisis.  
The ‘difference’ exhibited by the outsider points to another essential character of the 
non-Symbolic subject: it must be self-sufficient, which means that it cannot be 
constrained by Symbolic boundaries, but must be free to move between the Real and 
Symbolic; in other words, it must be both feminine and masculine and reflect the 
failings of the subject’s self-constitution through (mis)representation. 
The character of Dionysus in The Bacchae captures all the characteristics of the non-
Symbolic subject, and I use his figure as the framework onto which the prerogatives of 
the non-Symbolic subject can be illustrated. There is, however, more than one reason I 
suggest The Bacchae can be used to explore the non-Symbolic subject. The tragedy 
was written by Euripides in the final years of his life, and it premiered posthumously at 
the Dionysia Festival, in 405 BC. The period in which it was written is important: the 
ancient world pertains to the social organisation that regards life, language and labour 
as quasi-transcendental elements; however, it precedes the shift in épistéme that 
propelled the subject at the centre of scientific and philosophic inquiry, situated by 
Foucault in the 17th century, and belongs to the type of ideology that saw man as an 
orchestrator, rather than producer of knowledge. This implies that texts from this period 
use a different system of reference to quasi-transcendental elements, particularly 
language, and manage to by-pass the subjective, introspective character of 
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anthropocentric texts that necessarily follow the shift in ideology. The model one can 
derive from working with such texts will be descriptive of human vicissitudes, and it will 
resist contextualising these in an anthropocentric framework. Finally, the text belongs 
to a period which is exempt from what Nietzsche calls ‘slave morality’, as it was written 
before the onset of Christianity.135 Nietzsche’s thought is that ‘slave morality’ is based 
entirely on the desires, hopes and fears of a conquered people, and is thus opposed to 
displays of power, domination and aggression, which it sees in a negative light. By 
choosing a text that precedes this type of morality, I do not seek to idealise a ‘pure’ 
ancient past, but to gain sufficient clarity to flesh out the non-Symbolic subject outside 
the pauses of post-Christian language on intra-subjective aggression. With this in mind, 
I argue that the figure of the non-Symbolic subject will display the following traits:  
Androgyny:  the non-Symbolic subject must be independent of Real/Symbolic 
constraints, and free to move between them; both feminine and masculine, it will 
display deviant, overabundant sexuality, like a child in a state of polymorphous 
perversity. In the case of Dionysus, androgyny is the first trait others notice: he is an 
effeminate god, and throughout the play we see instances where he appears to be 
male, but acts and is seen by others as female. In his interactions with Pentheus (as 
representative of the male imaginary), Dionysus occupies the female, inferior subject 
position, a position mirrored by the one he occupies in relation to his father (Zeus), and 
his sister (Athena). Dionysus comes from the outside (Lydia), an exotic element that 
disturbs the peace of the home-town, the hearth. His sexuality is overabundant, 
combining phallic elements and feminine jouissance, and is perceived by those who 
oppose him as a corrupter of rationality and morality, for whom the only acceptable fate 
is death through castration (beheading): he is described by Pentheus as “a wizard, a 
sorcerer from Lydia, with fragrant golden curls and ruddy face and spells of love in his 
eyes,...[who] spends his days and nights in the company of young women, pretending 
to initiate them in the bacchic mysteries.”  Enraged by the apparition of the stranger, 
Pentheus declares: “If I catch him in this house, I’ll stop him from beating his thyrsus 
and tossing his curls. I’ll cut his neck from his body.”136 Dionysus has the power to 
initiate a sacred rite that exists independently of the precepts of Symbolic order and 
linear time; however, this rite affects the Symbolic, changing it irremediably and 
disrupting the (apparently uninterrupted) flow of rationality. 
Unusual birth/parentage: for the self-sufficiency of the non-Symbolic subject to be 
apparent, the circumstances of its birth must be unusual, and display its ability to move 
freely between the Symbolic and the Real, not belonging to any one register, but 
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existing within them at will. Unlike mortals (or even other gods), Dionysus had a double 
birth: with the death of Semele, he was taken from her by his father, Zeus, and allowed 
to reach viability in his thigh. Therefore, he does not undergo a traditional transition 
from the Real to the Symbolic, from maternal jouissance to paternal rule; rather, he 
exists always-already in the Symbolic, having been born in it. He has not undergone a 
period of omnipotence from which to break free, but enjoys the liberty of the Real in a 
Symbolic setting: he can move between the two registers without fearing dissolution of 
identity. I will return to Dionysus, but it is important to note at this point that his birth is 
not only problematic, but also unclear: he is born by either (both?) a woman (Semele) 
or/and a male (Zeus), and he lives his childhood as a boy, or, in some versions of 
mythology, as a girl. Dionysus is also referred to as ‘the bull-horned god’, and accounts 
of his childhood mention that he can shape-shift.137  
Like a disruptive element, Dionysus appears as unhindered id, as pure libidinal energy, 
but, crucially, capable of measured (albeit violent) decisions, uprooting rationality and 
instilling chaos. He is a phallic god: he is the bull-horned god, whom the fates adorned 
with coils of serpents, and who is worshipped through displays of violence (sexual, like 
orgies, and physical, like the hunt). Nonetheless, his Maenads enjoy a surreal setting 
that blends elements of violence (such as the delight of killing and revelling in the blood 
of the killed creature) with bucolic scenes, as “the ground [that] flows with milk, flows 
with wine, flows with the nectar of bees”, and the air that is as “fragrant as Syrian 
frankincense.”138 Descriptions of Dionysus capitalise on the fluidity of his gender, and 
his ability to occupy various and multiple subject positions at will: he is male, female, 
and animal.  
Propensity for pure, extreme violence: not being constrained by the influence of the 
superego, the non-Symbolic subject can release the full potential of its id without 
fearing retribution or guilt. In the case of Dionysus, he chooses, for no clear reason 
other than vengeance against a specific group of people, to plunge the whole of 
Thebes into chaos and set in motion a sacrificial crisis through the dissolution of 
individuality. Although he announces he seeks vengeance for the destruction of the 
tomb of his mother, it is interesting that the destruction of Semele’s tomb was not 
inflicted by the people of Thebes, which makes Dionysus’s acts of violence 
unprovoked. One could, to an extent, consider most Greek gods manifestations of 
unbridled id-energy that emerge from the subject’s desire for guilt-free aggression; 
Ovid’s Metamorphoses shows the capacity of gods for horrific violence in, at times, 
                                                          
137 For a detailed discussion of Dionysus, see Graves, The Greek Myths, (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1960) and Theoi, 
“Dionysos”.  
138 Euripides, Ten Plays, 320. 
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grotesque ways (for example in the stories of Marsyas, Arachne, Actaeon, and 
Prometheus). However, these stories depict punishments, which, although not always 
proportional to the harm inflicted, are seen as retribution.  
Furthermore, the violence depicted in myths is often physical, and rarely threatens the 
dissolution of the self; in the case of Dionysus, however, the type of violence he inflicts 
or causes to occur is unhinged and leads to the dissolution of the limits of the self, and 
of the polis as extension of the self. The violence that plagues Thebes results in the 
destruction of boundaries, and makes its inhabitants repetitions of a particular model of 
sameness (the maddened/confused woman); confusion is especially important in the 
play, as it prefigures the destructive violence that ensues from subjects’ inability to tell 
each other apart. As an external element, Dionysus acts as a catalyst that precipitates 
events that break the fragile ties of kinship that hold the polis together; through his 
fluidity, he brings to the fore the same type of (repressed) fluidity in the leader of the 
polis, contaminating the city. In making Pentheus a double of himself, Dionysus 
hastens the unravelling of a tenuous weave of kin relations and of delicately balanced 
subjectivities.  
Dual characteristics: due to its subjectification, the non-Symbolic subject retains 
elements from both the Real and the Symbolic. Therefore, it cannot belong to either, 
and appears often as a double or as Other, and of dual nature itself—male/female; 
human/non-human or animal. Dionysus has changed form (from divine to human), and 
has come to Thebes to avenge his mother, whose tomb he finds struck by lightning. 
The destruction of the tomb comes to symbolise the denied maternal jouissance that 
precedes the familiarization of the infant into norms, and stands for Dionysus’s refused 
transition into the phallic rule. As a result, Dionysus becomes a figure of incomplete 
subjectification: he seems to lack both a mother and a father (although, as I will show in 
Chapter 4, he has both) and becomes incompatible with the Symbolic, a disruptive 
force that disturbs order and rationality. By means of his birth in the Symbolic, his 
status as disruptive element is reified.  
Mimetic quality: like a mirror, the non-Symbolic subject can reflect the desire to 
constitute oneself through mimesis of the Other’s desire. This characteristic is essential 
in making the fabric of the Symbolic unravel, and it is only through the sacrifice of the 
scapegoat that the Symbolic boundaries can be reasserted and the desire to oscillate 
between Real and Symbolic/return to Origin temporarily appeased. In the case of 
Dionysus, this ability is evident in the way he bewitches the population of Thebes: from 
the beginning, he shows himself as subversive, as capable of upturning the order from 
inside. He becomes manifest as an ancient power that forces people into orgiastic 
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celebrations of unbound id. Furthermore, his followers are allowed respite from 
rationality, and are instead encouraged to revel in the hitherto forbidden (maternal) 
jouissance. Their revelry is seen as a spell, as madness, and is rejected by Pentheus 
(the embodiment of reason); rationality in the context of Bacchic revelry is perceived by 
revellers as sophistry.  
Interestingly, Dionysus comes from Asia, a ‘barbarian’ land, and brings with him his 
rites, his “dances…and mysteries”, turning Thebes into a mixture of Hellenic and 
barbarian, of the rational and the instinctual.139 The rites initiated by Dionysus are seen 
by Pentheus as shameful, as contrasting with the expectations of decency, morality 
and rationality. He regards the Bacchants as prostitutes who, bewitched by Bacchus, 
become sexually promiscuous. In response to their debauchery, he shackles and 
imprisons those he captures, to put an end to their immorality. Once more, the 
insistence on the superiority of rationality over instinct points to a deeper, untenable 
obsession with the fixity of boundaries, which proves self-destructive. Yet in The 
Bacchae, to maintain strict delineations is as foolish as to deny a god’s divinity, and it is 
often the barbarians, the mad, the women and the blind that speak most rationally and 
convincingly.  
Dionysus’s disruptive power, his ability to bewitch people and make them renounce the 
requirements of rationality put him in an ideal position to link the Real and Symbolic. He 
can initiate an experience that transcends the limits of understanding and push the 
boundaries of normality. As Pentheus decides to hunt Dionysus down, he sets in 
motion events that mark him the true outsider of the play: his transgressions of phallic 
rationality and his deliriousness make him an alien element in the Symbolic; once in 
Dionysus’s territory, he is identified as an outsider by the Bacchants and killed the 
same way he had promised to kill Dionysus if he set foot in his territory.  
The mimetic act that the existence of desire presupposes corresponds to a primal 
instinct that can only be channelled in constructive directions through cultural 
constraints.140 Nonetheless, mimesis as a presence in the subject’s life means the 
subject oscillates between extremes, between the desire to imitate and to resist 
imitation, between submission to social constraints and (imagined) omnipotence. It is 
impossible, or at least enormously difficult, to identify an origin when it comes to the 
True Oppressor or the True Oppressed: as Girard argues, tragedy shows these 
positions alternate, making characters occupy both roles depending on circumstance 
and context. It is this alternation that creates the premise for tragedy, as it renders 
                                                          
139 Euripides, Ten Plays, 318. 
140 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 147. 
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characters sufficiently alike for sacrifice to occur. The surrogate victim, at once 
monstrous double, must die for the rest of the community to endure. His death is tied to 
life: only through the death of the victim is life possible.  
 
Nietzsche and the aesthetics of the Dionysiac  
Nietzsche’s text, The Birth of Tragedy, can be read in conjunction with Lacan and 
Girard for a more holistic picture of the relationship between the Real and the 
Symbolic. I do not intend to suggest that Nietzsche’s work should be understood as 
similar to Lacan’s, nor do I argue that their theories are complementary. However, 
there is a strong case to be made for the idea that Nietzsche’s return to classicism and 
his reading of ancient morality opens a space for enquiry that allows for a better 
understanding of Lacan’s differentiation between the Real and the Symbolic. 
Nietzsche’s theory returns to a time prior to the shift in épistéme that propelled man to 
the centre of philosophical enquiry. More importantly, he adopts an amoral stance to 
bypass the Christian bias against the ego and gives an impassionate account of the 
human condition before the current era.141 The text leaves the reader with a dual 
picture of morality (Apollonian and Dionysiac) that is not illustrated in ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
terms, and which allows for different psychic structures to become more readily visible.  
The Birth of Tragedy, one of Nietzsche’s earliest works, was met, as Nietzsche himself 
had anticipated, with what David Allison calls “a cry of outrage”, as it presented a 
reinterpretation of Greek tragedy that drew too comfortable a parallel between 
Hellenism and late 19th century Germany and rejected current approaches to human 
existence, as those of Kant and Schopenhauer.142 To Nietzsche, these accounts of 
human existence advocated an almost decadent withdrawal from life, and encouraged 
hostility to the world. The thought of Kant and Schopenhauer presents the subject as 
guilty of original sin, which he must overcome in desperate acts of redemption. Despite 
being the quintessence of Christianity, redemption originates in hatred and rejection of 
the ego, in judging the world from the viewpoint of Christian morality and in finding it 
                                                          
141 Of course, one can argue that, even if Nietzsche speaks of a time prior to the shift in épistéme, he is still doing so a 
posteriori, and is already embedded in a new ideology. Shifting away from Christian morality would necessarily entail 
using the same morality as a reference point, therefore causing the entire discourse to gravitate around the object it tries 
to avoid. Nonetheless, even if this is the case, having identified the turning point of ideology and its manifestations 
makes it more likely to be able to uncover its traces in discourse and, if not avoid them, then take note of them. 
142 In effect, the socio-political situation of 19th century Europe anticipated the decline in values that characterized the 
20th century: “the entire age,” Allison writes, “was abandoned to nihilism,…mediocrity…and self-annihilation”; 
consequently, Nietzsche’s act of grounding Classical tragedy in contemporary society was part of a widespread 
movement of reviving Classical values and returning to a moral golden-age. Allison, Reading the New Nietzsche, 
(Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000, 15. The same type of movement took place in 19th century 
Britain as a revival of the cult of masculinity amongst boys and a return to the glorification of the male body. See 
Easthope, What a man's gotta do, (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990). 
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responsible for individual shortcomings. In this sense, The Birth of Tragedy proposes 
an ‘amoral’ understanding of the world based on aesthetics and on the glorification of 
various form of beauty (Apollonian and Dionysian extremes), rather than the 
condemnation of pleasure and excess.  
Nietzsche sees European society as trapped in a social, political, intellectual and 
aesthetic crisis, which he proposes to resolve by returning to an image of the self 
congruent with the image of the artist-god, Dionysus—one that does not disavow 
passion, violence and activity, but regards them as aesthetic attitudes to life. To an 
extent, Nietzsche’s work is a reaction against an obsessive cult of the superego that 
became evident with the onset of Christianity, an act of fetishizing guilt and 
transforming it into the holy Grail of modernity. In contrast to this type of morality, the 
ethical system of the ancient world revolves around tangible ideals: power and lack 
thereof, social domination and submission, and the cyclicity of these extremes.  
The Birth of Tragedy accounts for two contrasting psychological attitudes that shaped 
Greek culture, symbolized by the gods Apollo and Dionysus, by looking at the way 
these attitudes were expressed artistically. Despite occupying socially and religiously 
complex roles, both Apollo and Dionysus are described by Nietzsche from the 
viewpoint of their involvement with aesthetics. They enter a binary opposition, and 
encompass order, form, enlightened art, restraint, reason and limitation on the one 
hand, and instinct, sensuality, intoxication, frenzy and madness on the other. Despite 
being random states of the mind, the Apollonian and the Dionysian were attitudes that 
came as responses to the problem of existence, and symbolized two different 
valuations of life and reality. It is the acceptance of both tendencies, towards order and 
chaos, that allowed the Greeks to establish a set of values that transcended basic 
morality and led to the genesis of the highest state of Being in ancient Greece, which 
facilitated the creation of the great tragedies. The Dionysian and the Apollonian 
illustrate the two opposing tendencies of man, the struggle between formal organization 
and natural expression. Nietzsche goes as far as to identify the satyr, frequently 
depicted in Dionysian celebrations, with the natural being, and contends the effect of 
the satyr on the man of culture was the same as that of music on civilization: just as 
music, the language of the Dionysian, nullifies civilization, the presence of the satyr as 
embodiment of desire and irrationality defies the cult of the Apollonian by making 
evident the necessity of balance.143 The satyr becomes a way to bridge the gap 
                                                          
143 “Perhaps we can reach a starting point for this discussion when I offer the claim that the satyr himself, the imaginary 
natural being, is related to the cultural person in the same way that Dionysian music is related to civilization. On this last 
point Richard Wagner states that civilization is neutralized by music in the same way lamplight is by daylight. In just 
such a manner, I believe, the cultured Greek felt himself neutralized by the sight of the chorus of satyrs, and the next 
effect of Dionysian tragedy is that the state and society, in general the gap between man and man, give way to an 
 
80 
 
between the extremes of rationality and sensuality; through his nature, he embodies 
the fluidity necessary to navigate both registers. As I will show in Chapter 4, the chorus 
in the play serves a similar function, and seeks to negotiate between the masculine and 
the feminine. Nietzsche sees modern civilization as trapped in excessive morality and 
rationality to the point of being entirely divorced from passion and instinct. Without the 
Dionysian, the Apollonian enters an unbalanced cyclical process, soon consuming and 
castrating itself.  
Nietzsche proposes that the Dionysian attitude, the natural man, is the underlying 
foundation of all subjectivity, arguing for a psychic structure that is transmissible and 
common to all subjects—although, I would argue, decidedly historical. Yet the quixotic 
search for pure rationality and the obsessive rejection of instinct gave rise to 
insurmountable intrasubjective tension, calling for the creation of a non-Symbolic 
subject. The sway of Christian morality advanced the thought that the ideal subject 
must deny his instinctual side, which led to an identity crisis and a culture of guilt. This, 
in psychoanalytic terms, could be translated as stepping away from trying to attain 
balance between the id and the superego, and favouring the superego as the sole 
compass for a meaningful life. The result was an act of self-castration of the phallic 
superego, which became manifest as a crisis in morality and activity, and which stood 
in contrast with the Greek idea of balance, creativity and artistry.144 This reading 
provides a further explanation for my previous contention that there must always be a 
degree of identification between the subject and the victim of a sacrifice: in the context 
of ritual sacrifice, the scapegoat is elected based on his/her similarities (and 
differences)  to the outsider. If these similarities help those who perform the sacrifice 
identify the scapegoat with the outsider, the differences help them find some common 
ground between themselves and the scapegoat. This identification with the outsider by 
proxy offers a facile, guilt-free and readily available avenue for indulging in the 
fascination the outsider exerts, without falling into the trap of complete identification, 
and, consequently, into the dissolution of identity and Symbolic boundaries.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
invincible feeling of unity, which leads back to the heart of nature. The metaphysical consolation — with which, as I am 
immediately indicating here, every true tragedy leaves us, that, in spite of all the transformations in phenomena, at the 
bottom of everything life is indestructibly powerful and delightful — this consolation appears in lively clarity as the chorus 
of satyrs, as the chorus of natural beings, who live, so to speak, indestructibly behind all civilization, and who, in spite of 
all the changes in generations and a people’s history, always remain the same.” Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy & The 
Genealogy of Morals, 28. 
144 It could be argued the modern world is now moving away from pure Apollonian pursuits and is becoming more 
accepting of the naturalness of instinct. However, a very telling example of the tension between reason and instinct, and 
the crisis to which is gave rise is the Chivalric Code. In Arthurian legend, or even in later tragedies, such as 
Shakespeare’s Titus Andronicus, there is an almost palpable discrepancy between characters’ actions and the high 
standards of conduct, integrity and civilization to which they are held. In Titus Andronicus, Shakespeare (perhaps 
unwittingly) introduces a hint of postcolonialism by showing the barbarians, who cannot aspire to same ideals of pure 
rationality as the civilized Romans, are less savage and capable of more refined language than the Romans 
themselves. (See Tamora’s speech.) Similarly, we see the same tension in chivalric love, for example in Lancelot’s duty 
to his King, and the nobility he must show by loving Guinevere unconditionally, as in Mallory’s La Morte d’Arthur.  
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When applying this idea to an ethical system divided between ‘good’ Apollonian 
tendencies, and ‘bad’ Dionysian ones, it become clear why identification with the 
outsider would be sought through an intermediary, and how the sacrificial victim might 
serve to facilitate this process of identification. Through the destruction of the 
scapegoat, any affiliation with the outsider, even momentary, can be denied, and the 
bias for pure reason reasserted. Reading the outsider as an embodiment of a rejected 
ethical system might provide a potential answer to the idea that the original aggressor 
must come from within the community. If evil, in Christian morality, can be found 
through a return ad-originem, then the ‘evil’ it seeks to refute can only be the common 
ground of all subjects, embodied, in Nietzsche’s theory, in the natural man, whose id is 
allowed respite from Symbolic constraints.  
In tracing the history of Christian morality, one can note the shift between situating evil 
on the outskirts of the (spiritual) world, from where it could exert its destructive 
influence, to situating it within the individual. This paradigmatic shift goes hand in hand 
with a similar one identified by Foucault to do with regarding the mechanisms of desire 
as external, then internal to the subject.145 Both refer to the idea of evil existing in a 
liminal space, either on the fringes of the physical world, or, in modern day, on the 
fringes of one’s conscience.   
In the context of stepping away from the idea of balance towards unconditional 
internalisation of the Father, followed by strict adherence to the dictates of the 
superego, it is expected that tension should arise, which becomes manifest as periodic 
surges of instinct into rationality, of elements of Dionysian psychic organisation into the 
Apollonian rule. It is important to emphasise that I am not arguing for the non-Symbolic 
subject as a manifestation of instinctual drives that surge into the Apollonian. The 
argument I make is broader: I associate the Dionysian tendencies, which we see 
displayed in The Bacchae, not with instinct, but with a psychic structure that revolves 
around the mother, and contrasts with that which revolves around the Father. I return to 
this in Chapters 3 and 4, when I explore the reason the repression of these elements is 
needed. The Dionysian element serves to symbolise not just unbridled id, but rather 
energy that must be balanced, and not annihilated by the Apollonian. This element can 
be read in terms of an unbound ego, that is, an ego un-tempered by the (phallic) 
superego, capable of interrogating the makeup of the transcendental ego and of 
asserting the necessity for balance, but also capable of rejecting the homogenising 
influence of the Apollonian: the Dionysian element is translated, in psychic terms, into a 
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non-Symbolic subject—not common to all men, as Nietzsche proposes the satyr to be, 
but bound by language, manifest in culture and determined by history. 
Ultimately, The Birth of Tragedy can be used to understand the interplay between the 
Apollonian and the Dionysiac as aesthetic attitudes. In the context of these two 
contrasting attitudes, the non-Symbolic subject serves simultaneously as mediator, 
necessary developmental stage and structured entity, and is not to be regarded simply 
as surplus psychic energy. When understood as a product of the regulation of interplay 
of the relations of kinship, and of the repression of the feminine by the phallic, the non-
Symbolic subject serves to mediate between structuring elements, but also reveal them 
as doubles of each other, proving boundaries to be fluid, and inviting their 
de(con)struction. 
 
Summary of Chapter 2 
In this chapter I have looked at the idea of violence that arises at the heart of 
community and the remedies available to restore peace. Using Girard’s understanding 
of sacrifice, I have fleshed out the characteristics of the non-Symbolic subject, and 
argued that it is at the same time a liminal presence that threatens the integrity of the 
Symbolic, and a double of someone within the Symbolic that can serve as its most 
prominent representative. In the context of The Bacchae, I have argued that 
understanding Dionysus as the manifestation of the non-Symbolic subject, a double of 
the enforcer of rationality and representative of the phallic, can help us begin to explore 
the process of subjectification and the left-behind subject. I have also suggested that 
the non-Symbolic subject, being a (transcendental) subject but not habituated into the 
Symbolic, has certain defining traits, most prominently its propensity for violence, 
mimetic quality, and ability to move between the Symbolic and the Real. Finally, using 
Nietzsche’s reading of the Apollonian and the Dionysian as attitudes, I have argued 
that the theorization of a non-Symbolic subject is borne out of quasi-transcendental 
determinants and is meant to enrich, not supersede the oedipal model. 
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Chapter 3 
God, man and country: limits of 
feminine agency in the male imaginary 
 
Up to this point, I have argued that self-sustained, non-psychotic forms of subjectivity 
can emerge in the absence of the Father; to substantiate this claim, I will now look 
towards the mother as a potential structuring element in the psychic life of the child. In 
this chapter, I will explore her existence in the Symbolic, and the way her figure can be 
generative of psychic structures even when absent from the space of representation. 
 
The psyche and structure: against monadic (mis)representation 
In her book on matricide, Jacobs argues that we may have made the move away from 
the position of Lacanian psychoanalysis, that of a monadic structuring of the psyche, 
and can now begin to argue for alternative ways to go beyond this model. As I 
suggested in previous chapters, the debate surrounding available avenues for thinking 
outside Lacanianism is important, as it deals with feminist politics of social 
transformation, and stems from the question as to which figure (the paternal, the 
maternal or both) can play a structural role in the organisation of the psyche. To Lacan, 
Jacobs explains, “the founding scene of the symbolic order is the repudiation of the 
feminine that assumes its status as the limit of representation,”146 which is to say that 
for phallic (i.e.: socio-Symbolic) life to be possible, the representation of the feminine 
must necessarily be impossible. The alternative, in the Lacanian picture, is psychosis.  
The generally accepted assumption, Jacobs writes, is that “the symbolic order is a 
condition of sanity”, and feminism seeks to uncover femininity in this setting rather than 
posit it outside of it, in the un-representable dimension of abjection.147 Lacanian 
feminists hold that the phallus is the only possible signifier of sexual difference, and the 
one element that structures the subject’s psychic life: “to have or to be the phallus 
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becomes the pivotal split determining the position one can take within culture.”148 From 
this perspective, The Bacchae can be read in a faithfully Lacanian way by interpreting 
the phallus, in the play represented by the arbiter of order and rationality, Pentheus, as 
the civilizing element with which the (effeminate and non-Symbolised) Dionysus 
clashes. Yet the play also lends itself to a (contemporary) anti-Lacanian reading, as it 
shows how the culture in which the phallus represents the condition for sanity is 
anything but sane. In this chapter, I will show the women in The Bacchae have the 
potential to uncover the underlying problem with monadic psychic organisation, and 
that they do so by exploiting the limits imposed on them by the phallic rule.  
To understand why an analysis of femininity in The Bacchae can shed light on the 
reason the society presented in the play collapses into madness, I will return to 
Irigaray’s views on Lacanianism, and in particular her reading of the place femininity 
occupies in the Lacanian picture. To Irigaray, as I mentioned briefly in Chapter 1, 
femininity is not a position that can be readily occupied by women in culture; culture is 
founded on the male imaginary and does not allow female difference (and implicitly 
female psychic structures) to be represented. Rather, culture, including speech, is 
dominated by a male understanding of the world, and only allows for male identities to 
exist. Female identity is obliterated, relegated to undefined and un-Symbolised spaces, 
and allowed into the phallic culture only as manifestations of madness. The phallic 
woman (the woman that can exist in the phallocentric society), must show no traces of 
femininity, but be another representation of the phallus, albeit a defective one. Both 
identity and difference are assumed through language; yet, since language pertains to 
a particular Symbolic system, the only possible subject-position is male, making all 
other positions a) of non-subjects, and b) of non-males, that is, defective, castrated 
men. As Whitford puts it, “women are not symbolically self-defined”.149 
If speech is the authority on what type of identity can be constructed through language-
as-Dasein, then the patriarchal system Lacan theorises silences female speech and 
excludes it from the (phallic) framework, lest it produces madness within the system. 
By this token, the way to liberate speech and allow both sexes to make use of it is to 
show how the phallic rule itself produces psychosis inside the Symbolic, rather than 
guaranteeing sanity and keeping psychosis at bay. It is in this direction that Butler 
steps when she argues for the performativity of gender: in positing gender fluidity and 
performativity, Butler shows the structuring effect can be theoretically exorcised from 
the phallus. Butler does not simply suggest subjects decide their gender or that gender 
decides the subject; in Bodies that Matter, she argues that the performativity of gender, 
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the critical agency she had identified in Gender Trouble as key in both upholding and 
subverting the dominant ideology,  must be understood “as the reiterative and citational 
practice by which discourse produces the effects that it names.”150 While some form of 
fluidity remains, gender and culture appear to be tied in a cyclicity, reinforcing and 
subverting each other, constituting the materiality of sex. 
This is to say that, even in the context of performativity, normativity remains, and the 
phallic organisation occupies the normative position. For this reason, ‘willing’ oneself 
into one gender identity or another is a subversive practice that nonetheless depends 
on working within language-as-Dasein, not a widespread characteristic of gender of 
being mutable. When understood through the lens of deviance, Dionysus’ sexuality is 
aimed at overturning the sexual law from within. But perhaps a further question can be 
asked, as to why Dionysus’s sexuality is subversive. Is it because it is a feminine 
sexuality that is seen as monstrous and therefore exorcised from the phallic setting? Or 
is it more plausible to understand Dionysus as a manifestation of feminine sexuality 
that appears and overthrows the Symbolic order precisely because it has been 
exorcised from the normative setting? To answer this question, we need to interrogate 
the type and degree of agency the Bacchants have in the play and the reason their 
sexualities are overabundant, and explore a fundamental aspect of the non-Symbolic 
subject: its relation with the mother.  
Jacobs emphasises what she terms “the determining power of the symbolic order”, that 
is, “the order of meaning to which all human beings are subjected if they are to become 
part of the social world.”151 This definition of the Symbolic features in Irigaray’s 
understanding of the Imaginary structured by the Symbolic: it is only by means of a 
Symbolic order that can shape the livelihood of every subject that we can speak of an 
Imaginary created in relation to this Symbolic. As the dominant order that governs the 
Imaginary is male, it follows that the Symbolic order must necessarily also be male, 
elevated to the status of social law. This, as Jacobs puts it, means that “projections of 
male unconscious phantasy achieve the validity and the weight of a powerful symbolic 
order.”152 For this reason, Irigaray argues, one must interrogate the Symbolic, and, by 
extension, the Imaginary by returning to tragedy and myth. 
In This Sex Which Is Not One, Irigaray argues for the existence of a non-masculine 
discourse, which can be unearthed by looking at the oedipal structures of both 
language and culture, which form the basis for the distribution of social roles. Irigaray’s 
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argument for power and social structures being embedded into language is 
substantiated by her findings in Sexes et genres à travers les langues, which show that 
men are more likely to take up a subject-position in language, while women efface 
themselves and their subjectivity. Following Irigaray, we could argue that the act of 
speaking in a phallocentric society reinforces the male subject-position and makes it 
impossible for women to express a feminine subjectivity. By this token we can argue 
that the moment of subjectification-proper is itself gendered, and only allows the 
subject to undergo the process of subjectification by referring to itself as male—not, as 
Lacan argued, because other identities are psychotic, but because the structuring 
discourse is closed to female subjectivity. 
Analysing the position of subjects in relation to quasi-transcendental elements is 
hindered by one’s own investment in said elements; for this reason, it is easier to see 
how this applies to a society by looking at mythology, and the way myth is absorbed 
and modified in culture. To Irigaray, mythology “is one of the principal expressions of 
what organises a society at a particular time”153 and “formative of the collective 
unconscious”, constituting a “culture’s self-image”.154 Myth can interrogate the 
ideological systems to which subjects pertain at a given time, and help identify their 
breaking points, raising one’s consciousness with regard to changes in thought 
systems and psychic organisations. By tracing speech and understanding who wields 
the power to censor or facilitate it in mythology and in cultural products in which 
mythology is engaged, one can glimpse the oedipal structures that dictate power-
relations within language and the wider society. 
The place of femininity in culture and the relation between the masculine and the 
feminine is important, as it concerns the status of culture itself: the question that arises 
is whether we can understand culture as a product of the interplay between femininity 
and masculinity, the same way we understand subjects. Yet if we take this view of both 
culture and subjectivity, a further question arises: who is the non-Symbolic subject? In 
previous chapters, I presented the non-Symbolic subject as a structured subjectivity 
that is not accounted for in theory. In this chapter, I would like to explore the influence 
kinship has on the subject’s positioning within culture.   
In The Bacchae, feminine subjectivity appears linked to female independence, and tied 
to the setting in which women manifest themselves. The phallic society, represented by 
the polis, not only impedes female expression, but stunts it the moment it shows signs 
of manifesting itself: Pentheus orders the maddened women to be locked away, 
                                                          
153 Irigaray, Je, Tu, Nous, 28. 
154 Whitford and Irigaray, The Irigaray reader, 11. 
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removing them from society the moment they deviate from their set identities. It is 
solely when the phallic society collapses that female identity becomes possible, and 
then only destructively.  
The Bacchae exposes the modern male-centric system of representation: by failing to 
acknowledge its debt to the mother, modern thought (and psychoanalysis and 
philosophy as complicit discourses) only represents the male imaginary, imposing 
phallocentrism on society. The project of this thesis is to intervene in psychoanalytic 
discourse and enable it to move beyond the oedipal paradigm towards a plurality of 
subject positions. By tracing subjectification in myths, we can see the structuring 
elements that contribute to the development of the subject and assess their mutability.  
The Symbolic order is built contingently, based on conglomerates of symbols that the 
male imaginary chooses to incorporate and treat as law, suggesting that, while 
Freudian psychoanalysis identified one element that structures the psyche, it is likely 
that there are more such pivots that display different phantasies, and do not revolve 
exclusively around the Father.155 “In myth”, Jacobs writes, “we witness what is left of 
the delirium of the (male) imaginary once it has been structured and “installed in the 
imagination”…The delirium and symptoms expressed through myth allow us to 
glimpse…a kind of cultural dreaming.”156 The danger of not analysing these phantasies 
is real: if not exposed, they become rationalised and embedded into social norms.157  
Such an ingrained social practice is the ostracism of the mother: she is never theorised 
in her structuring function, as a quintessential element in the psychic life of the baby 
who organises the baby’s psyche by means of her own mind-work, but only as a mirror 
that reflects the baby back to itself and forces it into the phallic organisation. The 
elimination of the mother perpetuates a monadic subject position that replicates almost 
through parthenogenesis, narrowing the possibilities of subjectification. 
Jacobs goes on to argue that matricide itself, or, rather, the silences and lack of 
attention that surround it, warrant scrutiny. The occlusion of matricide as a concept 
from psychoanalytic theory is unusual when the practice of matricide appears 
throughout myths and tragedies. It is this systematic caesura that suggests matricide 
functions as an (un-theorised) concept that, like patricide, may serve a structuring 
function. Matricide, in Jacob’s theory, becomes a standalone unconscious phantasy, 
which plays a structuring part despite having been excluded from the oedipal situation.  
                                                          
155 This is, to an extent, the project that Jacobs undertakes to demonstrate in On Matricide: that there is such a thing as 
a law of the mother, whose existence is not erased or nullified by that of the Father. Stone undertakes a similar project 
in Feminism, psychoanalysis, and maternal subjectivity and argues for matricide as being foundational in the 
development of patriarchal Western society.  
156 Jacobs, On Matricide, 20. 
157 The example provided in this sense is the analysis undertaken by Carol Kohn, who identifies in the intellectualized 
discourse about nuclear destruction a deep male wish for parthenogenesis. Jacobs, On Matricide, 21. 
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Jacobs uses the myth of Orestes and pays attention to both the matricidal component 
and the judgement imparted by Athena, using these threads to uncover the underlying 
un-theorized matricidal structure. Up to this point, Jacobs argues, what we have 
witnessed is a model of the Western psyche from which the figure of the mother is 
absent, and in its absence reveals the blind spot of Western phallic organisation. In 
formulating a structuring matricidal concept, what is achieved is a different type of 
structuring of the psyche, one that does not hold the castrating loss at its core and that 
“is not reducible to the logic of patricide”.158 This reading remains close to Green’s, as it 
does not link all unconscious phantasies to castration anxieties, like the Freudian and 
Lacanian models. While one paradigmatic centre around which psychic organisation 
can revolve is the bloody mutilation of castration (the Red anxiety), the other is that of 
separation from the mother, which, although traumatic, is not a severance, but a 
(potentially non-permanent) loss that leaves no traces on the body (i.e.: castration). 
The loss of the mother is not generative, and is not seen as a moment when psychic 
structuring is precipitated into being. The type of structuring the absence of the breast 
gives rise to is fundamentally different from the structure based on castration.  
And yet, any type of maternal structure must be uncovered, as it always appears 
concealed, as silence, not presence. Like Jacobs’ Metis, the mother in The Bacchae 
appears in two different guises. In her weaker form, she is present in the figure of 
Agave, while in her more structurally potent form, she appears through Dionysus (albeit 
indirectly), as that which is created on its own amid the Symbolic. Dionysus is, in this 
context, a manifestation of maternal jouissance that infiltrates the Symbolic. From his 
birth, which is, to an extent, a process of parthenogenesis, to his desire to avenge his 
mother, Dionysus is a product of maternal energy, which springs forth in the phallic, to 
upturn and re-organise it.  
The absent mother, Jacobs demonstrates, cannot have the same structural influence 
as the dead Father. The dead mother is never unquestionably dead, and her departure 
leaves no trace (no castration), making it impossible to reduce matricide to patricide; it 
is, Jacobs writes, “programmed by a different phantasy and a different kind of loss from 
that of patricide”, and produces “different modes of mourning, of remembering, of 
symbolising.”159 For this reason, the mother readily haunts in texts and undermines the 
phallic through her simultaneous being and not being there.  
To define matricide and the phantasies that call for a matricidal law, Jacobs introduces 
what she terms “the story of the origins of patriarchy”: Zeus’s parturition. According to 
                                                          
158 Jacobs, On Matricide, 34. 
159 Jacobs, On Matricide, 36. 
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the myth, Zeus lusted after Metis the Titaness, priestess of all wisdom and knowledge, 
who did not respond to his advances. Despite trying to elude him by changing into 
various forms, Metis was eventually caught and raped, and she fell pregnant. Before 
giving birth to Athena, she was tricked by Zeus and swallowed whole. Athena emerged 
fully armoured months later, from Zeus’s brain, amidst his roars of pain. In his stomach, 
Metis remained hidden, fuelling his omniscience and wisdom. Zeus, Jacobs writes, 
achieved his immense power and knowledge through “rape, incorporation and 
appropriation of the woman/mother. He cannibalized Metis in order to rob her of her 
knowledge and wisdom, together with her reproductive capacity.”160 Following her 
incorporation, she remains silent and invisible, the forgotten source of Zeus’s power.161 
The rape and incorporation of Metis give course to events that (graphically) delineate 
the boundaries of patriarchal law. Both the mother and the daughter are absorbed by 
the father, becoming subordinate to his will. The literal brainchild of this union, Athena, 
is the epitome of male phantasy: a vengeful, aggressive, asexual female, whose 
femininity is a facet of masculinity, not a standalone trait. As Jacobs puts it, “Athena 
becomes…proof that the father is the prime author of identity”162 and, in a further ironic 
twist, the warrant of democratic justice, tasked with deciding whether women’s voices 
are heard, erasing any trace of Metis’s existence. In the Oresteia, Athena judges 
whether reparation for violence against the mother is necessary, and she reasons the 
murder of the mother is justified; she becomes the advocate of the phallic law, and the 
woman through whom the existence of womanhood is irremediably denied. In her 
book, Jacobs shows the matricidal law lies at the root of male phantasies; in this thesis, 
I work with a similar concept, but will show that the pre-oedipal is structured, and in so 
doing argue for a new model of subjectification.  
                                                          
160 Jacobs, On Matricide, 63. 
161 Fry’s account is different, and it is important to consider why these differences arise now, in this current socio-cultural 
climate. He writes: “Zeus ran in pursuit [of Metis], transforming himself first into a bull, then a bear, next a lion and then 
an eagle. Metis hid behind a pile of boulders deep in a cave, but Zeus, turning himself into a snake, managed to slither 
through a gap in the rocks and wrap his coils around her. Metis had always loved Zeus and, both worn down and 
touched by his persistence, she finally consented.[…]Afterwards, as playful pillow talk, they fell into a conversation of 
the subject of transformations.[…]She congratulated him on his skill at this art.  
‘Yes,’ said Zeus, with some self-satisfaction. ‘I pursued you as bull, bear, lion and eagle, but it was as a snake that I 
captured you. You have a reputation for cunning and guile, but I outsmarted you. Admit it.’ 
‘Oh, I’m sure I could have beaten you. Why, if I had turned myself into a fly you could have never caught me, could 
you?’[…]With a buzz and a whizz she turned into a fly and darted about the cave. In a twinkle Zeus transformed himself 
into a lizard and with a quick flick of a long sticky tongue Metis…had been safely transferred to his interior.[…]Metis had 
been uncharacteristically foolish. Or so it seemed. In fact she had not been tricked at all. She had done the tricking. 
Metis means ‘craft’ and ‘guile’ after all. She had deliberately allowed herself to be consumed by Zeus – more than that, 
she had duped him into doing so. She saw that, if she sacrificed her freedom and remained inside him always, she 
could assume the role of a wise counsellor[…]forever able to whisper advice to him. Whether he liked it or not. Those 
who speak truth to power usually end up in chains or an early grave, but inside Zeus’ head Metis could never be 
silenced. She would be a prudent check on the reckless excesses and headlong passions that often threatened to get 
the god of thunder into trouble. His storms of temper, lust and jealousy needed to be balanced by her calm voice, a 
voice that could urge his instincts into more rational and enlightened channels.[…] [Metis’] shrewd inner 
guidance…helped raise him into a great ruler whole attributes far outshone those of his father and grandfather...” Fry, 
Mythos, 81-89. 
162 Jacobs, On Matricide, 64. 
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The monstrous mother: Dionysus and Agave  
Despite their differences, Dionysus and Athena share the same father, and are very 
similar in their births: both were born of Zeus himself in acts of parthenogenesis. 
Nonetheless, while Athena remains ignorant of the existence of Metis and proudly 
takes ownership of her being born of no mother, Dionysus honours Semele’s memory. 
Dionysus arrives in Thebes to avenge the destruction of his mother’s tomb. While the 
destruction of the tomb by lightning does not warrant bringing chaos and destruction on 
the people of Thebes, Dionysus feels compelled to avenge her, and pursues this 
revenge with as much fervour as Athena pursued the pardoning of the murderer of the 
mother.163 Although there are numerous characters involved in the Oresteia and The 
Bacchae, one of the central themes of the two plays is the status of the mother in 
relation to the father: the children side with a different parent each, and, in choosing 
their allegiance, reveal important aspects of their psychic makeup: Athena is a 
representative of patriarchy, and Dionysus is the advocate of an absent, faceless 
mother. In his clash with the male imaginary, he reveals the shortcomings of prioritising 
the Father as structuring element over any possibility of a maternal role. 
Unlike Dionysus, Athena acts as an enforcer of patriarchy, the ideal phallic female, who 
has no sexuality and instead perpetuates the phallic one. Athena’s emergence from 
Zeus’s head as an armour-clad adult means she had no childhood and experienced 
none of the complexes an infant would experience, including castration anxiety and 
penis envy. If we assume mythical characters embody coded cultural wishes (after all, 
none of them actually have childhoods), Athena is shorthand for a broader wish of the 
male imaginary to be rid of its infantile dependence on its caregiver(s). Due to her 
unusual parentage, Athena becomes a poster-child of patriarchy: a vengeful virgin, 
developmentally immobile, who serves to further the phallic rule by advocating a type 
of femininity like her own, modelled on the requirements of patriarchy.  
Dionysus sprang from Zeus, too, but he orchestrates a corruption of the phallic from 
within, becoming a disruption that penetrates the Symbolic clandestinely. His disregard 
for boundaries contrasts with Athena’s pursuit of rationality. In the play, Dionysus 
describes himself as vengeful and cruel when wronged and improperly worshipped, but 
otherwise kind to humans. He displays nurturing and caring characteristics, but makes 
                                                          
163 Although the destruction of the tomb may not warrant vengeance as drastic as Dionysus’, the destruction of the 
womb might. When interpreting the tomb as symbolic of the maternal womb, Dionysus’ action may be seen as revenge 
for the foreclosure of the mother, the erasure of her structuring and generative functions and her exclusion from the 
space of representation.  
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an important point: that no such kindness is possible in the absence of proper 
recognition, in the way the subject himself wishes to be recognised. Unlike Athena, he 
brings chaos, not closure. It may be relevant that Dionysus sprang from Zeus’s thigh, 
while Athena from his head: while ancient Greeks had a monadic understanding of the 
subject, Armand D’Angour writes that Athena’s birth from Zeus’ head prompted the 
Stoic philosopher Khrysippos of Soloi to interpret her birth “as symbolic of the fact that 
wisdom originates in the head.”164 We could therefore consider Dionysus’s birth closer 
to the liminal character of femininity than that of Athena and argue that, with him, Zeus 
unwittingly brought forth the type of femininity he attempted to smother with Metis: the 
vengeful mother that upturns rationality from within. Dionysus becomes a symptom of 
the killing of the mother, and displays all the characteristics that had hitherto been 
denied to her - maternal jouissance, and a structuring role in the infant’s life.165 
Athena and Dionysus are engaged in a binary opposition, and Dionysus is a double of 
Athena, a position he mirrors in his relationship with Pentheus. In the Athena/Dionysus 
binary, Athena occupies the male subject-position and Dionysus the female one, 
reflecting his own lack in comparison with the male subject-position. Female identity, 
when defined as complementary to male identity, takes the form of lack; yet, as Irigaray 
shows, the relation is paradoxical, as in describing women as a mirror in which the 
male reflects itself to fashion its alter-ego, the male/female binary opposition is 
subverted. In being a vessel to contain male identity and reflect it back onto itself, the 
woman becomes that which dictates the terms of the male’s (re)fashioning of his 
identity. As Penelope Deutscher writes, “the representation itself is paradoxical and 
auto-destabilizing. It limits the feminine to atrophy but destabilizes itself by indicating 
the possibility of excess.”166 By the same token, Dionysus destabilises the phallic 
society of Pentheus by making Pentheus himself succumb to excess and be 
overwhelmed by it. 
                                                          
164 Armand D’Angour, The Greeks and the New (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 140. 
165The problematic nature of natality has been addressed by philosophers, including Hannah Arendt and Adriana 
Cavarero, and more recently Irigaray and Stone. In her 2018 lecture “Being born and its significance for philosophy”, 
Stone discusses natality in the context of her upcoming book, Being Born: Birth and Philosophy. To Stone, emerging in 
the world through birth has a strong ethical dimension, and can constitute an equalising factor between subjects, who 
become empirico-transcendental subjects by virtue of having been born. Stone, “Being born and its significance for 
philosophy”, 2018. Unlike modern conceptions of natality, however, Greek myth operates with an exceptionally fluid 
notion of what it means to be born: the mythical womb can be situated inside or outside the body and can pertain to 
females, males, asexual or inanimate beings. The specificity of one’s birth, that is, the manner in which the subject 
(often, a god) enters the world prefigures to some extent his/her life: Athena springs from Zeus’ head and comes to 
symbolise wisdom, rationality and the rule of law; Dionysus is twice born (of both woman and man) and evolves into an 
almost transitional space between the two; Aphrodite emerges from Ouranos’ semen as his severed testicles touch the 
sea and embodies abundant sexuality, love and procreation; men are fashioned from clay by Prometheus and brought 
to life by Zeus and Athena, becoming mortal beings with the capacity for reason and forethought. To be born is to enter 
a phenomenological field, but how one is born predetermines the way the subject is positioned into this 
phenomenological field and in relation to other subjects. In The Bacchae, the specificity of Dionysus’ birth provides a 
rich (counter-)material that adds a further layer of complexity to the understanding of his place relative to the Symbolic, 
and, by extension, of the place of the male imaginary relative to its relationship with the mother and subjectification.  
166 Penelope Deutscher ""The Only Diabolical Thing about Women...": Luce Irigaray on Divinity." Hypatia 9, no. 4 
(1994):92. 
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To understand why Dionysus can be read as a symptom of the repression of the 
mother, it is helpful to turn to the theories of Melanie Klein. Klein returns to the image of 
the mother and gives her a voice, different and almost always incongruent with that of 
the Father. Klein’s work exposes the mother as a potent, violent structure that 
threatens the child through her power to annihilate. Klein both hints at the structuring 
power of the mother, and gives convincing arguments as to why it is imperative for the 
safety of the male imaginary that the figure of the mother be excluded from the 
Symbolic. Klein makes a strong argument for regarding the mother as one of the 
quintessential monstrous figures, hence her exclusion as a structuring presence in the 
psychic life of the subject.  
 
Klein’s theory of subjectification 
Klein approaches the formation of monstrosity through the structural construction of the 
subject and identifies envy as one of the main drives in the formation of the subject. To 
Klein, the care and nourishment provided by the mother (the breast), give rise to two 
conflicting emotions in the newborn: gratitude and hostility. If gratitude is connected to 
the satiety that comes after feeding, hostility stems from realising that the breast is 
separate from the baby, and the source of food/pleasure is external and unreachable. 
As the baby is aware from birth of its instinct for death, the ego employs all available 
means to ward off demise, which translates into a raging, primitive hatred directed at its 
main caregiver: the mother. Klein relates this hostility to envy, which is constitutional in 
the life of the infant and occurs developmentally before the formation of the ego.  
Envy, the derivative of the Death Drive or its psychic form, becomes essential in the 
formation of the psyche and lays the foundation for what we later call aggression 
(although the latter can be sexualised), both intra-subjective and against the Other. 
Envy seeks to destroy, to spoil and poison a good object to achieve enjoyment; it is not 
guided by reason and is aroused by the very existence of the object. To Klein, the 
breast can arouse envy in the infant in two ways: through the enjoyment the infant 
experiences when suckling at the breast (gratification), which testifies to the object’s 
elusive plenty; and through the frustration experienced when hungry, perceived as a 
denial of gratification caused by the object enjoying its own richness.  
The relationship between envy and the breast is unilateral, and plays a part as 
important in the development of psychic structures as the pleasure-seeking dimension 
of the id. To Klein, the subject strives towards both pleasure and destruction, which 
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occupy crucial roles in the shaping of the psyche.167 Unlike Freud, Klein proposes that 
destructiveness is the first driver of the subject, not pleasure, and re-reads the birth of 
psychic structures through the prism of the mother, whom she takes to be the catalyst 
for the genesis of the ego and superego. Klein concludes that the foundation of 
subjectivity lies in the infant’s envy for the breast and its violent phantasies of 
destroying it, hinting at the structuring role of the mother and giving it developmental 
primacy over that of the Father.  
As envy is fundamentally destructive but crucial to the baby, the internalisation of the 
image of the mother will necessarily incorporate this residue as intra-subjective 
aggression, leading to the splitting of the object into the good and bad breast. The 
process is concomitant with the infant occupying the paranoid-schizoid position, a 
period of (psychotic) oscillation between pleasure and violence, between the love for 
the good breast and the hatred for the bad one. The guilt inherent in enacting, even if 
only in phantasy, destructive violence onto the breast generates splitting, which 
presupposes the internalisation of both the nourishing and persecutory aspects of the 
maternal object and results in a primitive form of superego. As it stems from the 
internalisation of the child’s own violent tendencies, the Kleinian superego is 
persecutory in nature and an essential trait of the paranoid-schizoid position. The 
paranoid aspect will become manifest as the paralysing fear of being devoured by the 
monstrous mother, while the schizoid aspect will consist of the defence mechanism 
that splitting provides, meant to ward off anxiety and fear. In normal development, this 
position is followed by the depressive position, when the infant realizes the two 
‘breasts’ are aspects of the same object and is plagued by guilt for the violence inflicted 
on the bad breast. The two phases are positions, meaning the subject oscillates 
between the more stable depressive and the split paranoid-schizoid positions 
throughout adult life.  
A point of contention in Klein’s and Freud’s theories is the superego: while Freud 
regards the superego as a result of the internalisation of the Father, Klein argues that 
this sophisticated psychic structure can be organised around the mother. The Kleinian 
superego is based on the internalisation of the mother, which the male imaginary ejects 
from phallic social structures. As a result, clinging onto the maternal superego in a 
space dominated by the male imaginary (as is the case of Dionysus, as he has not 
been Symbolised into the paternal rule) necessarily threatens the dissolution of the 
                                                          
167 It is true that Freud identifies the existence of two drives and moves towards incorporating both in the structure of the 
psyche with the theorisation of the death drive; Klein herself to some extent relates envy to the death drive. However, it 
is Klein that explains the part this violent tendency plays in the structuring of the psyche, and integrates it with the 
pleasure-seeking dimension from early infancy.  
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male imaginary, and, implicitly, of the limits of selfhood, as it implies bringing an un-
representable image in the realm of representation.  
When translating the non-Symbolic subject in Kleinian terms, envy appears to be the 
quintessential trait of the subject, a type of catalytic violence that propels the infant into 
subjecthood and opens the way for experiencing guilt. If both the newborn and the 
adult subject can experience envy, then envy, in its primal form, exists throughout adult 
life as an underlying presence, even after accepting the paternal rule as law and 
excluding the mother from the space of representation. As a primordial emotion, envy 
is a destructive force that attacks everything good as soon as it realises it lies outside 
the subject, and an emotion that the non-Symbolic subject will experience. 
Nonetheless, the understanding that, through envy, everything good is attacked can 
only be a retrospective understanding, from a post-oedipal, Symbolic position. If 
quantifying moral judgement is a product of Symbolisation (and possible only with the 
internalisation of the Father and the creation of the superego), the violence against the 
(m)other, the hatred for the breast, the splitting of the breast in good and bad parts can 
be neither moral or immoral, good or bad. They are, as they take place (i.e.: are carried 
forward) post subjectification, into the type of organisation that allows for the existence 
of a transcendental ego, but are outside any possibility for moral judgement.168 
From this, we can infer that, if guilt followed by the desire for reparation is possible only 
with the coming into being of the superego, then this type of guilt can only exist in the 
Symbolic. This means that the depressive position can only exist in the Symbolic, and 
as such is closed to the non-Symbolic subject, who must be structurally incapable of 
experiencing the necessity for reparation.169 Since qualitative judgements are only 
possible with the appearance of a system capable of understanding morality, it also 
follows that neuroses are a Symbolic product.  
Like neurosis, splitting cannot be de facto paranoid or schizoid, but only apprehended 
as such retrospectively, from a Symbolic viewpoint. In other words, both neurosis and 
psychosis are products of the Symbolic, as the process of splitting requires an object (a 
sign) to split. In the absence of a register capable of containing signs, the sign itself 
cannot exist in a form that allows splitting. This raises the question as to whether 
psychotic behaviour can be experienced in the pre-Symbolic; I would argue that 
whatever symptoms mimic psychotic ones outside the Symbolic require different 
                                                          
168 I am, at this point, translating Kleinian theory in a Lacanian framework; this move is not without its difficulties, and I 
will return to my reasoning for holding Klein and Lacan together (and the way I propose to do so) later in this chapter.  
169 Dorothy Dinnerstein makes a similar point when arguing that the basis of the psychic organisation of the child is laid 
by the relation the child develops with the mother. If we consider neuroses are possible only after the apparition of the 
superego, then the relation with the mother up to that point is essentially conflict-free. Dinnerstein, The rocking of the 
cradle and the ruling of the world, (London: Souvenir Press, 1978), 34. 
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theoretical and structural leverage to be unpacked, and cannot be labelled ‘psychotic’ 
within a system that does not employ the same frame of reference. The non-Symbolic 
subject’s capacity for aggression and pleasure, for violence and transcendental 
reasoning are never incongruent with one another, and, as a result, never in need of 
repression; they coexist smoothly, and do not lead to neurosis or psychosis until after 
the internalization of the father-figure and the transition into patriarchal organisation.  
This prompts an interesting question regarding the ability of the non-Symbolic subject 
to make a qualitative judgement: we could argue the non-Symbolic subject is neither 
solely rational in decision-making, although capable of sophisticated reasoning, nor 
solely instinctual, although capable of experiencing emotions. This leaves us to 
conclude that some form of qualitative judgement is possible for the non-Symbolic 
subject, one that is not moral, as it does not meet the Other’s need for recognition, or 
immoral, as it does not inflict on the Other violence that is unpalatable to the non-
Symbolic subject’s frame of reference. It is amoral as it is constituted subjectively, from 
a position where narcissistic cathexes are impossible as the Father has not been 
internalised, and no typology can be replicated. The image of the mother, although 
internalised by the infant, is equally unsuitable, as it would imply replicating an un-
representable image in a Symbolic setting, which would invariably lead to the 
unravelling of the Symbolic. The non-Symbolic subject is not, therefore, operating 
within the constraints of either a positive or a negative appreciation of emotions; the 
aggression and gratification it seeks are neither good nor bad. If any type of qualitative 
analysis of these tendencies, particularly aggression, is possible, then it is nothing 
more (or less) than a defence mechanism: in destroying the object, violence 
successfully keeps at bay the envy the distance of the object creates, and in so doing 
the ego protects itself. 
In fact, if we argue that issues of splitting, repression and oscillation only arise after the 
internalisation of the father-figure, and that the organisation of the psyche around the 
figure of the mother is more-or-less smooth (albeit fraught with tension and fear of 
disintegration), then a stronger point can be made: that the oedipal stage does not 
solely serve to create a triangular structure with the introduction of the father, but to 
overwrite existing psychic structures. Once the patriarchal rule has (partially) 
overwritten the maternal one and translated psychic structures into structures that are 
organised around the phallus, the mother is erased from the picture. The sophisticated 
psychic structures with which the child entered life, organised around the mother, have 
now been transposed into the Symbolic, and reinterpreted so as to support and 
perpetuate the male imaginary.  
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The question that arises is whether these new structures can fully overwrite existent 
ones. I argue that they cannot. Up to this point, I have analysed the functioning of 
psychic structures from the perspective of the phallic rule, and have found, especially 
when using the figure of Dionysus as a model, that tension does arise, particularly in 
the presence of elements that do not pertain exclusively to the Symbolic. When 
combining this idea with Klein’s theories, it becomes possible to argue for the existence 
of two registers of psychic organisation—one created around the mother, and one 
around the Father as structuring elements—that clash in the moment of the oedipal 
crisis, and exist concomitantly throughout the infant’s life. Yet I do not wish to imply that 
both registers are equal, despite the fact that the two drives that prompt their 
emergence are. On the contrary, it seems that the register created with the mother as a 
structuring element in mind and prompted by envy or the drive towards 
destructiveness, is forced into submission and (almost) entirely incorporated by the one 
created by the pleasure drive, with the Father as the structuring element. It is precisely 
this unevenness at the core of psychic organisation, the over-writing of the mother and 
her complete incorporation by the father (as shown in the myth of Metis), that gives rise 
to violent clashes between registers. If the structuring of the psyche depends on both 
life and death instincts, then attempting to give one primacy over the other is always an 
ill-fated attempt, as it inevitably generates intra-subjective tension and oscillation 
between the two.  
 
Accounts of subjectification: Klein and Lacan 
In Chapter 1, I gave a (Lacanian) account of subjectification and presented the 
emergence of the subject from a phallocentric perspective; above, I proposed a 
Kleinian reading to discuss the transformations that occur in the infant as a result of the 
mother’s structuring capacity and inserted Kleinian concepts in a Lacanian framework. 
There is tension between Klein and Lacan, and it is important to explain how I use their 
ideas in this thesis, as it is through theoretical abstraction that we can uncover the 
theoretical space for the development of alternative forms of subjectification. 
I employ Lacan’s theoretical body as the structural framework into which various 
psychoanalytic theories can be fitted. The reason for this is the exceptionally strict 
definition of structure Lacan uses, particularly in relation to the structuring quality of 
language and the implications this has for the project of the non-Symbolic subject. 
When understanding the Lacanian framework as the type of structure that enables a 
certain organisation of the psyche, it becomes more evident how and why the non-
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Symbolic subject acts as a disruptive presence and cannot exist in the (Lacanian) 
structure.  
In “Of Structure as the Inmixing of an Otherness Prerequisite to Any Subject 
Whatever”, Lacan argues for the primacy of structure in the organisation of the 
unconscious. The unconscious, he explains, is structured like a language (langue) by 
the materiality of words themselves. The linguistic structure of the unconscious 
becomes useful when subjects interact with each other: this interaction is never 
conducted between subjects, but following a linguistic structure, between subjects and 
signifiers. The act of constituting meaning within the Symbolic is always closely 
connected to the type of linguistic relation subjects have with signifiers around them, 
and to the self-representation of the subject, also intrinsically linked to unconscious 
linguistic structures.  
Lacan understands structure as the condition for the existence of the Symbolic subject. 
Interestingly, he refers to Dasein as a definition of the subject, which suggests he 
positions the subject in a phenomenological field. The phenomenological field of the 
Dasein is constituted through the subject’s interaction with the environment around 
him: the phenomenological field of the subject appears through “thoughts thinking 
thoughts”, but is mediated by the existence of an unconscious structure that enables 
the connections between signifiers that, in turn, result in thoughts thinking thoughts.170 
It is interesting that Lacan refuses to refer to the language of the unconscious as a 
meta-language as this points to a rather different understanding of the structure of the 
unconscious; in calling it a langue, Lacan suggests not a meta-structure, but an 
underlying structure, common to all thinking subjects, that enables their positioning as 
subjects in the Symbolic. 
From this perspective, Lacan is making a bold universal claim, and argues that for the 
subject to exist, they must go through a structuring process. In a phallocentric 
psychoanalytic picture, the element that prompts and ensures the process of 
structuring is complete is the phallus, and, at a linguistic level, the Name of the Father. 
In the course of the oedipal stage, the infant is separated from the mother by the 
intervention of the Father. As André Green argues, this separation takes the form of 
bloody mutilation, of the threat of castration, and is final, in the sense that any attempt 
to go against the established structures threatens disintegration and the loss of the self. 
                                                          
170 “When I prepared this little talk for you, it was early in the morning. I could see Baltimore through the window and it 
was a very interesting moment because it was not quite daylight and a neon sign indicated to me every minute the 
change of time, and naturally there was heavy traffic and I remarked to myself that exactly all that I could see, except for 
some trees in the distance, was the result of thoughts actively thinking thoughts, where the function played by the 
subjects was not completely obvious. In any case the so-called Dasein as a definition of the subject, was there in this 
rather intermittent or fading spectator. The best image to sum up the unconscious is Baltimore in the early morning.” 
Lacan, “Of Structure as the Inmixing of an Otherness Prerequisite to Any Subject Whatever”. 
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By this token, the only influence in the existence of the infant that can have structuring 
power is the Father, as he sets the structure in place. So far, the argument I make is 
orthodox Lacanian; but it is important to also interrogate what ‘structure’ means, and 
what it is for an object to have structuring power.  
Lacan introduces the idea of structure as not referring to a unity and proposes the 
subject need not be a Gestalt subject to be structured. On the contrary, he argues that 
no subject is a unity, but a plurality. The subject, he explains, is constituted through 
repetition: it repeats itself to constitute itself, but only one such repetition is needed for 
self-constitution to be precipitated. The repetition is not of sameness, but of an 
unconscious ‘mark’, which opens the possibility for the initial subjecthood to be 
repeated. Yet, crucially, the subsequent repetitions are not identical to the original 
subject, but only related to it through their sharing of the same mark. The mark 
because of which the repetition of the initial subject becomes possible for subsequent 
subjects must necessarily have vague, non-discernible traits, so that it effectively 
becomes a mark of sameness, a common denominator between subjects. Through the 
repetition of a generic, undefined self, the initial subject is lost, therefore making each 
subsequent subject effectively a repetition of a lost object.171  
In the Lacanian picture, the subject is always divided, and always caught in a web of 
signifiers (the Others) that can articulate their meaning based on a similar trait, a mark, 
that they share with the subject. At this point, Lacan goes one step further and argues 
that the same structure we see in the creation of a subject, the repetition based on the 
existence of a mark, can be seen in language, in the repetition of signifiers. The 
paradox becomes clear: both the subject and language are created through repetition, 
through an overabundance of signifiers that are repeated and, with every repetition, 
slightly modified. And yet, the essence of the subject, and that of language, is loss: in 
the plenitude of repetition, the one element that cannot be represented or captured is 
the original (lost) object. The subject becomes “the introduction of a loss in reality”, 
which, however, “nothing can introduce…since by status reality is as full as possible.” 
This depleted, “fading subject yearns to find itself again by means of some sort of 
encounter with this miraculous thing defined by the fantasm”, Lacan writes, and is 
sustained in this endeavour “by…the lost object.”172 
                                                          
171 “The mark has the effect of rubbing out the difference, and this is the key to what happens to the subject, the 
unconscious subject in the repetition; because you know that this subject repeats something peculiarly significant, the 
subject is here, for instance, in this obscure thing that we call in some cases trauma, or exquisite pleasure. What 
happens? If the "thing" exists in this symbolic structure, if this unitary trait is decisive, the trait of the sameness is here. 
In order that the "thing" which is sought be here in you, it is necessary that the first trait be rubbed out because the trait 
itself is a modification. It is the taking away of all difference, and in this case, without the trait, the first "thing:" is simply 
lost.” Ibid. 
172 Ibid. 
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The argument here is that the subject seeks to recapture the initial self, which cannot 
become part of a structure, perhaps in a search like the one for the originary. However, 
the subject is not looking for a point in history, not even in the history of the subject 
himself, but for an irrecoverable ‘entity’ that does not make it into the structure of which 
history is part—he is looking for the original subject that must be repeated for 
subjecthood within the Symbolic to be possible, the subject that nonetheless must 
remain lost for the Symbolic itself to exist. Lacan pinpoints the subject to an existence 
within a structure (defined by his three registers), but, I would suggest, does not make 
a definitive argument that the entirety of the subject’s existence lies within the structure. 
He leaves an important aspect unanalysed, the original lost subject, and does not pay 
much attention to the way the infant becomes part of a structure.173 Lacan offers a 
compelling (and convoluted) explanation for the existence of Dasein, but does not go 
beyond (or before) Dasein itself. This means that the structure Lacan identifies does 
not extend to the entire existence of the subject, but only to a part of it—the 
phenomenological field, that in which Dasein exists, and that which Lacan defines in 
terms of the three registers. Even though the Real refers to something which is outside 
the reach of the subject and serves to destabilise it, it is nonetheless part of the 
phenomenological field, as the classification itself (i.e. the Real as a register of 
abjection) can only be made retrospectively, from within the phenomenological field. To 
put it otherwise, the Real can only threaten the subject once there is a subject that lives 
outside it. The links between the structures that the subject develops once it becomes 
part of the phenomenological field (i.e.: the unconscious, the superego, etc.) follow the 
same structure—that of a language. The linguistic structure is not only reflected in the 
relations that form between subjects in the phenomenological field, but also underpins 
the structure of the field itself, by being embedded into the unconscious. The subject’s 
role in defining (and enabling the existence of) the phenomenological field means that it 
encompasses all three registers, which are named from within this field. 
From the Lacanian perspective, therefore, the subject exists in a phenomenological 
field, which is governed by a strict linguistic structure that permeates all strata of the 
field—from the subject’s unconscious, to the relations between subjects and the way 
subjects constitute themselves and meaning. Following this thread, we notice an 
interdependence between the unconscious, language, the subjects’ livelihoods (the 
way subjects relate to each other) and the phenomenological field. This 
interdependence is not meant to suggest that the linguistic structure is the condition of 
possibility for the existence of the subject, nor that the phenomenological field is the 
                                                          
173 By ‘the lost subject’ I do not refer to the existence of the infant at birth, as I do not wish to suggest the infant is born 
with a transcendental ego—although being born is a condition for possibility for a transcendental ego to emerge. Rather, 
I propose that the infant develops into a subject, and does so before being forced into (Symbolic) structures.  
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condition of possibility for the existence of language. Rather, it shows that the subjects’ 
inner life, language itself and the subjects’ activity are quasi-transcendental elements 
that shape the phenomenological field to the same extent that they are dependent on it 
to exist. In other words, the structure of the phenomenological field is dependent on the 
perpetuation of the quasi-transcendental elements, which, in turn, can only be 
perpetuated within said phenomenological field. The relationship is not one of 
dependence, but of interdependence; it is fluid, not static, and in its fluidity it allows the 
subject to develop, at least to the extent permitted by the fading of the mark. 
In this structure, the Father acts as a structuring presence. The neurotic phantasy 
produced by the subject’s imagination sees him not as an already castrated presence, 
but as a threatening figure that both separates the child from the mother (castrating the 
child), and completes the child’s transition to the structure of the phenomenological 
field. What I am interested in examining, however, is what happens to the subject 
before it enters the structure of the phenomenological field and, more importantly, if 
and to what degree the mother acts as a structuring presence. It is important to 
consider the theoretical implications of the definition of structure when discussing 
subjectification, and the extent to which the Lacanian structures (Real, Imaginary, 
Symbolic) encompass the totality of subjective experience. A traditional view would 
argue that they do, and that no subjectivity other than the phallic one is possible within 
them; however, I seek to demonstrate that the Lacanian structures exist within a 
phenomenological field in which they manifest as conditions of possibility for the 
existence of the phallic subject, but that the phenomenological field allows for the 
development of a plurality of modes of subjectification—including a form of Being 
structured around the mother. Through the non-Symbolic subject, we can begin to 
explore the phenomenological field and probe the permeability of the male imaginary 
and of Lacanian structures (as emanations of the male imaginary)—and one of the first 
steps in this direction is to unpack the function of the mother. 
According to Green, the separation from the mother (the withdrawal of the breast) is 
sterile and cannot have structuring capacity. As it is not bloody, it is more of a gradual 
retreat, subject to (potential) reappearance. Structures and boundaries, it would seem, 
can only be put in place by castration and death, and the loss of the breast does not 
qualify for the task. In other words, what lies outside the Symbolic stays outside, and 
plays no part in the structuring of the infant in line with the requirements of the 
Symbolic. By virtue of its being on the fringes of structure, the breast, or the mother as 
the object with which the baby forms a connection before it is Symbolised, does not 
play the same role as the Father. As an element with structuring power, the Father 
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exists always already in the Symbolic, and severs the ties of the subject with that which 
is not structured—the lost subject.  
Yet, by following the thought of Klein, we may still be able to distil the way the mother 
is, in fact, a structuring presence. Klein’s thought differs from Lacan’s, and the greatest 
difference appears to lie in the locus of each thinker’s theories. If Lacan’s argument is a 
top down one (or bottom-up, given that he departs from the structure of the 
unconscious), Klein’s deals more with the behaviours of the phenomenological field 
and of the subject that exists in it. By concentrating on the early stages of development, 
Klein trespasses the boundaries of the phenomenological field, and moves into the pre-
structural, into that which is not yet governed by linguistic structures. In so doing, she 
lays the foundation for discussing the existence of the non-Symbolic subject (the lost 
subject, to some extent, although I am not trying to suggest the non-Symbolic subject 
can be reduced to the petit objet a) in not entirely unchartered territory.  
On the contrary, rather than considering the pre-structured to be unchartered, Klein 
offers an important insight into the influence exerted by the mother on the non-
Symbolic subject, and opens the way for arguing that the mother is a structuring 
presence in the sense that she enables the entry of the non-Symbolic subject into the 
Symbolic. In other words, Klein shows why and how the relationship with the mother is 
the condition of possibility for the existence of the subject by delving into the physicality 
of the mother-child relation. There are tensions between Klein and Lacan, and reading 
Klein through Lacan (or vice versa) is bound to be fraught with tension—especially as, 
while Lacan read Klein, it is unlikely she read him; yet what I propose is, firstly, that 
tension arises in the area where their theories overlap, that is, in the phenomenological 
field, and, secondly, that Lacan and Klein can be held together when one uses their 
understanding of structure.  
Thus, firstly, I argue that the tension between Klein and Lacan manifests itself most 
poignantly within the phenomenological field, that is, once the subject has been 
through the process of subjectification and has been irreconcilably separated from the 
mother. However, I am more concerned with the Kleinian take on the relationship 
between the mother and the infant in the monadic, and later dyadic stage of mother-
child development; I therefore analyse what happens to the subject after it becomes an 
ontological subject, but before it is absorbed into Symbolic norms—a stage that I argue 
is occupied by the non-Symbolic subject.  
Secondly, I propose that understanding Klein in a Lacanian structural framework is not 
necessarily impossible, as the structures they propose operate at different levels. While 
Kleinian structures refer more to functions of the psyche (e.g.: the superego), Lacanian 
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structures deal with universal modes of organisation that depend more on quasi-
transcendental elements than on the on-going development of the baby. While both 
argue for the primacy of the subject and seem to avoid making top-down claims, 
Kleinian structures appear to operate from within, while Lacanian ones from without. By 
this token, reading the mother as having structuring capacity from a Kleinan 
perspective would entail reading her as a sine-qua-non condition for the organisation of 
the infant’s psyche in a way that allows future integration in a Lacanian structure. The 
mother’s structuring of the baby’s psyche becomes a form of enabling the development 
of the functions that allow the subject to become integrated in the Symbolic.  
By using a Kleinian approach, I look at the (allegedly) unstructured period of the 
psyche (the non-Symbolic subject) and understand what happens to the non-Symbolic 
subject once it effects the transition to structure. More specifically, I am interested in 
whether the non-Symbolic subject can be regarded as the lost subject, and, if so, 
whether this subject is, indeed, lost. My purpose in analysing the figure of the mother, 
however, is to also explore the idea that the mother has structuring capacity (although 
this capacity for embedding structure into the infant will not be understood in a 
Lacanian way), and that she relates to both non-Symbolic and Symbolised subjects.  
 
The mother and the non-Symbolic subject 
The relationship the non-Symbolic subject has with the mother will be radically different 
from that of the ‘normal’ subject; as one of the characteristics of the non-Symbolic 
subject is unusual parentage, it will implicitly lack the initial object-relation elements that 
appear in regular development. More specifically, the non-Symbolic subject enters the 
Symbolic in an unconventional way, as existing always-already in the midst of it, never 
fully pertaining, but moving freely between the Symbolic and the Real, as a 
transcendental subject not yet habituated into phallic norms. We have already 
established that the non-Symbolic subject lacks traditional Symbolic structures, such as 
a (phallic) superego, as it has not undergone the oedipal crisis and the internalisation 
of the paternal figure, but its unusual parentage also has repercussions on its 
relationship with the mother. Since the non-Symbolic subject exists at the height of the 
subject’s independence, as a transcendental subject for whom the laxity of the 
boundaries between Real and Symbolic means it can come as close as possible to the 
omnipotence of the Imaginary, it follows that the type of bond it has with the mother 
lacks the persecutory nature of a typical (Kleinian) bond. In lacking a phallic superego, 
the non-Symbolic subject can bypass the distress its own inadequacy as a subject 
causes when compared to its ego-ideal inherent in the male subject position. The 
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relation of the non-Symbolic subject with its ego-ideal is more or less non-existent, in 
the sense that the non-Symbolic subject has no need to relate to a hierarchically 
superior ideal and an inferior locus of lack to define itself; thus, the sudden 
disappearance of the mother cannot, by definition, cause the same level of distress as 
it does in the case of a subject habituated in the patriarchal.  
It is important to explore the relation of the subject to the (male) ego-ideal to 
understand the distance between the non-Symbolic subject and the mother. The 
relation of the subject to the ego-ideal in patriarchy is essentially, as Irigaray argues, 
the relation between man and God, a relation in which the woman is relegated to an 
inferior position. In Divine Women, Irigaray shows it is impossible for women to 
establish an alternative to patriarchy in the absence of a female divinity to which they 
can relate, in a comparable (albeit dissimilar) fashion to the way men relate to their 
God ego-ideal. “If women have no God, they are unable either to communicate or 
commune with one another.” In the absence of a goddess in her image, “she [woman] 
cannot establish her subjectivity”,174 which makes it impossible for women to become 
Symbolised in language. Irigaray correlates the absence of female identity and the 
absence of a female deity in Western culture: it is due to the existence of a male God, 
she explains, that man could define his identify and exist; on the other hand, the 
absence of a female divinity contributes to “the atrophied state of women’s identity, 
subjectivity and community”.175 
To provide leverage for women, Irigaray attempts to find a counterpart onto which the 
creation of feminine identity can rest and argues that one can trace throughout cultural 
history both the representation of women as lack, and the auto-destabilization that this 
representation entails. Like the man/woman binary, the man/God binary also implies an 
essential excess in femininity that is crucial for the self-definition of man. Thus, the 
presence of a male deity becomes of paramount importance and the ‘ideal ego’ in male 
Western culture. If the woman comes to represent the baseness of human nature, the 
sensuousness from which man must distance himself, God comes to symbolise noble 
pursuits, reason, and the cultural horizon of the male. The image of the male of 
patriarchy rests, on the one hand, on the image of God, and, on the other, on the that 
of the woman. And yet the image of God, Irigaray argues, represents an important 
‘blind spot’ in consciousness, which attempts to efface the fact that man falls short of 
the divine potential of his ideal ego. Man regards God as a guarantor of masculinity, yet 
                                                          
174 Irigaray and Whitford, The Irigaray Reader, 63. 
175 Deutscher, “Luce Irigaray on Divinity”, 92. There are feminine aspects of God as well, and, indeed, female divine 
figures – Irigaray herself explores at length the relation with the Virgin Mary in Christian tradition. The point here, 
however, is to do with the hierarchical relation with (the male, Christian) God, which, Irigaray argues, should not be 
replicated in a relationship with a feminine divinity.  
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remains oblivious to the way he differs from this divine ego-ideal, a difference which 
severs him from God. The divine ego-ideal is so distinct from man that it cannot be 
grasped. Thus, man needs femininity as a subservient ego by contrast to which he can 
hallucinate himself closer to God than he can ever be. Both God and the women are 
‘props’ for the male identity, in whose absence the male imaginary would come 
undone. In the context of man/God/woman being instrumental for self-definition, 
another interesting question arises regarding the relationship between the three terms. 
Irigaray does not address divinity in the context of the ancient Greek world, but from a 
contemporary (Christian) perspective. I contextualise her theory in the space created 
by The Bacchae not to suggest that patriarchal and religious hierarchical structures are 
universal, but to demonstrate a contemporary rereading of the play would situate 
subjects in a similar position relative to divinity in the play as if it were a contemporary 
male God.  
The idea of ‘coming undone’ is especially important, as it is precisely the process we 
witness in The Bacchae: modern audiences can detect in the events that culminate in 
the murder of Pentheus the contemporary loss of religious devotion and dissolution of 
the notion of divinity, and the failure of the lower form of the binary (women) to remain 
within the confines of their roles. Throughout my discussion of divinity, I explore the 
part divinity plays (or can play) in the lives of modern subjects; I refer to divinity in The 
Bacchae not to contrast ancient and contemporary forms of worship, but to interrogate 
the mythical aspects that can be appropriated for contemporary use in discussions of 
subjectification. For the fabric of the male imaginary to unravel, what is needed is a 
direct link between male divinity (in this case, symbolised by the son of Zeus, 
Dionysus) and women, which precipitates the manifestation of womanly excess (also 
represented, to an extent, by Dionysus). The destabilization of the props that hold male 
identity together is catastrophic. 
To Irigaray, the schism between man and God is one man brought onto himself, 
through the dissociation from the figure of God in religion: in situating himself as God’s 
Other, man has severed all links with his ideal ego, and has downgraded himself in the 
man/God hierarchy. For femininity, the impact is profound: not only do women occupy 
a secondary role in relation to men, in virtue of their being the Other from which men 
must distance themselves, they also occupy a tertiary role in relation to God, by 
becoming the Other to God’s Other. The effect this has on contemporary female 
subjectivity is significant, as it makes it nearly impossible to unearth it from under 
successive layers of cultural cover-ups: female identity is excluded from language, 
women occupy a tertiary position in relation to God, the role of the mother is obliterated 
from culture, and female drives (particularly the female death drive) are not Symbolised 
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in the phallocentric society. And yet, the silencing of female subjectivity through 
successive renditions of oedipal structures is only fragile, as the edifice of 
phallocentrism is founded on the murder of the mother. By the token of 
deconstructionism, it is precisely the murdered (silent/absent/unnamed) mother that 
can unravel the male imaginary.  
By distancing itself from the phallic ego-ideal, the non-Symbolic subject becomes 
somewhat independent, and needs no (m)Other to exist in a tertiary relation with the 
aforementioned ego-ideal. When reading Dionysus from a Kleinian/Irigarayan 
perspective, it is easier to understand the structures around which his psyche is 
organised if we consider the figure of the mother an element that has structuring 
power. When seen from the mother’s viewpoint, the Dionysian picture allows the reader 
to identify more readily the tropes that are omitted from The Bacchae. There are at 
least two ways of reading the play (and, perhaps, any Greek tragedy) in the current 
socio-historical setting: from the perspective of the male imaginary, whilst bearing the 
paternal law in mind, and from the perspective of the mother. In Chapter 2, I employed 
a phallic reading that interprets Dionysus as a disruptive element, a type of subjectivity 
that must be excluded from the Symbolic for rationality and order to exist, and for the 
phallic rule to be perpetuated.  
From a Kleinian framework, however, it becomes possible to explain how the psyche of 
the infant is organised around the mother. It is for this reason that Klein is radically 
different from Freud: she addresses different underlying phantasies that do not 
perpetuate and reinforce the phallic law. Through her theories, the mother becomes a 
presence, not an absence, and is exposed as a potent, violent structure that threatens 
the child's livelihood. The mother is revealed as monstrous, and the reason for her 
obliteration is the threat to the infant’s existence. 
If we combine an Irigarayan reading with a Kleinian one, we could argue that the 
transition from seeing the mother as absence to understanding her as monstrous 
presence constitutes a reversal of roles in the hierarchy of the binary: the mother’s (or 
silenced woman’s) second rate status is not enough to keep her from upturning the 
phallocentric order that had relegated her to an inferior position. The upturned binary 
shows that it is seldom as simple as a binary organisation: the deconstruction of the 
male imaginary does not occur simply as a reversal of roles in the father/mother or 
male/female binary; rather, the disavowal of the mother as an underlying thread 
becomes more visible with the reversal of the binary, making deconstruction inevitable. 
Yet this is not to say that the female voice did not exist before the reversal of the 
binary; on the contrary, is it because of its existence that the reversal became possible.  
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If we understand The Bacchae as a (mythical) cultural product that captures the male 
imaginary, and start from the idea that Western civilisation rests on the murder of the 
mother, then we should, theoretically, be able to use the play to understand the female 
difference that the male imaginary attempts to silence, and extrapolate this to a more 
generalised ‘law’, one that may better explain the reason behind the male imaginary’s 
institutionalised rejection of the mother, as well as the reasons behind the formation of 
taboos around her body.176  
A good start is to look at how female desire is represented in the play: according to 
Irigaray, it is women’s death drive in particular that has failed to be Symbolised, and 
which threatens destruction for both men and women. As Whitford explains, Irigaray 
fully understands the importance of the death drive, and ascribes to it the tendency 
towards sacrifice, crime and war. In the case of men, the death drive is Symbolised and 
allowed to take manifold forms, including, but not limited to, institutionalised violence, 
linguistic violence (in the form of refusing the subject position to the other sex), and any 
type of violence that rests on denying the Other liberty of expression. In the case of 
women, however, the death drive is not allowed to surface in the Symbolic, and is not 
tied to cultural practices.177 The solution is not as simple as allowing female death 
drives to become Symbolised: in The Bacchae the cult of Dionysus does precisely 
this—it allows the manifestation of female jouissance, and does not impede the 
expression of female violence, even when it bursts through the fabric of the Symbolic 
and threatens the male imaginary. And yet the exercise fails: the expression of female 
drives leads to the collapse of the male imaginary and to the undoing of the 
phallocentric social order, not to the acceptance of difference. This may be because, as 
Irigaray argues, women are unable to articulate their difference, and cannot present 
themselves as such. They are “torn between the sons and the fathers, the stake of 
sacrifice of disputes between men...fragmented into bits and pieces,” and find it 
impossible to represent themselves other than as feminine-mothers, which is the male 
conception of women. Accepting the alternative, that motherhood is a facet of 
                                                          
176 I here say more or less because generalising a law centred on the mother is not as easy as generalising one around 
the Father: female desires and drives, as Irigaray argues, are not Symbolised, and therefore any material that can be 
used to theorise a law must necessarily come in the form of slippages that seep through male-dominated language. The 
danger is that, if we try to put into language non-Symbolised drives, we may re-inscribe these into a (male) oedipal 
linguistic structure. 
177 As Whitford argues, it is important to read Irigaray as a rather pessimistic thinker, who surfaces in her critique of 
patriarchy, and as a constructive one, who envisions a harmonious future in which the death seeking male imaginary is 
revolutionised and bettered by the acceptance of women and of difference. “Irigaray’s work”, Whitford notes, “is at its 
best when these two elements are held together in tension. When one or the other – the pessimistic or the optimistic – 
gains the ascendant, the tension is lost, and the danger of ordinary banality is then never far away.” Irigaray and 
Whitford, The Irigaray Reader, 12. 
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femininity, would entail the acceptance of archaic fears of castration and death: 
woman, to men, is “the heterogeneous other”.178 
 
The mother and the Symbolised subject 
When reading The Bacchae with the possibility of the mother to structure the psychic 
life of the infant in mind, it becomes easier to interpret the clashes between the two 
cults (that for rationality, represented by Pentheus, and that for sensual frenzy, 
represented by Dionysus) as occurring between two psychic registers: one structured 
around the Father, and one around the mother.   
The picture Klein presents of the development of the infant under the influence of the 
relation with the mother puts her in an unfavourable light, as the first monster of the 
child’s imagination; the ambivalent place the mother occupies elevates her to the status 
of an unmentionable trope, something beyond what is conceivable. In an argument that 
departs from Klein, Lacan places the mother, the Maternal thing, outside the limits of 
representation, reifying her status of monster. If, to Klein, the subject attempts to atone 
for the damage inflicted in phantasy onto the mother’s body, to Lacan the subject 
expels the mother from the space of representation, allowing her (and her body) to only 
inhabit the Real. This way, the mother becomes an outsider, lurking on the margins of 
the Symbolic as a presence that threatens to dissolve the boundaries of selfhood and 
re-assimilate the subject into the dyadic union, in an act of castration. Once absorbed, 
the subject is rendered powerless yet again, dependent on the mother for survival.  
If we regard the mother as a truly monstrous figure, someone—or something—whose 
presence threatens not only the safety of the subject, but of the subject’s social order, 
then it follows that this monstrous presence should be ostracized to a liminal space, far 
from the subject himself. Yet, if we argue the monstrous mother is a structuring 
element that orchestrates the first psychic organisation of the subject, then we must 
concede that there exists common ground between the mother and the subject, like it 
does between the Father and the subject. Although not recognised as such, this 
common ground would account for the oscillation between the Symbolic and the Real 
and the pull of the abject. In short, we could argue for the existence of two (almost) fully 
formed registers, one centred on the mother, and the other on the Father, which split 
the subject, making his complete adherence to the phallic rule fraught with difficulty, be 
it in the form of a death drive, or, in its weaker guise, as repression and neurosis.   
                                                          
178 Irigaray and Whitford, The Irigaray Reader, 27. 
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For this reason, I argue a reading from the perspective of a maternal structuring 
element is fruitful in The Bacchae: understanding the women in the play, and Dionysus 
himself through something akin to a maternal rule can reveal an attempt to recover the 
initial maternal figure through the characters of Agave and Dionysus. It can also shed 
light on how the non-Symbolic subject can function as a tool that hastens the 
unravelling of the patriarchal order, called for by the female/maternal imaginary.  
In the play, we witness the destruction of a cultural order, catalysed by discordant 
elements; some, like Agave and the other Bacchants, are dormant and await the 
proper impetus to awaken; others, such as Dionysus, are brought clandestinely into the 
Symbolic, and, once there, instil chaos through madness and confusion. Confusion 
plays a crucial part, and may provide the key to reading the plot from a non-phallic 
perspective. From the beginning, we see the fear of confusion as the most prevalent 
one, kept at bay through splitting in the paranoid-schizoid position. Pentheus, the 
pinnacle of rationality and the representative of the phallic rule, fears that the arrival of 
the stranger from Lydia may bring confusion between the socially acceptable and the 
taboo. Women, we understand as the play unravels, are caught in the spell of the 
stranger, and can no longer distinguish between the limits imposed on their 
prerogatives and their own (traditionally repressed) desires. The type of confusion 
Pentheus (i.e.: the male imaginary) fears most is that between identities, the dissolution 
of individuality and of subjecthood. To preserve these boundaries, which, from a 
Lacanian perspective, form the core of the Symbolic, Pentheus himself falls prey to the 
type of undifferentiation he seeks to avoid. Far from acting as the epitome of rationality, 
Pentheus adds another layer of sensual confusion when he spies on the women. His 
role and limits are tested, and, as his involvement with Dionysus increases, so does his 
willingness to push the boundaries of what is acceptable. Eventually, in his effort to 
preserve social norms, Pentheus breaks taboo (e.g.: by crossdressing) and forces 
social expectations onto others, distorting and perverting their original purpose, such as 
chaining the Bacchants for their safety. The death of Pentheus is the point where it 
becomes clearest that the limits of subjecthood have become fluid: Pentheus is 
murdered by his own mother, who does not see him as human, but as an animal. She 
delights in hunting him and tearing him apart, completely oblivious to his individuality. 
Ultimately, Pentheus’s fears become reality: as boundaries are dissolved, social norms 
are upturned, and the type of rationality that made the quintessence of the phallic rule 
becomes irrational. According to Butler, it is at points such as this, when tragedy occurs 
in the midst of a family and death is rendered unnatural because it comes as a result of 
breaking taboos (infanticide) that kin ties are exposed. I will return to the centrality of 
kinship later in this chapter, but I would like to note the place of the mother amid kin 
relations: Agave becomes the monstrous mother. Powerful and cruel, she is blind to 
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the child’s individuality, and feels no remorse in annihilating it, absorbing it into herself. 
It seems as if Agave uses the confusion created in the dissolution of the boundaries to 
manifest her own (death) drive.  
In the context of such a reading, it is imperative to identify where femininity, eruptions 
of non-phallic language that cannot be represented in the Symbolic, can be extracted 
from its phallic setting in The Bacchae. The plot of the play appears simple: tempted by 
a demigod (daimon), the women of Thebes become crazed, and in their madness, 
succumb to violence, orgiastic revels and irrational outbursts. Despite attempting to 
contain their madness and restore order, the leader of the city, Pentheus, is captured 
and killed by the women, an event presented by the demigod as the culmination of an 
orchestrated (albeit not entirely motivated) act of revenge. If we understand the 
women’s madness as the only instance when femininity can seep through the fabric of 
the male Symbolic, Pentheus’ attempts at restoring order become cover-ups of a clash 
between two registers. The madness of the Theban women and the events that follow 
their crazed lapses can be read as manifestations of repressed drives, which must find 
expression and surface as neurotic symptoms.  
In a way, madness is in the play a way of being woman, similar to Irigaray’s parler 
femme or Cixoux’s écriture feminine. And yet, The Bacchae does not allow much 
space for female voices, especially when it comes to the voice of the Theban women. It 
is interesting that the Chorus of Bacchants does have a voice, one that is on more than 
one occasion the voice of reason: it is the Chorus that draws the audience’s attention 
to Dionysus’ cunning, Cadmus’ and Tiresias’ political savvy and Pentheus’ 
foolhardiness in challenging a god. The Chorus proves invaluable in transitioning 
between psychic registers (organised around the mother and the Father) and helping 
the audience perceive the switch between the two as between two different forms of 
organisation, not a transition from rationality to madness. And yet, the Chorus’ advice is 
seldom heeded, and, like female speech, it ends up framing the male-dominated 
Symbolic. It is through silences and absences that female voices make themselves 
heard. If through speech, as Irigaray argues, one assumes the male subject position 
and disavows oneself of female identity or difference, silence becomes a form of 
resisting appropriation by the phallic, a refusal of being (re)inscribed into an oedipal 
(linguistic) structure and re-silenced. 
The silence of the Theban women is, however, only pre-linguistic; it is not pre-verbal, 
and reminds one of the semiotic chôra,179 of the state of undifferentiatedness that 
                                                          
179 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, 1982. 
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preceded the superimposition of oedipal structures onto language—the women of the 
play can only be confined to silence in the phallic system, but retain their voice outside 
it. It is their lack of speech, their stillness that draws men to them (Pentheus, the 
herdsmen) and marks their difference. They manifest themselves through dance, 
movement, song and shouts, and in so doing reject institutionalised language.  
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the women of the play is their lack of cooperation in 
upholding the fragile balance of the patriarchal system. Instead of performing their role 
of the binary, of acting as feminine mothers, they present the one aspect of their 
femininity that has remained un-Symbolised and cannot be contained by the Symbolic: 
their drives. In manifesting unbridled jouissance, sexual drives and violence, the 
women present themselves not as mothers, but as women, non-maternal and non-
phallic. This hypostasis is particularly threatening to the male imaginary and cannot 
safely exist in the Symbolic. In presenting themselves as women, the maddened 
women go one step further in unravelling the fabric of the Symbolic, and identify with 
an image the male imaginary attempts to repress: that of the absent mother, who 
announces the annihilation of the baby and has separated herself from the infant, but 
only partially, always threatening to return.  
It is interesting that the figure of this absent, beloved, yet destructive mother is not 
named: various translations refer to her by different names, as Kybele, Demeter or 
Rhea, or simply as the Mother, but we are never sure who the Mother is. The figures of 
these goddesses are, themselves, elusive, and appear in interchangeable guises, 
easily confused with one another, as well as with Aphrodite, Aphrodite of Mount Ida or 
Venus Barbata and the Queen-Bee or Bee Woman. It is fascinating to note that the 
older translations generally provide a name for this goddess, but one of the most recent 
translation (Carson’s) refers to her simply as ‘The Mother’. The avoidance of naming is, 
I would argue, a further thread that unravels in the fabric of the phallic subject. The 
failure of language-as-Dasein to name testifies to the subject’s historicity and to the 
ever more pressing need to reform language and move beyond inert oedipal structures. 
Ultimately, the Mother’s real identity is irrelevant (or uncapturable) for modern 
audiences; it is more important that her figure escapes definition, and helps revive 
ancient fears of castration and annihilation in the infant. That the Theban women 
identify with this divinity is, arguably, a step towards attaining a positive form of 
identification with a female identity, as Irigaray suggests in Divine Women.  
The schism between man and God, and the identificatory function God serves in this 
relation, prompts Irigaray to conclude that some form of divinity is necessary for 
identification to be possible; for women to be able to create a sense of identity that is 
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independent of being the twice-mirrored Other of a patriarchal transcendental figure, a 
feminine divinity is needed. To prevent the feminine divinity from becoming a schism 
between women and God, like it has become for men, Irigaray proposes a divinity that 
dwells on the difference between men and women. Deutscher writes that 
“Transcendence would exist between men and women, rather than between human 
and divine,”180 but highlights that Irigaray operates with more complex notions of 
‘divinity’ and ‘transcendence’ than what we regularly mean by these terms. Thus, to 
argue that women need a form of feminine divinity to define themselves is not to say 
that women lack identity and that a goddess revered in the same way as the patriarchal 
God would help remedy this situation. Irigaray suggests that women’s identity rests in 
their difference, that female divinity is the idea of ‘woman-as-difference’, and that the 
‘diabolical’ thing about women lies in regarding them as atrophy, as being vessels in 
which male identity can be shaped. To Irigaray, the idea of divinity is that of a vastly 
improved culture of sexual difference, in which the difference between sexed subjects 
is respected, and identity is not created through a hierarchy of the sexes. The divine 
becomes an aspirational ego-ideal, attainable through a process of becoming, and not 
something from which women are severed. 
In the context of this understanding of divinity, we can formulate an ideal of human 
relations by saying that this ideal should resist appropriation. As Deutscher shows, the 
relationship between men, the patriarchal God and women simultaneously implies 
renunciation of identity and the appropriation of the Other to fill the lack created by the 
severance from God. Once man situates himself in opposition to his ego-ideal, as not-
God, he both creates and rejects his identity, as aspiring-to-be- and never-to-be-God. 
In this context of failed identification, man needs woman as a negative specular image 
to situate himself (by contrast) closer to the unattainable ego ideal. This form of relating 
to one’s ego-ideal generates a spiral reaction, which is felt at the level of all human 
relations: the need to define others in relation to the self, as part of the self/non-self 
dyad, which follows naturally from self-definition as God/not-God and man/not-man. 
Consequently, all relations are redefined from the perspective of their impact on the 
self, and become exercises in possessing the Other, rather than understanding, 
accepting or relating to the Other.  
The relations between men, women and God, as those between the mother, father and 
subject, are complex and essential in shaping the subject and culture. Yet, as I 
mentioned in earlier chapters, I do not wish to suggest that these positions (particularly 
that of the mother and the Father) should be occupied by one female or male person, 
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as I do not argue that the process of subjectification is fixed and only possible in the 
nuclear family; rather, I suggest that subjectification is fluid, and sits in a nexus of 
relations between a plethora of elements, that may serve maternal or paternal functions 
for varying periods of time. The relation between the elements of this network and their 
relation to structures of power has been explored in an edifying way by Butler through 
her work on kinship; her theories illuminate tragedy through kinship (and kinship 
through tragedy), and look at the way kin relations link to the dissolution of the self. 
More importantly, Butler’s work can bridge the seemingly irreconcilable theoretical gap 
between subjectification driven by the Father, which belongs to the Symbolic, and the 
subjectification centred on the mother, which sits squarely in the Real.   
 
Kinship and tragedy  
To Butler, the issue of kinship raises a critical question: whether kinship really works, 
and, if it does not, when and where it fails. Tragedy, she argues, allows us to 
interrogate the workings of kinship, as relationships most often presented as 
problematic in tragedy. Through ‘kin relations’ Butler refers to a particular “set of 
relationships of dependency” that regulate the way a subject orients himself towards 
life and death.181 Yet kin relations are confusing to subjects, and can be some of the 
relationships with the highest potential for strife, anguish and misunderstanding. In The 
Bacchae, the relations between those of the same blood are simultaneously those that 
ward off tragedy, by setting clear boundaries and power structures, and the relations 
that, through their strict delineations, set in motion the tragic course of events. The 
issue of recognition (or lack thereof) is interlinked with kin relations, and figures 
prominently in the process of subjectification: from its first months, the child is taught to 
recognise its parents, and is directed into appropriate forms of recognition by its main 
caregiver(s). The child is not yet allowed to question whether recognition in this form 
works, or whether it wishes it to work: questions that doubt the appurtenance to one’s 
family can only arise later, once the proper way of recognising one’s kin has been 
successfully embedded into the subject.182  
                                                          
181 Butler, Judith. “Kinship Trouble in The Bacchae,” 2017  
182 “Kinship first gets established by someone else giving an authoritative narrative of the relationship, one that involves 
a form of instruction: “Say mama” or “papa” when a child starts sounding out what he’s heard, and then some 
preliminary form of recognition takes place that starts to install kin relations in linguistic ones. Getting the sound right, 
directing it to the appropriate object is among the first forms kinship recognition takes. There is someone there who has 
been designated as kin. There is no way for an infant to evaluate the claim that this is your mother or your father; that 
emergence finds its way into the incipient moments of speech relying on directive methods, which are composed of 
sounding forms of address and naming stray objects – usually ‘cat’ and ‘ball’.” Ibid. 
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To recognise kin relations, then, is to become part of a complex system of reference 
that brings together not only family bonds, but also issues of legitimacy and social 
norms. Recognising one as one’s mother also necessarily entails recognising oneself 
as a subject that is part of a web of socio-political relations and exists in a nexus of 
already-there concepts, such as that of ‘family’ or ‘society’. Subversive forms of kinship 
also presuppose appurtenance to pre-defined categories, even if such categories are 
loose and meant to designate deviations from the norm. 
To question kin relations is, therefore, to question established norms and categories, 
which transcend the life of the family and spill into transmissible categories and quasi-
transcendental elements. The confusion of who one’s kin is, and, especially, whether 
one’s kin is animal or human, goes back to confusion relating to one’s subjecthood and 
its limits. There is no kin category attached a priori to a person that designates said 
person into a mother or any other role, which makes confusion not an exception, but a 
defining rule of kinship. To be someone’s kin, then, is to question whether you are that 
person’s kin.  
The problem with recognising one’s kin, and the question this gives rise to in relation to 
doubting one’s belonging to kin relations, leads us to an interesting aspect of the 
process of subjectification and its relation to recognition. If we accept that the child 
identifies with the image of the main caregiver, internalising it for future reference in the 
fashioning of one’s own subjecthood, then recognition of one’s kin should not be 
subject to doubt.183 As lack of recognition does enter kin relations, it raises an 
interesting conundrum regarding the place of recognition in subjectification: if you 
internalise the image of your mother to become a subject, and are then unable to 
recognise your mother, you either did not internalise the image of your mother, or the 
person you fail to recognise is not your mother. The impossibility to recognise one’s kin 
may be an instance of transference, in which misrecognition is directed at one’s self: 
when I cannot recognise myself, I start doubting that you are my mother. This, in The 
Bacchae, is shown in the fascinating, albeit distressing scene at the end: in her 
madness, Agave identifies with the god and with animals, and no longer with herself. 
Her lack of self-recognition translates into her questioning the identity of her son. 
Misrecognition ends in death and despair.  
As Butler shows, one of the defining characteristics of kin relations is the possibility of 
rupture due to the (temporary) impossibility to recognise one as kin. Yet if kinship 
regulates intimate intergenerational relations, its failure must be treated as subversive. 
                                                          
183 This should also hold true in societies where the primary caregiver is not a blood relation of the infant; the infant 
should be able to recognise the caregiver as kin, testifying to the fact that kin relations are not reducible to blood ties. 
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This seems to be the case in Antigone, when kin relations are revealed to be 
interwoven with state relations and representative of the militarised state. By defying 
Creon’s command, Antigone not only defies filial duty, but also acts against the decree 
of her sovereign, committing treason. In Antigone, kin relations are twisted, and in 
some sense Antigone can only show recognition towards her kin (her brother) by 
defying her uncle and dismissing her sister, and refusing to recognise Creon and 
Ismene as also her kin. Matters are further complicated by the fact that kin relations in 
Antigone double as political relations, and the site of kinship is, at the same time, a site 
of civil war.  
Kinship represents a nexus of relations that is unique, and opens up the possibility for 
forms of rupture and dissent that would simply not exist were it not for the enabling 
existence of kinship. For example, familial crimes, such as matricide, infanticide and 
parricide only make sense in a context of kin relations. The heinous dimension of these 
crimes is such because they are interlinked with kinship. Paradoxically, the same site 
that enables crimes that become taboo to exist also enables society to exist, in a form 
that is recognisable precisely due to its affinity to kin relations. If kin relations are 
closely related to both social organisation and crimes within the family, kinship will also 
be implicated in crimes within society, and crimes concerning society will follow a 
similar structure to that governing kin relations. 
In Greek tragedy, crimes that happen within the family permeate relations and are 
transmitted intergenerationally through kinship lines. Familial crimes designate a type 
of rupture that requires both perpetrator and victim to be related for the violence to be 
pervasive. In ancient tragedy we witness heinous, taboo crimes that culminate in the 
destruction of a nexus of kin relations and of society, and are somehow enabled by the 
same kin relations that are destroyed. In The Bacchae, the House of Cadmus falls, 
showing that it is not only the family that crumbles, but also sovereignty and the polis 
itself. The crimes that happen within the confines of kinship reverberate into society 
and are potentiated by their relation to kinship.  
To imbue kinship with the power to govern the family and, indirectly, the state, we must 
regard it as a set of relations capable of organising relations across generations, 
regardless of how these relations are established, and whether they are legally binding 
or not. Yet this definition for kin relations, Butler argues, might be too idealised, and fail 
to recognise that kinship is defined not externally, but from within, by the way kin 
relations are practiced and enforced. The fluidity of kin relations means they cannot be 
considered binding, limited to human relations, or able to regulate these throughout 
time and space. Kin relations can encompass forms of attachment to animals, and can 
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endure once one is no longer alive, perhaps more strongly, since the kinship bond is no 
longer subjected to violence, or is only subjected to unilateral violence, inflicted by the 
living party.  
We can therefore assert not only that kinship signifies much more than family ties, but 
that kin relations are permeable, and can stretch to accommodate human and non-
human participants. Yet once one or more of the participants to these relations cease 
to exist, so does the fluid character of the relation; once a character is dead, the 
relation becomes fixed and subjects remaining participants to inescapable rigidity. To 
an extent, we can explain the threat of the figure of the mother precisely through its 
fixity: the mother’s absence, indeterminate as it is, makes her role in kin relations static 
and potentiates her influence. In addition to the difficulty of defining what or who kin 
relations refer to, Butler argues it is difficult to differentiate between “family, kin, 
friendship, cross-species cohabitation and community, and even broader modes of 
belonging that provide some kind of provisional and iterable structure of intimate and 
social relations.” The result is widespread confusion and disorientation “by virtue of the 
instability of the categories themselves.”184 
This impossibility of differentiating brings us back to the initial question, of finding a 
defining trait of kinship, one that endures in the face of confusion with other modes of 
belonging, such as friendship. Butler uses the opaqueness of kinship to advance her 
argument that kin relations can only be known once they are breached, once violence 
affects the bonds to the point of making them visible again. The issue is that kin 
relations can, and sometimes do, become unknown, and need to be uncovered, 
exposed for what they are. Exposition is only possible through the breach of the 
relations themselves, one of the main lessons of Greek tragedy. The questions to ask, 
Butler argues, are:  
“at what particular moments does someone become kin or is someone 
recognised to be kin? And at what point, and for what reason do they become 
unknown or unknowable as kin? Why is it that kin relations make them known 
precisely when they are less easily recognised or in the aftermath of not having 
been recognised at all?”185 
Although it is difficult to assign one definition to kin relations, it seems safe to say that 
the web of relations they form, and the utterances that exist in this web, echo through 
subjects’ everyday lives, and impact on much more than just the subject himself. The 
influence of one’s kin relations, whether immediate caregivers, partners or distant 
relatives, leaves a footprint on the subject’s psychic life. Yet only in moments when 
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rupture is imminent do kin ties become evident: the desire to both love and harm 
another, to live with them or far from them, and the necessity to admit all ambivalent 
feelings hold true at the same time usually, Butler argues, designate one as kin.186 
Butler goes on to argue that the ambivalence one feels towards loved ones is 
symptomatic of kinship, and signals tension that exists within kinship bonds, and which 
needs to be ‘set right’ by means of a law. The implication of this claim is that laws and 
rules that govern kinship are always necessarily external to kinship itself, and seek 
belatedly to re-establish order in kin relations. Destabilising kin crimes, such as 
matricide, infanticide, parricide and incest, are not only enabled by the web of kin 
relations in which they exist, in the sense that they would not be designated as such 
had they occurred under different circumstances, but are also necessary for the law to 
have effect. For the incest prohibition to work, one needs incest to be a pervasive fear 
that permeates kin relations; it is only due to this pervasiveness that a law can exist.  
And yet, as Butler shows, the fear of transgression is seldom enough to stop the 
transgression from happening, although, when it does happen, its effects are 
destructive enough to reassert the importance of the rule of law. Kinship relations “are 
from the start subject to…murderous confusion,” which is why they can call for the 
enforcement of a rule of law.187 Thus, in a myth such as the one of Oedipus, the 
problem is not that he is unable to recognise his mother and his father, but rather that 
what makes them recognisable as such is a desire for parricide and incest.  
In Butler’s analysis, Oedipus operates on two different levels: firstly, there is the 
parents’ infanticidal wish, which makes Laius and Jocasta abandon Oedipus to die; 
secondly, there is the story of Oedipus’ killing of a stranger, who also happens to be 
the king, and the act of wedding the former king’s wife, common when a king is 
dethroned by another. The complication appears when the murder is exposed as 
parricide, and Oedipus’ marriage to Jocasta as incest; this recognition does not happen 
to the characters, but is imposed on them from the outside, through an authoritative 
narrative that has the power to decide what the ‘normal’ course of events should be. 
Like the subject’s entry into the Symbolic, Oedipus’ life is ordered from without, by a 
third that imposes restrictions on the mother’s body through bloody mutilation.  
Oedipus is forced to rely on external narratives that govern the course of his life twice, 
once when he leaves Polybus and Merope’s home, and once when he acknowledges 
                                                          
186 “Kinship might arise at a moment when one feels acute forms of ambivalence such as “I cannot live without this 
person”, and “I must absolutely live with this person”, or “I must absolutely live without this person”, and all of those 
being true at the same time. There is a good chance that person is your kin. Or “this person loves me madly, and so I 
will surely be killed by this person if I am killed by anyone at all”.” Ibid. 
187 Ibid. 
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his two crimes. On both occasions, the external narrative is needed to regulate 
entangled kin ties, and illuminate bonds that had been forgotten: firstly, Oedipus’ 
parentage, unknowable because of his parents’ attempted infanticide, and secondly, 
his acts of parricide and incest, overshadowed by his assumption of the throne along 
with the former king’s possessions. It is interesting to note the double nature of sight, 
most evident in the impossibility to see what is in front of one’s eyes, and the 
understanding that comes with blindness. Double sightedness also appears in The 
Bacchae, an aspect to which I will return in the following chapter. What is essential to 
recognise in the story of Oedipus is that he does not know his kin relations, because, if 
he had, he would also understand their violent dimension. If Oedipus had been raised 
by Laius and Jocasta knowing he was prohibited from killing his father and having 
sexual relations with his mother, perhaps tragedy would have been avoided, not 
because kinship lines were made clear from the beginning, but precisely because they 
remained untested. He might have then felt sexual desire towards a wet nurse, or 
some other form of caregiver, and might have experienced murderous thoughts against 
this nurse’s partner. In such a case, however, these desires would not have been 
considered incestuous and parricidal, although, technically, Oedipus might have related 
to the nurse and her partner as if they were his mother and father. The same is true of 
Oedipus’ relationship with Polybus and Merope: could we conceive of a version of the 
story where Oedipus were told he would feel incestuous desire towards his mother and 
experience murderous thoughts towards his father? And, if such were the case, would 
he recognise he feels these towards neither Merope nor Polybus, and thus conclude 
the authoritative narrative was false, or, on the contrary, conclude that Merope and 
Polybus are not his parents? 
The authoritative narrative that reveals kin relations is needed in tragedies, as 
characters rely on external forces to understand events. In Oedipus, the drunken 
stranger gives a truncated version of an authoritative narrative that causes Oedipus to 
leave the safety of Merope and Polybus’ home; at the end of the play Tiresias sheds 
light on the events, and shows how Laius “becomes the father at the moment of the 
murder” and how Jocasta “ascends to her maternal place at the moment at which a 
belated recognition is made,” in so doing causing anguished pain and shame.188 The 
belated recognition represents a tightening in the usually fluid web of kinship, as it 
signals a transgression that will be transmitted throughout all kin relations, as was the 
case with Polynices, Eteocles, Antigone and Ismene. In The Bacchae, the authoritative 
narrative, re-established at the end by Cadmus, brings to the fore the pervasive 
influence of kinship in the unfolding of the play, and establishes kin ties as quasi-
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transcendental elements that regulate the lives of subjects, regardless of the ways in 
which their subjectivities were formed. In the following chapter, I will look at the way 
femininity appears in the play and will argue that the emergence of the non-Symbolic 
subject is symptomatic of the repression of the mother, perpetuated structurally through 
kin relations.  
 
Summary of Chapter 3 
In this chapter I have looked at a different account of subjectification, one that gives the 
mother more prominence in the psychic life of the infant, and have discussed the 
problematic nature of the mother’s existence in the Symbolic, made difficult by her 
exclusion from the space of representation. Yet instead of concluding that her being 
theorised out of the Symbolic makes it impossible to argue for a form of subjectivity that 
goes beyond the oedipal, I have proposed that it is possible to theorise a new form of 
subjectification when operating with a particular understanding of structure. Using 
Butler’s definition of kinship and its role in shaping the quasi-transcendental elements 
of the subject’s lifeworld, I have shown we can bridge different models of 
subjectification and bring them together in the same theoretical framework and 
phenomenological field. Butler’s theorisation of kin ties, especially their (potential) 
transcendence and prolonged influence, demonstrates how the subject continues to 
constitute himself after the period of subjectification is over, not around the Father as 
structuring element, but in a web of relations in which the mother and the Father play 
key parts, without being the sole actors. Kinship adds an important dimension to 
theories of subjectification, as its ties make up the condition of possibility for the 
existence of subjectivity. In the following chapters, I will consider the process of 
subjectification not as a developmental stage that exists in isolation, but as a 
multifaceted, fluid process that hinges on more than one structuring element and exists 
in a nexus of relations that qualify the subject’s existence. 
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Chapter 4 
Little women: femininity in The 
Bacchae 
 
In Chapter 3, I have analysed the mother’s tense existence in the Symbolic and have 
explored a different account of subjectification that gives her more prominence in the 
psychic life of the infant. In this chapter, I will look at the way femininity becomes 
manifest in The Bacchae and will attempt to distil the role of the mother in the play.  
 
The mother-child dyad: Agave and Pentheus 
When understood through the prism of Irigarayan divinity, as positive self-definition that 
need not ‘absorb’ the Other, the mother-child relationship in The Bacchae becomes 
doubly problematic. Part of the tragedy of the play lies in the fact that Agave unwittingly 
beheads her son and presents his head as a hunting trophy. The play’s intense effect 
rests on the impact Agave’s horrified awakening from her Bacchic revelry has on the 
audience, who may empathise with her impossibility of balancing love and maternal 
care with her duty towards the polis, especially when it conflicts with religious devotion. 
However, there is space to interpret Agave’s impossible situation as the natural 
culmination of (failed) male self-definition: Agave’s crime is the ideal form of ‘love-as-
possession’ and self-definition as ‘appropriation of the Other’ advocated by patriarchy.  
Agave’s actions are directed by Dionysus and symbolise his revenge on Thebes for not 
acknowledging his divine status. Yet when understanding the relation between the god 
and the human from an Irigarayan perspective, it becomes clear that Agave acts in 
accordance with the place of women in the patriarchal system: as the male fails to 
recognise himself in the image of the god, the woman becomes a contrasting element 
that helps the male attain some form of agreeable self-definition. In this picture, the 
woman is doubly removed from the god, and must submit completely both to the god 
and to the male. In The Bacchae, Agave does just that: initially, she submits to 
Pentheus and does not recognise Dionysus as a god—we learn towards the end of the 
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play that she had “blasphemed the god”, and had “denied his deity,” as had 
Pentheus.189 As the god exacts his revenge, the women become possessed, and must 
submit to his demands. In the case of the Theban women, this double submission 
highlights their status as objects through which the patriarchal system is both upheld 
and destabilised, denying their agency as subjects. 
Perhaps the most pitiful scene of the play, and also one of the most horrific, is the final 
one, when Agave comes to realise her actions. The scene arouses feelings of pity and 
compassion in the fervent worshippers of Dionysus, the Chorus of Asian women, and 
faces the audience with the pathetic despair of a human forced to submit to a god, 
while allowing glimpses into the dignity with which Agave accepts her anguish. The 
scene emphasises the crucial role Agave plays in the unfolding of events: on the one 
hand, she is the most important piece of Dionysus’s carefully orchestrated event, 
without whom his actions would remain the mere vengeance of a god, as opposed to 
the cruel, unnatural, and almost perverse violence of an elemental spirit with no 
comprehension of human passions. She is what makes Dionysus’ revenge savage, 
and the reason identity, boundaries and Symbolic laws are dissolved: Agave comes to 
embody the monstrous mother, who takes pleasure in asserting her power over the 
helpless infant, and delights into tearing him apart and returning him to a state of non-
Being. Combined with Agave’s near-cannibalism (the ingesting of the animals of which 
her son is one), the picture comes to resemble the innermost fears of the subject, only 
tentatively held at bay by taboo and repression.  Her ‘monstrosity’ seeps through when 
she is shown to take delight in her kill as she is coming down the mountain, still in a 
Bacchic trance. The parallel between her ‘high’ and ‘low’ moods mirror the 
incompatibility between the unbound excess represented by Dionysus, and the frigid 
rigidity of the Symbolic (Pentheus). 
However, although briefly, Agave is also a Bacchant, who worships the Mother 
Goddess: her actions, up to the beheading of Pentheus and her awakening, are not 
tied into a phallocentric system, but guided by a different type of (non-Symbolised) 
identification—that with a female divinity. Despite being part of a larger ploy for revenge 
enacted by an androgynous, non-Symbolised element, orchestrated according to the 
rules of the phallic God/male/female triad, Agave exists for a brief interlude in a non-
Symbolic space, where she need not assume an object-position and male identity with 
the purpose of upholding patriarchy. The identification in The Bacchae is not the type 
Irigaray advocated: while there is no binary or tertiary relation between women and 
divinity and the divine figure enables feminine difference, the tragic outcome of the play 
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shows identification alone cannot warrant the smooth coexistence of two psychic 
registers built around competing elements.  
And yet, it is possible to read a counter-narrative in the relationship Agave develops 
with Pentheus, which deviates from the uniform type of relation the phallocentric 
system expects of male/female pairings. The relationship between mother and son, 
particularly its culmination, reflects the phallic conception of love as appropriation. 
Agave becomes an embodiment of the primal fears the male child feels in relation to its 
main caregiver. Subjected to the mother’s power and faced with his own 
powerlessness, the child’s paranoid fears, as Klein shows, develop into scenarios of 
annihilation at the hands of the mother, which can only be kept at bay by containing her 
into rigid, restrictive ‘phallic-friendly’ boundaries. Failing to do so risks allowing the 
mother to divorce her motherhood from her womanhood and act erratically. Although 
uncertain, the threat of destruction at the hands of the mother is always there, and all 
the more pressing when she is not contained.  
The love for the first object in the infant’s life, the one around which complex oedipal 
structures develop in the case of the male child, is an all-encompassing, cannibalising 
form of love: the male infant fiercely desires the mother, and hates the father for 
coming between him and the object of his desire. Yet, paradoxically, this consuming 
type of love the infant seeks to subject the mother to becomes one of the main fears of 
the male imaginary: that of being consumed, of being swallowed by the mother, 
subordinated to her devouring subjectivity, never to exist again. The best protection 
against this threat is to restrict the boundaries of femininity and redefine it to only 
include phallic-oriented mothering that enhances, and never threatens the male 
imaginary. The consuming love of the male becomes manifest as an appropriation of 
the mother, of the possibility of femininity (that is, of femininity understood as the ability 
to subordinate, to occupy a unique subject-position) and of the ability to make one into 
Other (like a mother would other her child in refusing him the assumption of a subject-
position). To protect itself from being subjected to the same violence to which it 
subjected the mother, the male imaginary transforms this form of love as appropriation 
into taboo: making the Other less than the self and rendering the Other a non-subject 
becomes an unpardonable transgression. And this is what Agave does: she sees 
Pentheus as an animal which, possessed by her death drive, she hunts and kills. The 
barriers of the Symbolic had been erected to protect the male imaginary from such 
occurrences: in transgressing these limits, Agave renders these moot.  
The beheading of Pentheus is a convoluted scene, which reveals characters’ 
complexities: in what concerns Dionysus, the scene shows the full extent of his 
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amathia (brutish ignorance). Dionysus sought to prove he was a god, to avenge the 
death of his mother at the hands of an oppressive (patriarchal) divinity (Zeus/Hera). He 
comes to Thebes to seek revenge and exacts it by forcing the women of Thebes away 
from their homes, driving them mad with the sensuous madness his own mother had 
been accused of possessing: the type that makes women commit lewd acts and sleep 
with random men. In instilling this type of insanity, he allows them to break the confines 
of the male imaginary by dissolving Symbolic boundaries and reclaim a (lost) female 
jouissance. This, by extension, amounts to a form of revenge against the Symbolic that 
lays it bare before the Real, vulnerable to it. From this viewpoint, the beheading of 
Pentheus becomes the Symbolic castration of the male imaginary, the epitome of 
highly orchestrated poetic justice and the physical erosion of the censor that had 
maintained the repression of female agency. Pentheus denied female agency not only 
by being possessive of the women of Thebes, but also by slandering Semele and 
rejecting the importance of the rites of Dionysus, the representative of the mother-
goddess. Audiences become privy to an intricate scheme, and are let in on details of 
Dionysus’ revenge through double-entendres uttered in private scenes: for example, 
when helping him into a woman’s dress, Pentheus thanks Dionysus for “spoiling him”, 
to which Dionysus replies that he means to spoil him.  
Yet the exacting of his revenge, cunningly planned as it is, becomes almost perverse in 
its cruelty and comes at the cost of what Dionysus seeks to regain: female agency. His 
quest against the offence brought upon his mother (her stripping of agency and 
transformation into an object in the play of the male imaginary, subject to Zeus’ lust, 
Hera’s hatred and Thebes’ mockery) is cleverly coordinated, and he pursues the object 
of his ire with the cunning of a hunter; however, in doing so he treats Agave the same 
way Semele herself had been treated, and uses her as an object, essential in an 
elaborate plan, but nevertheless devoid of agency. Through his use of Agave, 
Dionysus slips into amathia and foregoes his sophia (divine wisdom). As Irigaray 
showed to be the case with hierarchical pairs of opposites, the passive/active binary is 
self-subversive, as is the use of the lesser term to define the other. In the play, the 
passive role of Agave ends up actively destabilising the claims to activity of Pentheus 
and Dionysus and nullifying their claims to sophia.  
As Agave and Cadmus are receiving their punishments, Cadmus attempts to bargain 
for leniency. At this point, we first see Agave taking an active stance and displaying 
female agency, despite her despair: while her father attempts to use his wisdom to gain 
the favour of the victor, she accepts her fate, as Arrowsmith argues, in the only true 
display of wisdom in the play—the acknowledgement of the necessity of anguish—
making the audience question who the true monster is. Yet, ultimately, the meaning of 
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monstrosity remains elusive. Agave is monstrous only inasmuch as she threatens 
taboos and acts in a way that is potentially damaging to the male imaginary, while 
Dionysus is only monstrous when regarded through the prism of Symbolic morality. 
Outside it, he is neither monstrous nor kind: he is an elemental force, gentle and cruel, 
defined not by ethics, but by fluidity. 
Yet the role Agave plays is even more complex: she is at once engaged in the 
transgression of Symbolic boundaries and in a power-play with the other side of the 
binary which defines her role. As the lower half of the binary, she is less than the male; 
as the play shows, Agave behaves like (and becomes) an animal, an identification that 
may be driven by the desire to identify with the (shape shifting) god. However, from the 
viewpoint of her relation with Pentheus, her regression to animal state is important, as 
it puts her on the same footing as Pentheus-mistaken-for-an-animal himself. From this 
perspective, Agave’s delight in ingesting the animals she kills and their blood, as well 
as the pleasure she takes from hunting, overpowering, and destroying the mountain 
lion (Pentheus) are not just murderous, but cannibalistic. It is only when Agave-the-
mother becomes equal to Pentheus that the complexity of their relation is revealed: in 
appropriating and displaying the love the male imaginary bestows onto the mother, 
Agave transgresses taboos, and becomes the monstrous, feared and rejected mother 
from which the male imaginary had been protecting itself. Like the Queen-Bee, she 
symbolises both nourishment, life and sustenance (honey), and excess libido, rape, 
cannibalism and death (also honey). I will return to the Queen-Bee in later chapters.  
When enmeshed in the complexity of these relations, Agave can (paradoxically) 
become free of the constraints of the patriarchal, and hint at a type of Being that goes 
beyond the limited to-and-fro movement the male imaginary allows. She is no longer 
confined by narrative logic (a mark of the Symbolic), and can express herself through a 
combination of pre-oedipal, pre-linguistic means; she can explore her un-Symbolised 
death drive, and allow it free play with her pleasure-driven instincts.  
Ultimately, her drives remain un-Symbolised, and incompatible with the male 
imaginary. Her existence in a pre-oedipal space cannot be sustained, while inclusion in 
the Symbolic is impossible as long as the Symbolic continues to reject the structuring 
role of the maternal. The complexity of Agave’s way of relating to the society around 
her, her becoming entangled in a seemingly contradictory relationship with the god in a 
bond that is at the same time empowering and stifling, and her inability to Symbolise 
her death drive and sustain it alongside her love for her son gives us a glimpse into 
what I would suggest Irigaray meant by feminine identity. Agave becomes a fluid mass 
of contradictions that cannot and, importantly, have no reason to seek to cohabitate 
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smoothly with the phallic narrative; in being refused a subject-position in the Symbolic 
for fear it would lead to its destruction, Agave is paradoxically enabled to become that 
which the male imaginary fears most, and perform the (female) violence the phallic 
seeks to ward off. The conflicting nature of Agave’s relationship with the phallic belies 
the manifold repressions that overlap to shield the male imaginary from the influence of 
the female structuring element. Ultimately, in the absence of an appropriate form of 
reconciliation of patriarchy with the variety of modes of subjectification open to the 
subject, intrusion of feminine elements in the Symbolic only results in death, 
destruction and confusion.  
 
Objectification: the Theban women as the structural base of patriarchy 
There is a clear distinction, discernible across translations, between the maddened 
women of Thebes and the chorus of Bacchants, which becomes more pronounced 
towards the end of the play. The discrepancy can be articulated in terms of the two 
groups’ claim to reason, and the ability with which they manipulate male discourse. 
While one group (the Theban women) is objectified and reduced to the status of 
animals, the other becomes the voice of reason, calling out other characters for their 
transgressions and their amathia. The women of Thebes act erratically and are caught 
up in maddened hysteria, but the Chorus ponders philosophical questions on the 
nature of life and death. The Chorus is at all times differentiated from the women of 
Thebes (of whom only Agave speaks), and is presented in stark contrast to them.190 As 
Arrowsmith argues, the main difference lies in the way the two worship Dionysus: the 
women of Thebes have been maddened and driven from their homes, but the Chorus 
displays calmer, quieter worship, and lacks the frenzy of the Theban women. While the 
Theban women’s frenzy is a form of regression to the pre-oedipal, the Chorus is able to 
mediate between the pre- and post-oedipal. It is clear from the beginning that the 
Theban women differ from the Chorus and are instruments in the Dionysian plan: even 
in speech, Dionysus refers to the women collectively as “Maenads”, “Bacchæ”, 
“Bakkai”, and “army” (depending on translation) and uses them as tools for battle, to be 
unleashed on Thebes if it opposes him. In the modern translation he addresses the 
Chorus differently, highlighting his affinity with them and distancing himself even further 
from the Theban women. The Chorus is made of “dear women”, Dionysus’ 
                                                          
190 It is interesting to note that Gordan Maričić and Marina Milanović argue the gender of the chorus often reflected that 
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Јournal of Historical Researches, 2016, 58-68. The play, as I argue throughout this thesis, revolves around women, and 
the place they occupy in society; the gender of the chorus may serve to reinforce the focus of the play being on the 
social and political condition of women in ancient Thebes.  
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“cadre,...sisterhood,...fellow travellers – ...who left...[their] distant lives to wander all the 
way from Lydia with [him].”191 A similar distinction can be seen in the Murray 
translation, where Dionysus addresses the Chorus as: 
Lydian band, my chosen and mine own,  
Damsels uplifted o’er the orient deep        
To wander where I wander, and to sleep  
Where I sleep192  
while the Arrowsmith193 translation reads: 
On, my women,  
women who worship me, women whom I led 
out of Asia where Tmolus heaves its rampart  
over Lydia! 
On, comrades of my progress here!  
 
Dionysus herds the Theban women like animals: “[h]e touches them to fire if they lag/ 
and rouses them with shouts if they wander...”,194 whipping them if they disobey.  
The difference between the two groups is important, as it allows us to glimpse a middle 
ground between an organisation around the phallus and one structured around 
femininity. The Chorus bridges the two registers through its claim to reason and its 
unique ability to exist concomitantly with their allegiance to the god, and reveals the 
rigid male/female, reason/unreason binary to be artificial. Similarly, the Theban women 
act as the structural base of patriarchy, without whom the phallic edifice crumbles. In a 
quasi-Marxist turn, the relationship between the Theban women and male Theban 
society mirrors relations of production: as second-class citizens, women have a 
reproductive role, and little to no political power; and yet, they are instrumental in the 
production and perpetuation of Theban society, including of Theban men and the 
phallic rule. The maddened women are structurally indispensable for the existence of 
the male rule and of the Symbolic itself. It is interesting to compare the way the two 
groups of women are presented in the play, to understand males’ and females’ claims 
to having a structuring function.  
Unlike the Chorus, whose origin is not discussed beyond mentioning they come from 
Asia and follow Dionysus willingly, the Theban women are described like animals, 
being driven from their home by a foreign ailment. The women’s status as objects of 
Dionysus’ revenge is emphasised in the Murray’s translation, where Dionysus explains 
he has “bound the harness of his rites” on their necks. 
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Thus must they vaunt; and therefore bath my rod  
On them first fallen, and stung them forth wild-eyed         
From empty chambers; the bare mountain side  
Is made their home, and all their hearts are flame.  
Yea, I have bound upon the necks of them  
The harness of my rites. And with them all         
The seed of womankind from hut and hall  
Of Thebes, bath this my magic goaded out.  
And there, with the old King’s daughters, in a rout  
Confused, they make their dwelling-place between         
The roofless rocks and shadowy pine trees green.195  
 
The reduction to animal state is something different translations convey, as is the 
importance of Dionysus’ only having selected women for his revenge: without women, 
Thebes is left without an identity, with no mirror-other to help self-definition, and 
collapses into similar madness. Through his actions, Dionysus highlights women’s lack 
of agency and reifies their status of less-than-subject, less-than-male Other, to the 
point of forcing them to renounce the Symbolic. In a way, he facilitates the expression 
of their femininity, and the renunciation of the roles imposed on them. In making them 
mad, he allows them to speak female (parler femme) in a pre-linguistic fashion. 
The language surrounding the Theban women is crucial for understanding the phallic 
expectations of them, and consistent throughout translations: they “wander, crazed of 
mind”, “compelled” to perform Dionysian orgies:196 the “whole bursting female seed-pod 
of Thebes is gone mad” and sits beneath fir trees “staring at their own green hands”, 
seemingly unable to comprehend what is happening.197 Tiresias blames their madness 
on their nature, not outside influence: “Dionysus does not compel women to go mad for 
sex, / their own nature determines that,”198 exposing once more the tension between 
the two types of treatment of women in the Symbolic: on the one hand, they are 
animals, unable to grasp their situation or external determinants; on the other, their 
madness comes from within, a manifestation of their nature, revealed in the presence 
of the god. 
The descriptions of the Theban women come together to picture the quintessentially 
‘bad mother’: maidens and women who had just given birth had left their homes, 
abandoned their husbands and children to go to the mountain (a safe space, a 
surrogate womb) and indulge in varied types of excess (portrayed in the play as milk, 
honey and wine—that is, excess of food and sex which degenerates into cannibalism). 
They are devoid of reason, and react instinctually to noise and movement. The 
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herdsman explains he had stumbled upon them, and found them fast asleep. “They 
were all so still... / Calm as buttons on a shirt”, he explains, which he had found 
curious, as Pentheus has told them “to look out for drunkenness, / wild music, / 
wantoning through the woods - / there was none of that.” However, when they hear the 
noise made by cattle, they  
spring straight up,...  
somehow instantly organised – I [the herdsman] was impressed.  
Young women, old ones, girls unwed, 
they shook out their hair and fastened their fawnskins,  
with snakes that slid up to lick their cheeks, 
some (new mothers who’d left their babes at home) 
cradled wolf cubs or deer in their arms and suckled them...199  
 
When threatened by herdsmen who try to seize them, the women react violently. When 
their targets flee, they redirect their aggression towards the herds, and dismember the 
cattle, attack the nearest village, steal goods and children, and return to the woods. 
Their behaviour is classic male plunderer behaviour, yet it arouses captive dread in 
onlookers, who are both horrified and bewitched.  
Throughout the play, the Theban women are systematically objectified: to Dionysus, 
they are his army, which he unleashes against Thebes to uproot rules and punish 
blasphemy. To Pentheus, they are those who ensure the successful breeding of 
Thebans, and the perpetuation of Theban laws and customs (nomos). To Cadmus and 
Tiresias, they represent the bulk of a political and religious movement, which, if 
nurtured, could ensure prosperity for both: to Cadmus because he would have a 
recognised god in the family, and to Tiresias because it would mean more chances to 
pass down prophecies for money. To the herdsman, the women, particularly Agave, 
represent a good bargaining chip, and something which could win them the king’s 
favour if returned home safely. The women are crucial to either uphold a system that 
supports the perpetuation of male prerogatives, or uproot it and install a new one. They 
are both objects and enablers of the Symbolic. 
The underlying structure of the play, which treats the relationship between men and 
women similarly to that between consumption and (re)production, has another, more 
fluid stratum, which allows the rigidity of the male/female binary to be broken: that of 
wisdom, or lack thereof. The idea of divine wisdom (sophia), Arrowsmith explains, is 
“primarily a moral rather than an intellectual skill”. Sophia “implies a firm awareness of 
one’s own nature and therefore of one’s place in the scheme of things... [It] 
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presupposes self-knowledge, an acceptance of those necessities that compose the 
limits of human fate.”200 The opposite of sophia, also evidenced in the play, is amathia, 
a way of acting which is unaware of the self, violent, brutal and harsh, and shows no 
regard for the necessities of life. All male characters display sophia, and yet all must be 
disavowed of it as they become amathēs. Pentheus is an intellectual and a sophist, but 
cannot accept the necessity that Dionysus represents—indeed, as D’Angour argues, 
he considers Dionysus to represent “an unwelcome religious innovation”;201 Cadmus 
and Tiresias are shrewd and understand what needs to be done to ensure prosperity, 
but the practical men fail to convince the audience of their devotion. Finally, Dionysus 
possesses the cunning of a hunter and the ability to chase his prey into an orchestrated 
trap; however, past this point he falls into mindless bloodshed that is not godly, and 
reminds one of Aphrodite in Hippolytus. Dionysus forfeits his sophia for amathia the 
moment he proves he is not a god, but a spirit, a necessity—a daimon. (It is only in the 
Carson translation that Dionysus introduces himself as a daimon, although he 
oscillates between naming himself daimon and god.) 
The struggle between sophia and amathia becomes the struggle to navigate the 
complex relations that form quasi-transcendental elements (life, language, labour), and 
negotiate between two different structuring elements. The Theban women play a vital 
part: through destructive madness, they reveal the madness of Pentheus’ disavowal of 
Dionysus and of the necessities of life he represents. (The Herdsman says: “Whoever 
this daimon is, sir, welcome him into Thebes. / People say he is important. / Extremely 
important. / They say he gave the gift of wine to men: / why, without wine we’ve no 
freedom from pain. / Without wine there’s no sex. / Without sex / life isn’t worth 
living.”202) However, if at the beginning they link the necessities of life, sexuality and 
excess to the Apollonian, the rational and the phallic law, they are also revealed to be 
what underpins and undermines phallocentric society. The second-rate treatment the 
maddened women receive contrasts with the part they play in upholding and reifying 
the male Symbolic; once removed from it, the phallocentric society descends into the 
chaos of over-rationalisation, of amathia, while the frenzied organisation proposed by 
Dionysus appears not only necessary, but more organised than the polis itself. The role 
the women play is doubly subversive: on the one hand, they allow glimpses into a 
dormant female agency, while on the other they expose the primal fears of the male 
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imaginary that calls for female agency to be silenced for the male imaginary to survive. 
Ultimately, femininity in the play structures a new subjectivity, while un-structuring the 
male subject. 
 
The female chorus: the negotiation between the feminine and the masculine 
The treatment the chorus of Asian women receives from Dionysus contrasts with the 
way the maddened Theban women are regarded. The Theban women are infantilised, 
mere tools to support phallic self-definition; in contrast, the Chorus becomes an 
advocate for female agency, the one the male imaginary seeks to silence. The 
repeated displays of amathia, most prominently in relation to the treatment of women, 
testifies to the fact that the male imaginary in the play fails to acknowledge its debt to 
the mother, and is unable to recognise in the unfolding of events its own archaic fears.  
Yet female agency becomes evident from the beginning: the language in the Chorus’ 
song is rhythmic, rich and possessive; it associates from the beginning with the Mother 
Goddess, a female divinity that guides their actions, yet who is not present and who 
does not act as an ego-ideal, as Zeus does.203 The Chorus does not adhere to 
convention: the sentences it uses are shorter, its song contains repetitions, 
enumerations, exclamations and onomatopoeias. Most importantly, although it is at 
times the voice of reason, the Chorus distances itself from speech, preferring 
passionate, rushed expression through song and dance. Its movements are halted, 
then free-flowing and sensuous again. The modern translation teases out the 
combination of movement and verse, and emphasises the almost alien nature of the 
Chorus:  
From Asia I come, 
from Tmolos I hasten, 
to this work that I love, 
to this love that I live 
calling out 
Bakkhos! 
Who is in the road? 
Who is in the way? 
Stay back, 
stand quiet. 
I shall sing Dionysos –  
I shall make the simplest sentence explode with his name!204 
 
                                                          
203 In the Murray and Arrowsmith translations, the deity is identified as Kybele, Rhea or Demeter – all facets of the same 
goddess, Mother of all gods and impersonation of life. In the Carson translation, the deity is not identified, but simply 
referred to as Mother, emphasizing further the Chorus’ non-hierarchical relation to the female divinity. 
204 Carson, Bakkai, 15. 
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From the beginning, the Chorus questions identity (“Who is...?”), accepts its part in 
promoting the Dionysian cult, and acknowledges its role in relation to both the daimon 
and the Mother. It takes pride in being instrumental in establishing a new cult, and 
willingly creates a relation of dependence between them and Dionysus, in which 
neither can exist without the other. Nonetheless, the Chorus also announces the godly 
purpose of Dionysus, that from which he strays in exacting his revenge: to honour the 
Mother, and to act on her behalf in enticing the population into frenzied worship through 
song and dance. From the Chorus the audience learns Dionysus is a representative of 
the Mother, and his cult is a by-product of her religion, especially the use of kettledrums 
and ritualistic dance.   
O 
blessed is he who, 
blessedly happy is he who 
knows the holy protocols, who 
makes his life pure, who 
joins his soul in congregation 
on the mountain of Bakkhos! 
Honouring the Mother 
and the mysteries  
with his thyrsos, 
his ivy, 
his submission to the god. 
Come, Bakkai! 
Come, Bakkai, 
bring your god home! 
Bring Bromios down from the mountains of Phrygia 
into the wide dancing streets of Greece!205 
 
The Chorus’ movements appear halted as it foretells of the victorious adoption of the 
Dionysian rituals by Thebes, something which only exists in the modern translation.206 
Sacred objects, the woods or mountains and the city, reason and delirium, joy and 
violence all become elements (at times even pairs of opposites) that make up the 
lifeworld of Thebes on the one hand and of the Bacchants on the other. Their 
association shows the new religion seeks to unify contrasting elements, not erase 
them, and not place any in a hierarchy to define them and the self.  
                                                          
205 Carson, Bakkai, 15-16. 
206 A note on translations: the play has been translated numerous times and filmed and dramatized at length. From the 
19th century onwards, it appears to continue to exert lasting fascination over the Western world and inspire countless 
retellings, particularly in the 20th century. The play appeals to each generation, and the differences between each 
director’s artistic choices suggest the play lends itself to being adapted and moulded to meet the needs of the age. For 
the purpose of this thesis, I use a limited number of translations, both prose and verse. I have sought to consult primarily 
modern translations (from the 20th and 21st centuries) to contrast the broad changes in attitude towards womanhood in 
the play depending on the socio-historical context. I have used editors’ notes, but have not included a detailed 
comparative study of all different translations, as an in-depth reading would have provided limited additional insight in 
the way the play can be used in a contemporary setting to argue for a move beyond the oedipal. 
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Interestingly, the Carson translation includes a short poem constructed around the 
colour green. The poem does not expand on the significance of the colour, and limits 
itself to listing different types of green. As the poem progresses, it becomes less and 
less logical, resembling an incantation; while the colour may be a reference to ancient 
Greece’s colour for victory, or to the colour of the forest where the Bacchae run, it is 
not the symbolism itself that matters, but the appropriation of speech by the Chorus. 
The Chorus is the middle ground between the pre-oedipal (and non-narrative, pre-
linguistic) feminine jouissance, and the Symbolic patriarchal, dominated by strict rules, 
logic, and oedipal structures. Although made up of women, the Chorus is rational, 
eloquent and sensible (it adheres to the principles of the Symbolic), and is equally 
aggressive, seeking pre-Symbolic modes of expression through song, dance and 
violence, thus mediating between the patriarchal and the (hidden) feminine voices of 
Thebes.  
O Thebes! garland yourself 
in all the green there is –  
ivy green, 
olive green, 
fennel green, 
growing green,  
yearning green, 
wet sap green, 
new grape green, 
green of youth and green of branches, 
green of mint and green of marsh grass, 
green of tea leaves, oak and pine, 
green of washed needles and early rain,  
green of weeds and green of oceans, 
green of bottles, ferns and apples, 
green of dawn-soaked dew and slender green of roots, 
green fresh out of pools, 
green slipped under fools, 
green of the green fuse, 
green of the honeyed muse, 
green of the rough caress of ritual, 
green undaunted by reason or delirium,  
green of jealous joy, 
green of the secret holy violence of the thyrsus, 
green of the sacred iridescence of the dance –  
and let all the land of Thebes dance! 
with Dionysos leading, 
to the mountains! 
to the mountains!207 
 
It its role of spectator, the Chorus also denounces slippage into amathia, albeit the full 
extent of its knowledge is not evident until the end of the play. When Cadmus and 
                                                          
207 Carson, Bakkai, 16-17. 
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Tiresias urge Pentheus to worship Dionysus, and Tiresias loudly defends the god’s 
rites and blames the women of Thebes for their degeneration into orgies, the Chorus 
mockingly congratulates him:  
Good speech, old man, you’ve kept your Apollonian poise 
and made the right noise 
for Dionysos, an important god.208 
 
In the first choral ode, the Chorus reveals Pentheus’ madness, and aligns itself with the 
necessity of the Dionysian rites. Importantly, the Chorus seems not to praise Dionysus, 
nor scorn Pentheus as it had previously, but acknowledge the importance of balance, 
the part the sensuous, the Dionysian plays in attaining wisdom, self-knowledge, and a 
successful, coherent definition of oneself. In the modern translation, the ode is 
physically balanced (aligned to the centre of the page).209 In the second choral ode, the 
Chorus once again reiterates Pentheus’ folly, who “pits himself against the gods”, and 
denounces it as lack of wisdom. The third ode opens with a nostalgic reminiscence of 
                                                          
208 Carson, Bakkai, 23. 
209 Holiness 
is a word I love to hear, 
it sounds like wings to me, 
wings brushing the world, grazing my life. 
Pentheus has a harsh sound, 
a negative sound. 
He’s a negative person. 
He’s against Dionysos, 
against rejoicing, 
against laughter, 
against flutes – 
not to mention the transcendental gladness of grapes and wine 
so beneficial to the body, soul and psyche’s 
interior design. 
 
I’m saying 
his tongue is unbridled, 
his reasoning reckless, 
his end may be hot and hard. 
A life of quiet discretion, 
still as a summer day, 
holds a house together. 
Cleverness is not wisdom. (my italics) 
Far off in the sky live the gods who never die 
but the watch us. 
They watch how far we press our limits: 
there is a morning star, 
there is an evening star, 
don’t press too far. 
... 
Our god loves festivity, 
he loves serenity. 
Whether you’re high 
or low 
or rich 
or simple, 
all the same 
Dionysos will fill your soul with peace. 
It’s not about intellectual prowess, 
it’s not about true and false, 
it’s pure release. Carson, Bakkai, 25-26. 
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the Dionysian rites, and a tacit warning of the way these would degenerate.210 In the 
modern translation, the ode is no longer aligned to the centre, but undulating, its verses 
jagged, adrift. It warns that the will of the gods is not reduced to fate, but is a force of 
nature, a necessity of the psyche that must be carried out, and, as a result, has 
become ingrained into law and custom (nomos). Pentheus’ amathia was to disregard 
custom; once this transgression is complete, the Chorus becomes instrumental in 
orchestrating Pentheus’ murder. It abandons meditations on wisdom, and concentrates 
on punishing transgression and reasserting the agency of the Theban women by 
repeating a ritualistic call to violence addressed to them. The fourth ode is not against 
Pentheus, but against he who rejected customs, thus plunging Thebes into chaos; it is 
not a call for violence, but a violent denunciation of the patriarchal renunciation of that 
which it fears, for the sake of protecting the fragility of the Symbolic. It calls for a 
holistic, inclusive approach to everyday life, which encompasses both wisdom (in all its 
guises), and the instinctual (the death drives of women, violence, aggression). The 
Chorus denounces the blind refusal to acknowledge the mother as the main cause for 
amathia, and, implicitly, for the failure to negotiate a middle ground between femininity 
and masculinity. 
His judgment is wrong, 
his anger chaotic, 
his arrogance out of control.  
He dispatched himself against you, 
Bakkhos, 
against your mother,  
against your holy rites. 
He is a violent man. 
But 
Death will discipline him. 
Death takes no excuses. (AC, 52) 
... 
Into the throat 
of 
the 
ungodly 
unlawful 
unrighteous 
earthborn 
son 
                                                          
210 Slow but unmistakeable  
the might of the gods moves on. 
It punishes that man, 
infatuate of soul 
and hardened in his pride, 
who disregards the gods. 
The gods are crafty: 
they lie in ambush 
a long step of time 
to hunt the unholy.  
Beyond the old beliefs, 
no thought, no act shall go. Euripides, “The Bacchae”, 194. 
134 
 
of Echion 
let justice 
sink her sword 
! 
 
Possibly the most striking contribution of the Chorus is its conversation with Agave as 
she returns from the mountain with Pentheus’ head. It is the Chorus, before anyone 
else, who elicits from her the details of Pentheus’ / the mountain lion’s beheading. The 
Chorus acknowledges the way Dionysus has forfeited sophia, and is horrified by the 
events caused by their god.  
The Chorus is made up of frenzied women worshippers, who are at the same time 
poised Hellenic thinkers. This duality may be an attempt on Euripides’ part to 
differentiate between the Theban women’s madness and the accepted, controlled 
Dionysian worship of the time, and situate itself neither in opposition, nor in full 
agreement with the god. The Chorus is not possessed; they are devout worshippers, 
but they retain their agency and are aware of their actions. For this reason, their duality 
is even more striking: although they rejoice at Pentheus’ death, understanding it as 
rightful revenge on Dionysus’ part, they are also aghast when they see Agave and the 
impact awareness of her deeds has on her. As Arrowsmith writes, the pity the Chorus 
feels for Agave is how the Bacchante differentiates herself from the god, and separates 
her humanity from the divinity of which she partakes through the Dionysian ritual. If 
through the orgiastic revels, the cannibalistic rituals, the dances and ingestion of milk, 
honey and wine the Bacchante ‘ingests’ and displays the same divinity that drives her 
actions and passions, through the pity it manifests for Agave, she displays her 
humanity. Their pity marks disapproval of Dionysus’ inflexibility, his cruel and ruthless 
actions, and allows them to show compassion for Agave and Cadmus. “In this they 
declare”, Arrowsmith writes, “their humanity and a moral dignity which heaven, lacking 
those limits which make men suffer into dignity and compassion, can never understand 
or equal.”211 Ultimately, the Chorus delineates boundaries and their absence.  
Firstly, they address the boundaries of identity, which are self-subversive in the case of 
the males of the play, as they rely on self-definition through the prism of an essentially 
fragile and fickle entity—the second-rate, hierarchically inferior woman, who 
nonetheless topples the male Symbolic.  
Secondly, they tackle the boundaries of compassion, morality and ethics, and highlight 
the discrepancy between the civilised Greeks and the barbarian Easterners, portrayed 
                                                          
211 Euripides, “The Bacchae”, 153. 
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as binary opposites. As the play unfolds, the audience is left to decide whether the 
barbarians do not prove more civilised than the Greeks. The Chorus also reveals the 
daimon to be incapable of such considerations—of morality, wisdom, compassion, 
mercy—as Dionysus cannot be expected to subject himself to human constraints and 
limits, as it exists outside Symbolic boundaries, outside time and reason—an elemental 
force that drives the psyche, as opposed to understanding it.  
Thirdly, they bring into question the boundaries of moral excellence, particularly in 
terms of wisdom; the Chorus denounces the profound amathia of all characters, and 
only reveals the possibility of true wisdom (sophia) in the acceptance of the necessity 
of anguish and despair, of violence and pleasure, of manifest and Symbolised death 
drives for both men and women. The Chorus shows and explicitly states that the happy 
man is he who understands the need for balance, for peace and harmony between 
reason and the elemental forces (of nature, or, more convincingly, of the psyche), and 
demonstrates that the current organisation of a Symbolic orchestrated by the male 
imaginary fails to accommodate these needs. The happy man, the Chorus sings, must 
be capable of understanding the play between domination and submission, and, in 
Irigarayan terms, must not fashion gods into ego ideals, as these are fundamentally 
unsuitable for such purposes. It is, ultimately, the urge to rival the extremes of the gods 
that constitutes hubris: Pentheus attempts to be like the god, have the final say in who 
is worshipped and who is rejected, be either entirely rational or entirely delirious, but, 
due to his bound nature, falls short of being godly himself. In the absence of the 
women he discounts, Pentheus can only measure himself against the god as an ego-
ideal, but his measurements prove self-subversive and leave the male ego empty, 
susceptible to consumption and annihilation by the female agency it had painstakingly 
silenced to avoid such risks.   
Finally, the Chorus reveals the boundaries of worship in relation to self-definition to be 
fragile. Both men and women have a deity they worship, who they more or less fashion 
into an ego-ideal: for women, it is the figure of the mother, while for men it is the figure 
of Zeus. However, while Zeus is present in the polis, the mother is absent, revered not 
for what she embodies, but for what she enables humans to become: in providing 
nourishment, fertile crops and wine, she allows men to live, forget their toils, and die. 
Zeus, on the other hand, is an active presence, shaping the male imaginary and the 
organisation of the Symbolic. The moment the necessity the male imaginary seeks to 
repress becomes manifest, the Symbolic edifice crumbles, and necessity itself 
maddens subjects and causes them to consume each other, to partake of each other 
for continued self-definition. This repression is part of a closed cycle, destined to 
consume itself.  
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Through the exclusion of femininity and of what it represents, the male imaginary 
inscribes itself in a loop that threatens to allow repressed elements to burst through, 
subvert the mechanism of repression and turn it against the psyche it protects. 
 
The absent mother 
The figure of the mother dominates the play, but never becomes explicit. The mother 
appears in different guises, some stronger than others, as mothers that refuse to 
mother (such as the Theban women who forsake their new-borns), or as mothers 
whose love becomes all-consuming (such as Agave). It is, however, in the figure of the 
absent mother that the structuring female function can be best read; in the play, the 
figure appears in the main female deities: Kybele, Rhea or Demeter. 
As the play opens, the audience learns Dionysus came to Thebes to avenge his dead 
mother, Semele, killed by Hera. He wishes to prove to everyone, including Semele’s 
sisters (his mother’s main accusers), that he is a god, and that Semele’s story of his 
conception was not a fabrication meant to conceal her promiscuity. Dionysus’ revenge 
is directed at those that preserve the phallic by silencing women, much like Zeus had 
silenced Metis. 
From this perspective, it is interesting that Dionysus is presented by the Chorus in 
some translations as a representative of Kybele. To introduce this comparison, the 
Chorus first extends an invitation to “holy silence”, to a way of worship that precedes 
rationalised religious rituals; Dionysus, it explains, must be worshipped “in the old, old 
way”. The fortunate man, the Chorus continues, pledges himself to Dionysus: “In the 
mountains he knows the bacchic thrill, the holy purifications; he observes the orgies of 
Kybele, the Great Mother [...].”212 The reference to Kybele and the explanations 
regarding the appropriate ways to worship Dionysus mark an important aspect of the 
play in relation to reading it from the viewpoint of the mother.  
Firstly, the Chorus emphasises the current ways of worshipping gods will not suffice for 
Dionysus; what is required of his subjects is a return to the “old, old way[s]” of religious 
devotion, archaic, pre-verbal methods that precede language, rationality, and logic. The 
type of devotion Dionysus seeks is instinctual and requires the devotee to abandon 
modern thought; to worship Dionysus, the individual must revert to a state prior to 
subjectification, one of undifferentiated-ness. 
                                                          
212 Euripides, Ten Plays by Euripides, 319. 
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Secondly, the Chorus explains that the worship cannot take place in profane settings, 
but must be carried out in sacred spaces, in the mountains (a surrogate womb), where 
return to archaic modes of praising the gods is possible. The impossibility of 
establishing a connection with the god outside a sacred space points again to the 
inadequacy of the rites set in place by the male imaginary: the polis, the space of 
rationality and logic, is hostile to the type of devotion Dionysus demands.  
Finally, the most poignant reference to the cult of the mother is the mentioning of the 
Great Mother, Kybele.213 Dionysus and Kybele share several characteristics: they are 
foreigners associated with ecstatic revelry, wine, dance and music. They come to 
Greece and demand to be worshipped in ways that differ fundamentally from the usual 
customs of the Greeks. They are both connected in some way to Zeus, associated with 
nature and wild animals, cold rationality devoid of morality, and capacity for extreme 
acts of violence. Most importantly, Kybele is the mother of the Phrygian god Sabazios, 
identified by the Greeks with Dionysus. The orgiastic cults of Dionysus-Sabazios was 
derived Kybele’s orgies, and Dionysus performs his mysteries in her honour.214 
One of the most prominent myths surrounding Kybele depicts her distant relation with 
Zeus: the latter, consumed with lust for Kybele, masturbated while watching her and let 
the sperm fall on the rock called Agdos, from which the hermaphrodite Agdistis 
sprung.215 Agdistis’ sexual urges soon proved impossible to control, so the gods 
decided to castrate it: after getting Agdistis drunk by pouring wine in the spring from 
which it drank, Liber (a god very similar to Dionysus) tied Agdistis’ testicles to its feet, 
so that, when it rose, it detached them from its body. The castration of Agdistis 
produced immense quantities of blood, and from the blood-soaked earth sprung an 
almond tree. Nana, the daughter of the river Sangarius (and one of the hypostases of 
Kybele) ate an almond and became pregnant with Attis. As the child was unwanted, 
Nana exposed it, only to have it brought up by Phorbas, a goat-herder. When Attis 
                                                          
213 Kybele was, originally, Phrygia’s only known goddess, possibly its state deity, whose cult was adopted by Greek 
colonists and spread to mainland Greece. Kybele has been partly assimilated to aspects of Gaia and Rhea (and 
ultimately identified with Rhea in Phrygia), and occasionally associated with Demeter. Kybele (like Rhea) resides on 
Mount Cybele, and is depicted as an exotic goddess, a foreigner who travels in a chariot drawn by lions, always 
accompanied by music, wine and ecstatic revellers. Unlike any other Greek cult, Kybele’s most devout male followers 
castrate themselves, presumably to emulate Kybele’s castrated shepherd-consort, Attis. She is associated with 
mountains, fertile nature, and wild animals. Graves, The Greek Myths, 1960. In Phrygia, Kybele’s worship was 
universal, and she may have also initiated Dionysus in her mysteries. Theoi, “Kybele”. I refer in this thesis mostly to 
Kybele, primarily because of her similarities to Dionysus: her status as an outsider and her association with ecstatic 
revelry. It appears Kybele’s foreign status allowed her to resist appropriation better than other female deities; if what we 
witness in contemporary culture is an erasure of the mother from the space of representation, her image will be more 
easily identifiable in aspects that have not been fully absorbed by (and translated into) patriarchal tropes.   
214 Theoi, “Kybele”. In some versions, the god Hermes brings the infant Dionysus to Rhea/Kybele to rear him. Semele 
(who becomes on Olympian Goddess) remarks later to Hera that Dionysus was reared by Kybele, the same one who 
reared Zeus himself: “this Kybele…who is called your mother brought forth Zeus and suckled Bakkhos…in the same 
lap! She dandled them both, the son and the father.” Ibid.  
215 Agdistis is Kybele herself in Pessinus; she is born of the sky-father (sometimes Zeus) and the earth-mother. She is 
often conflated with Rhea, who is Zeus’ mother. Note that seeing Rhea/Kybele as Dionysus’ mother means Dionysus is 
Hera’s half brother. Ibid. 
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reached adolescence, his incredible beauty caused everyone to fall in love with him, 
including the now female Agdistis (another hypostasis of Kybele). In an incestuous 
twist, Agdistis/Kybele took Attis as her lover.  
When Kybele discovered Attis was about to marry Ia, the daughter or King Midas of 
Pessinus,216 she wreaked havoc on the wedding party. Filled with despair and rage, 
she maddened all male wedding guests, and made them emasculate themselves in 
public. Attis mutilated himself under a pine tree, dying from the blood loss; his bride, 
affected by the same craze, cut off her breasts, her blood causing violets to spring 
where it spilled on the ground. This aspect of the myth is of particular interest: I argued 
earlier, quoting Green and Jacobs, that the separation from the mother cannot fulfil a 
structuring function due to the sterile way in which this separation is achieved. The 
absence of the mother is not physically felt, as it does not involve bloody mutilation. 
And yet the myth of Kybele presents precisely such a mutilation, showing a breast that 
is taken away by being literally chopped off. The Kybele/Attis story repeats tropes we 
find in other myths that are foundational in subjectification and the creation of the male 
imaginary: we see an unwanted child who is left to die or abandoned, but is rescued 
and raised by benevolent creatures in a pastoral setting until such time when he is 
ready to kill the father in both the stories of Oedipus and Zeus. In Attis’ story, it is the 
father that is absent, and the mother that births the child and takes him as her lover. 
Through the father’s absence and the mother/child love story, the myth bypasses the 
oedipal hierarchy, precipitating subjectification through separation from the mother.  
Although the pairing is not the classic mother-son one, and the one who inflicts the 
mutilation onto herself is the bride, the act of taking the breast away comes at the 
hands of Kybele, who is both mother and lover. Kybele inflicts the self-mutilating 
madness onto the wedding party, and, by extension, takes away both the penis and the 
breast from the baby (Attis). The story of Kybele and Attis is convoluted, with Kybele 
fulfilling several roles at once, and appearing simultaneously in different guises/sexes. 
This mimics the dream-logic of phantasies, and the myth may present the narrative of 
the structuring function of the mother, especially if we consider that such a narrative 
would necessarily be ‘told’ from a different perspective than the phallic one. 
Overcome with grief, Kybele asks Zeus to resurrect Attis. Zeus accepts, but makes 
Attis’ immortality manifest by allowing his body to never decay in his tomb. A further 
sign of his godliness is that his hair grows, and he can move his little finger, 
presumably in an emulation of his lost penis. The cult of Attis is associated with the 
                                                          
216 Kybele is sometimes referred to as King Midas’ mother. Ibid. 
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decay of fruit, and its rebirth the following year, while the pine tree became his symbol 
as a god. Kybele loves the baby, and, like Agave, also murders the baby by castrating 
him. In love, Attis and Kybele are inseparable; in death, their dyad is broken, and Attis 
can grow into his own subjecthood—symbol of life and death, plenty and decay. Like 
Pentheus, Attis’ relationship with his mother allows him to experience life and death. 
A parallel between the bacchants’ ecstatic revelry and the cults of Kybele and Attis 
reveals numerous common elements, ranging from the nature and location of their rites 
(drunken orgies conducted in a glade surrounded by pine trees), to their affinity for 
nature and animals. In some versions of the myth, Dionysus himself is a priest of 
Kybele, and promotes her mysteries; although not castrated like the priests of her cult, 
Dionysus is described as a beautiful young man, whose effeminate features could be 
associated with androgyny or castration. 
The cult of Kybele, as appropriated by the Greeks, rejected masculinity and evicted 
men, the phallic law and the male imaginary from the feminine setting. When 
understanding the Bacchic rites as directed at the (absent) figure of Kybele, it becomes 
apparent why the bacchants displayed such aversion for accepted social mores and 
the lesser roles of women in the life of the city. Moreover, it illuminates the matriarchal 
structure of the bacchants’ internal organisation, and it invites a closer reading of 
Kybele (and, to an extent, Agave) as the monstrous mother.  
As the quintessentially destructive, all-powerful mother, Kybele impregnates Nana with 
Attis, effectively giving birth to him, seduces him, takes him as a lover, castrates him, 
and eventually kills him. Once dead, she brings him back to life, yet offers him an 
immobile existence: confined to the tomb, Attis cannot speak or move (aside from his 
little finger); he is, once again, returned to the status of an uncoordinated babe, wholly 
dependent on his mother/lover, to whom he remains forever attached. Kybele 
simultaneously fulfils infantile phantasies of destruction, incest, omnipotence (in the 
form of immortality), and dissolution of selfhood, proving, like the monstrous mother of 
Kleinian theory, incompatible with the Symbolic, and dangerous to the male 
imaginary.217 In calling for worship outside of the city walls, she invites her adepts to 
renounce Symbolic constraints and return to origins, to a state of undifferentiated-ness, 
of non-logical, non-linear time and narrative.218 She represents a way of thinking from 
                                                          
217 In her manifestation as Rhea, the mother of all gods is equally dangerous for the male imaginary. When pregnant 
with Zeus, she duped Kronos into swallowing a large stone instead of the newborn Zeus, thus carefully crafting the 
collapse of the social order from within.  
218 Tiresias, the blind prophet, further supports this point in the play when he explains that “We do not rationalize about 
the gods.” He recognises the clash of two systems of worship, or of two systems of psychic organisation: “We have the 
traditions of our fathers, old as time itself. No argument can knock them down...” Euripides, Ten Plays by Euripides, 322. 
While making a case for the necessity of patriarchal boundaries and rules, his words also point to the fact that these 
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without patriarchal confines, and of organising the psyche around feminine elements 
while renouncing masculine ones, in the same way the phallic law requires that all 
feminine elements be renounced for the phallic way of thinking to be adopted. She is 
never present, reminding one of the absent mother, whose disappearance (not death) 
makes it impossible for the infant to not fear her imminent return. Yet Kybele also, 
paradoxically, enables a new form of subjectivity by allowing the baby (Attis) to fulfil all 
infantile phantasies, including those of death and destruction at the hands of the 
mother, and obtaining for him immortality and omnipotence. She is simultaneously 
mother, lover and goddess, present and absent, creating a new, horizontal form of 
relating to and identifying with an ego-ideal.   
At the centre of the Bacchants’ sexual frenzy, the absent figure of Kybele appears to 
have been summoned through a collective genesis, an attempt to recover the original 
maternal figure through orgiastic states that celebrate maternal jouissance, and are 
manifest against the phallic law. As the absent core of this type of organisation, Kybele 
becomes the paradigmatic monstrous mother, who un-structures and re-structures the 
male imaginary (Pentheus), reaffirming the structuring role of the mother. From this 
perspective, Dionysus becomes a priest in Kybele’s cult, a tool to coordinate and 
hasten the unravelling of the Symbolic and the structure of the social order. He is called 
into being by the female/maternal imaginary (should it be possible to speak of such an 
entity), and it is on its behalf that he acts. In orchestrating the unravelling of the male 
imaginary, Dionysus re-creates the story of Kybele and Attis in the characters of Agave 
and Pentheus: much like Kybele herself, Agave gives birth to Pentheus, seduces him 
into renouncing his masculinity and kills him.  
In the presence of the monstrous mother women and men who have renounced their 
masculinity become empowered, while (phallic) men become weak. Pentheus, in his 
attempt to cling onto his masculinity and end the crazed revels of the women, starts 
behaving like the crazed women themselves, illustrating the full extent of the reversal of 
social roles caused by Dionysus. It is relevant that Kybele herself is never named 
explicitly by any of the characters of the play; in being the absent mother, she becomes 
at the same time both the Kleinian monstrous mother, a structuring element of the 
psyche, and the Lacanian maternal Thing, who exists unnamed, on the outskirts of the 
psyche, threatening the phallic law. Once the action of the play moves to the 
mountains, so does the social order: the mother is no longer on the fringes of the 
Symbolic, looking in, but an orchestrator of the unravelling of the phallic law, and of the 
(new/old?) maternal rule. In the play, this shift becomes apparent in the subtle change 
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in language and behaviour characters undergo; Pentheus especially is overcome by a 
madness that not only makes him irrational to the point of breaking taboos, but also 
brings to light vulnerability not apparent before. He is dependent on the stranger to see 
and move, and is absorbed by the spectacle of the maenads; he is blind to everything 
that happens around him, including the superhuman display of force shown by the 
stranger who bends a fir tree to the ground, and is hypnotically drawn to the dances of 
the bacchants around the absent figure of Kybele. His destruction comes at the hands 
of Agave, who, like a hypostasis of Kybele herself, murders her son/lover and then, 
overcome with grief, mourns his loss. Ultimately, the pull of the monstrous 
mother/maternal Thing proves so strong that the male imaginary cannot help itself from 
gravitating around her; the monstrous mother is as destructive and dangerous to the 
male imaginary as the baby phantasizes her to be.  
Yet the unfolding of the story shows the mother to have structuring capacity, in the 
sense that she causes patriarchal constructions to come undone and guides the infant 
out of Symbolic constraints and into new forms of existence. We do not get to see in 
the play this structuring capacity leading to a reorganisation of the psyche with the 
maternal figure at its core, as in the story of Attis; due to the clash between the two 
registers of subjectification, breaking free from the bounds of the phallic imaginary, 
even if only momentarily, leaves no room for the subject to return.  
On the surface, the picture The Bacchae paints is depressing, as it confirms that 
stepping outside the Symbolic and organising subjectivity around a structuring element 
other than the Father can only result in death. Yet such a reading truncates the 
complexity of the story by not considering the crucial role Dionysus plays: through 
Dionysus, and, more importantly, through his actions that stretch and test kin ties, the 
space of the Symbolic widens momentarily to allow subjects (such as Agave), to exist 
qua subjects in a different form of psychic organisation. The intrusion of the phallic in 
this alternate model proves untenable, and results in death and suffering—but, as I will 
argue in Chapter 5, not because the existence of structured subjects is not possible 
outside the confines of the phallic, but because the phallic itself is incompatible with a 
different mode of subjectification. If, as the myth of Metis shows, the phallic is 
dependent on the murder and absorption of the mother to exist, then for the phallic to 
step outside of its own condition for possibility necessarily entails its own destruction. 
As the representative of the Symbolic, Pentheus cannot exist outside the Symbolic; his 
death at the hands of the mother does not show that subjectivity is impossible outside 
the Symbolic, but that the Symbolic cannot exist outside itself, and that the form of 
subjectivity the Symbolic creates rests on perpetuating incompatibility with the mother. I 
will return to this idea in Chapter 5, where I will explore the potential reason behind the 
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creation of a register from which the mother is banned, and whose existence is almost 
impossible alongside the mother. 
The play may be a reminder of the destructive, but liberating potential of the imbalance 
of structuring figures; the misrepresentation of any structuring element in the picture of 
the psyche leads to madness and tragedy. Euripides’ sensitivity to the condition of 
women makes him particularly receptive to the problem of women with no rights, and, 
by extension, to that of figures too long ignored, and the destructive force they pose if 
smothered indeterminately. Euripides’ tragedies are often incisive social critiques and 
analyses of the means by which madness permeates the social. In the current context, 
if we read the play as a manifestation of the absence of the feminine from the social, it 
follows that madness itself is founded on this lack: repressed from the phallic 
imaginary, the mother returns to haunt, her absence unravelling society. 
The unfolding of events in The Bacchae reveals the structuring capacity of the mother, 
but not by replicating the oedipal organisation with the mother at its centre. Rather, the 
mother’s structuring capacity becomes apparent through her absence being enough to 
make the Symbolic unravel, to strip it back to its constituting parts and return it to its 
origins. As Dionysus makes his entrance and starts to influence events, the mother’s 
presence is felt because she is absent, and because of the fragility her absence 
reveals at the heart of the phallic. Once Dionysus is gone, the picture returns to its 
Symbolic normality; yet, albeit briefly, the manifestation of the non-Symbolic subject 
opens a space for a different mode of psychic organisation, one that reveals a lack at 
the core of the Symbolic. As the layers of the Symbolic are ‘peeled back’ and the 
Symbolic comes undone, the figure of the mother emerges, hidden beneath phantasies 
of the male imaginary, and yet foundational in its constitution.  
 
Kinship ties and their opacity in The Bacchae 
The rich complexity of The Bacchae is fully revealed when considering the context in 
which events unfold—that of the family, which is complicatedly embroiled with matters 
of the state and religion. The currency of the play is female desire: under Pentheus, it is 
controlled and used for domestic purposes, while under Dionysus it is unbridled, and 
used to usurp the legitimacy of the law and the sovereignty of patriarchy. Female 
desire becomes a weapon, destructive when not contained by the phallic. Female 
desire and, implicitly, the act of repressing the figure of the mother, becomes the agon 
of the play, and the fight for control over women reaches a climax when situated in the 
midst of kin relations. Dionysus, the son of Semele, Agave’s late sister, seeks to 
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expose the repressed figure of the mother, while Pentheus, his first cousin, goes to 
self-destructive lengths to keep it hidden.  
Yet, as the play descends into amathia, chaos and undifferentiatedness, Dionysus and 
Pentheus grow similar, becoming doubles of each other, driven by an identical goal. As 
embodiments of the Symbolised and non-Symbolic subjects, Pentheus and Dionysus 
are revealed as facets of the same character, necessarily alike, yet fundamentally 
different, enmeshed in a nexus of kin relations.   
Throughout the play, Butler shows, kinship is revealed as an accusation, with kin ties 
being hidden or erased by those closest to them. When Dionysus arrives in Thebes, he 
informs the audience that Semele’s sisters, his aunts, had claimed Semele had not 
borne Dionysus by Zeus, but had instead had a love affair with a mortal man and 
claimed Zeus to be the father at Cadmus’ advice, to avoid a scandal. In other versions 
of the myth, we learn Semele was one of Zeus’ priestesses, whom Zeus witnessed 
slaughtering a bull. He visits her as a giant eagle on several occasions, until she falls 
pregnant. Hera, having found out about her affair with Zeus, tricks her into persuading 
Zeus to reveal his divine form, which kills her instantly; we also learn her sisters 
claimed the divine fire was Zeus’ punishment for Semele falsely accusing him of 
fathering Dionysus. The authoritative narrative of the play, that maintained by the 
House of Cadmus, comes into conflict with the one created by Dionysus: as he seeks 
to demonstrate his divinity, he establishes a new authoritative narrative that effectively 
splits truth, and encourages doubles to proliferate at the heart of kinship. In the new 
register of truth Dionysus creates he is a god, the bacchants are his army, and 
subjecthood itself, as demonstrated by Agave, appears to have forgone the oedipal 
paradigm in favour of another, pre-linguistic one, focused on the mother. Yet while the 
splitting of the authoritative narrative makes the second register viable by allowing it a 
claim to truth, it is still contained by the web of kin relations, and therefore linked to the 
first—the polis, ruled by Pentheus and his claim to truth. The fact that the two registers 
are situated in the midst of kinship is important: as kin ties are stretched, tested, denied 
and reasserted, the Symbolic and the pre-oedipal are bridged temporarily. When 
potentiated by the existence of a fluid web of kin relations, the non-Symbolic subject’s 
ability to transgresses boundaries allows for the creation of a moment in which two 
modes of psychic organisation can coexist, albeit briefly, until the non-Symbolic subject 
exits the picture and kin ties are broken.  
Yet whilst the Symbolic and pre-oedipal coexist, engulfed by the elusive, but exacting 
bonds of kinship, duality permeates subjects and actions, resulting in the proliferation 
of double meanings, and double forms of truth. The ‘authoritative narrative’ that does 
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not accept Dionysus’ divine nature, in this context, is true, and Semele’s sisters, in 
being devoted to it, stay devoted to the truth; however, as Butler points out, in 
supporting this narrative they also falsely accuse Zeus of having murdered Semele. 
Dionysus, “acting as Zeus’ emissary, punishes them all with a form of delirium that 
drives them from their homes, a form of radical and sudden de-domestication.” 219 
While Dionysus never introduces himself as Zeus’s emissary and maintains he is in 
Thebes to clear his mother’s name, through his revenge on his aunts, he acts as a 
force produced by the phallic to destroy the repression of the mother, thereby 
becoming Zeus’ emissary. Yet in attacking the phallic, Dionysus attacks himself, as 
Pentheus’ double. I will return to the problem of the phallic attacking itself through the 
non-Symbolic subject in the final chapter.  
Butler notes Dionysus exists in a nexus of interconnected threads involving his dead 
mother, his (absent/alleged) father and his crazy aunts, which designate these threads 
as kin relations; by being caught in this web, Zeus becomes kin to Dionysus, whether 
he is the biological father or not. Semele’s sisters had exposed the story about 
Dionysus’ parentage as a lie, forcing Zeus to punish the liar. If Zeus is Dionysus’ father, 
the punishment takes the form of the madness inflicted on Semele’s sisters (the liars); 
if Zeus is not the father, the punishment takes the form of Semele’s murder (the liar). 
Confusingly, Semele is dead and her sisters are mad, confirming Zeus both is and is 
not the father. The intricate web of relations established through the triangular relation 
that precedes Dionysus (Zeus-Semele-Semele’s sisters) is revealed as kinship 
because its constitutive parts are, at the same time, both guardians of truth and liars, 
both fathers and not-fathers.220  
But perhaps the most interesting duality is the one Butler identifies in Zeus: in being 
and not being the father, Zeus becomes his mother. When Dionysus is extracted from 
Semele’s womb by the fire-bolt (thrown by Zeus accidentally as he was trying to reveal 
himself to Semele, or on purpose to kill her for her lies), the gestating foetus is caught 
by Zeus himself, and sewn into his thigh with golden pins, where it continues gestation 
until it reaches viability. Zeus gives birth to baby Dionysus, becoming not the father, but 
the mother, or, indeed, both the father and the mother. This, Butler shows, implies that 
Dionysus has two mothers (or three, if we also count Kybele), his gestation being 
sequentially divided between Semele and Zeus. In allowing baby Dionysus to reach 
viability in his thigh, Zeus establishes the thigh as an alternative to the womb, 
completing a similar parthenogenesis like his birthing of Athena.   
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The transformation of Zeus into a mother and not-a-mother is mirrored by the 
transformation of Pentheus into a woman and not-a-woman. As he puts on his dress, 
Pentheus starts to see double, and doubt which of the two versions of the same is true. 
Yet the most powerful moment of misrecognition comes towards the end of the play, 
when Agave leads the bacchants in dismembering her son, who she genuinely 
believes to be a mountain lion. “Does she fail to recognise him,” Butler asks, “because 
he is for the moment a girl, or because he has not only departed from his birth gender, 
but has in fact become an animal?”221 As doubling and double-sightedness are set 
against the backdrop of a bridging of the Symbolic and the pre-oedipal, we can 
conclude both versions of the truth characters see are true at the same time: Zeus is 
the father and not-the-father and thus becomes the mother, Pentheus is man and 
woman, and Agave kills her son who is human and animal at the same time. Similarly, 
the women of Thebes are domesticated wives and maddened bacchants, Semele’s 
sisters are guardians of truth and liars, Cadmus is a shrewd political thinker and a 
devout follower of Dionysus, and the Chorus is logical and mad. But the most important 
transformation happens to Pentheus: Pentheus, Butler argues, first assumes the form 
of a man, then that of a woman, and finally appears (at least to his mother and the 
other Bacchae) as an animal, at which point he is killed. It is when he transforms into 
an animal that recognition fails, and his mother is unable to see her son.  
Dionysus is going through the same transformations, but with different results: he 
appears in Thebes as a man, but an effeminate one. We know from versions of the 
myth that he spent his childhood as a girl, to remain shielded from Hera’s vengeful 
gaze. Finally, he is known as “the bull-horned god”, and takes the form of a bull—
Pentheus himself, upon starting to see double, asks Dionysus: “…you seem to be a 
bull…Were you ever an animal?”222 Yet Dionysus is not killed the moment he 
transforms into an animal, but recognised as a god. If for Pentheus recognition falters 
when he falls into animality, for Dionysus it emerges. 
The dualities in the play and the violent fates that befall those prone to transgression is 
closely linked to libidinal excess. We see, in the case of the Theban women, excessive 
consumption of honey, associated with lust, which degenerates into violence; the same 
is repeated in the case of Pentheus, who is seduced by Dionysus into lustful dances 
that degenerate into murder. The assumption of various forms leads to misrecognition 
and violence; yet for both Pentheus and Dionysus, this misrecognition is precipitated, 
and somehow managed by a divine figure, who occupies various genders at will. “Shall 
we conclude,” Butler asks, “that the transposition of gender, one that already took place 
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when Zeus violently usurped the gestational process, continues as Dionysus beguiles 
with his feminine form, and Pentheus become a dancing woman?”223  
In the course of these transformations, Agave loses the ability to recognise her son. 
Yet Butler poses a further challenge, and questions how this misrecognition, and the 
transition from human to animal, is possible. “Is it that there are already affinities, if not 
forms of kinship, between the one gender and the other, and between human and 
animal, such that they can become confused quite easily?” she asks. The transition 
from human to animal, from male to female, Butler argues, is not as much a transition, 
but rather testimony to the fluidity of kin relations. The move into animality, as well as 
the oscillation between genders, “are relations that work transversally across 
established kinship ties based on claims of paternity and maternity…and represent 
forms of affinity that work through metonymy and concentricity, not following the rules 
of kinship based only on reproductive lines.”224 Through their changes, Pentheus and 
Dionysus testify to the fluidity of kin ties, and threaten the clearly delineated boundaries 
of subjecthood and the self. Yet Dionysus is (and is not) divine, and it is only Pentheus 
that is punished for this transgression. 
As far as Agave is concerned, she is unable to recognise her son on her own until the 
bridge between the Symbolic and the pre-oedipal collapses and Cadmus reasserts an 
authoritative narrative, re-establishing accepted norms ex post facto. With the 
recognition of her murder, Butler explains, “comes grief, another defining sign of 
kinship. But so too, surely, is the blindness.” In other words, misrecognition, whether by 
blindness or successive transformations that make the person be and not be 
him/herself at the same time mark a defining feature of kinship.   
As Butler shows, these instances of duality are delineations of kinship, becoming 
constitutive binds, both definitive and approximate: they constitute the lives of those 
enmeshed in them, but their punishments and boundaries remain fluid. The fluidity of 
the bonds demonstrates kinship must be enacted for its bonds to become visible; yet 
the enactment is always necessarily by means of blindness and double-sightedness, 
for kinship can only be recognised through misrecognition. The bonds of kinship do not 
converge to form a moralising tale; according to Butler, it would be wrong to seek to 
extract moral teachings from such a story, as to do this would be to fail to recognise the 
way kinship becomes apparent, is tested and reasserted in the play.225 The point is not 
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to undo the misrecognition or elucidate the instances of double-sightedness, but to 
recognise these as facets that cannot be treated independently, because they exist 
intertwined in a relation of kinship. Kinship is characterised by double-ness, by 
disorientation, and the punishment, marked by grief and anguish, does not merely 
reassert the law, but highlights that the law “depends on those traversals of categories 
of gender, humanness and animality that are recurrent and constitutive.”226 
Ultimately, the tragedy reveals the interplay between certainty and confusion that 
defines kin relations and the way kinship depends on the drives that are instrumental in 
undoing its ties. Reading the struggles of kinship through the non-Symbolic subject and 
analysing the relationship between Dionysus and Pentheus reveals duality asserts and 
denies itself. In being the same while different, Pentheus and Dionysus not only define 
kin ties, but also break the bonds of kinship and expose the ego as both pervasive and 
fragile. The non-Symbolic subject becomes what subverts kinship, generates 
breakage, and, at the same time, bridges the pre-oedipal and the Symbolic to reveal 
the possibility of an alternative to the oedipal model of subjectification. 
 
Summary of Chapter 4 
In this chapter I have looked at the place women occupy in The Bacchae, and have 
argued that, while the status of women as objects suggests a clear binary structure, the 
complex nature of the relationships between women, men and divinity makes the 
binary too rigid to maintain and self-subversive. By showing binaries to be untenable, I 
have argued the mother occupies a crucial role in the play, revealed through her 
absence, and have suggested that it is the centrality of her absence and its ability to 
threaten the Symbolic that underlie her structuring capacity. Using Butler’s reading of 
The Bacchae through the lens of kinship, I have demonstrated the non-Symbolic 
subject facilitates a bridging of the Symbolic and the pre-oedipal that allows two modes 
of subjecthood to coexist momentarily, pointing towards alternative models of 
subjectification beyond the oedipal.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
human communities and the lives of animals by claiming that humans are structured by kinship, then we invest kinship 
with a humanising force, one that is exercised at the same time gender is unequivocally established and heterosexual 
reproduction made the defining structure of kinship ties. And yet running thought this story is the idea that certain 
equivocations tend to recur and that they cannot be legislated away by rules of any kind. Oedipus: father/stranger, 
mother/lover; Antigone: brother/lover, uncle/sovereign. These are all forms of seeing double, and is what is happening 
when Dionysus and Pentheus are at once men and woman, and when Agave’s son becomes man/woman/animal. We 
can read the story to get to the end and then try to figure out its moral. Or we can see what interrupts the story as it 
proceeds, equivocations and echoes that are the psychic reverberations or kinship found especially in structure of 
ambivalence. Those recurring forms of doubleness interrupt the sequence of the story, suggesting that the ties of 
kinship that cross and link the human and the animal are not opposites, not mutually exclusive possibilities, but cousins, 
even kissing cousins.” Ibid. 
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Chapter 5 
Death, violence and self-harm:  
the place of the mother 
 
In this chapter, I will explore the way the exclusion of the mother from the social sphere 
and from the space of literature and the refusal to accept her structuring role has 
impacted the figure of women in the play. In so doing, I seek to uncover the reason 
behind the expulsion of the mother from the Symbolic, and what it may reveal about the 
male imaginary.  
In the play, it seems there are two possible positions for women: they are either 
‘phallic’, such as Semele’s sisters before being struck with Dionysian madness, posing 
limited threat to the phallic order and the male Symbolic, or non-phallic, such as Agave 
in her bacchic revelry and the failed mothers who leave their newborn babies to nurse 
calves, becoming fundamentally dangerous for the integrity of the Symbolic. There 
appears to be no way in which the mother that exists in the Symbolic space and is 
accepted by the male imaginary can be reconciled with the structuring mother, who is 
necessarily ejected from the Symbolic, and relegated to the Real, or at least to a space 
that can neutralise her structuring capacity. When Agave occupies a structuring 
position, she ends up killing her son, an act that brings about wide-spread despair and 
the destruction of two social units: on the one hand, that of a family, whose male 
figurehead is murdered, and on the other hand that of a state, whose ruler is sacrificed.  
As I have shown in the previous chapter, the strictly delineated confines of motherhood 
and of gender roles more widely in the play are fragile constructions that crumble under 
scrutiny. The positions of the play are only seemingly fixed, like an image on the water 
surface: the smallest ripple distorts it to the point that it becomes unrecognisable or 
shows the opposite of what it did at the beginning. The monstrous mother, who 
threatens the baby with complete annihilation, does so by displaying the pinnacle of 
love-as-appropriation perpetuated by the male imaginary; the crazy aunts who are 
devoted to the truth even when it comes at the cost of their own sister’s life end up 
destabilising the authoritative narrative and upholding an alternative they had initially 
sought to deny; the representative of the phallic rule, Pentheus, is willing to go to any 
lengths to safeguard the polis from the threat of the stranger, yet ends up acting in 
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ways almost identical to Dionysus, hastening and almost facilitating the destruction of 
the male imaginary. People behave like animals, seem to be animals, become animals, 
and occasionally are simultaneously animal and human. Death and destruction in the 
play happen in a complex nexus of kin relations that makes everyone related to 
everyone else in some way, and everyone human and non-human, depending on their 
circumstances; the convoluted setting means that, no matter how violence is enacted 
or against whom, it always runs the risk of turning into infanticide or cannibalism.  
Positions in the play are shifting, and hold stable only long enough so that characters 
are tempted into considering them fixed; at the centre of their movement, the figure of 
the mother is a gaping hole, absorbing characters, relationships, kin ties and the 
course of events, and in so doing causing the Symbolic to unravel. By the end of the 
play, the only things that remain are ineffable absences: of the mother, of the stranger, 
of a family that can govern the polis. Amidst generalised death and destruction, 
audiences are left wondering what if…: what if the mother, as Kybele or another 
mother-goddess, had made an appearance during the play, and had been at once 
recognised as a divine being? What if she had elucidated the Dionysian mysteries, 
taming the city into submission with much less bloodshed? Would her appearance 
necessarily entail her adopting a male subject position and replacing the figure of the 
Father? Or, otherwise phrased, is there any way for the mother to be present and a 
structuring element, or must she always be not-there-but-somehow-close for the 
psyche to respond to her by undoing and redoing itself?  
The structuring capacity of the mother revolves around violence and the death drive; by 
virtue of the violence being directed at the infant, the violence the mother brings is 
always sexual, threatening the child with castration and annihilation. In the play, we 
witness a reiteration of the Kybele-Attis myth with Agave and Pentheus in the roles of 
Kybele and Attis, in which Agave takes on both the structuring and destructive traits of 
Kybele, and Pentheus becomes the murdered child and the castrated (beheaded) 
lover. The separation from the mother, from this perspective, is no longer a sterile 
affair, but fully-fledged bloody mutilation: for the mother to come forward, the image of 
the father must be erased. In this chapter, I will explore the meaning of the killing of the 
son by the mother, and the importance of this murder in the wider issue of the 
repressed motherly figure.  
In Chapter 4, I looked in turn at the relationship between the mother and the non-
Symbolic subject, the Symbolised subject, and the relationship between Agave and 
Pentheus, and concluded that the mother’s full generative force is normatively 
contained to protect the male imaginary. In this chapter, I would like to delve deeper 
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into this question, and look at the reason the mother is considered threatening, and try 
to understand the mechanisms the male imaginary utilises to keep this threat at bay. I 
will show that the exclusion of the mother from the Symbolic sphere is the effect of a 
process of a multi-faceted repression, which is in turn attacked by the non-Symbolic 
subject and results in the dissolution of the social order based on said repression.  
Throughout this work, I have treated the non-Symbolic subject as the subject that 
exists unadulterated by the containing influence of the male imaginary, and argued that 
it is a structured psychic excess, a form of subjectivity that exists before the 
internalisation of the father-figure and that needs to be tamed for its entry in the 
Symbolic to be possible. I also argued that Dionysus can be regarded as a (literary) 
manifestation of the non-Symbolic subject. In this chapter, I would like to also propose 
that Dionysus functions simultaneously as a symptom of the repression of the mother 
and her exclusion from the Symbolic, and analyse how this repression functions and 
why the non-Symbolic subject (Dionysus) and the Symbolised subject (Pentheus) can 
only be linked through violence. I will look at the problem of doubling as a form of 
violence, and at what happens when such violence occurs at the heart of the family, in 
the midst of kinship. I will show that the complex repression of the mother is aimed at 
rendering her impotent, unable to ever occupy a structuring male subject-position and 
usurp the Father, and at erasing the traces of her generative and structuring qualities, 
to keep the male imaginary safe from her potentially destructive influence. In the play, 
we see this erasure in the figure of the absent, non-threatening, sterile Kybele, and that 
of the monstrous mother (Agave): as Agave’s structuring capacity manifests itself, her 
monstrosity becomes incompatible even with the violent non-Symbolic subject, and she 
is consequently exiled. 
In order to undertake this analysis, I will look at the figure of Kybele and similar 
goddesses that are linked to the idea of structure and life, to show that linking the 
mother to birth, particularly to the birth of men in myths, generates, in itself, a form of 
structure, which the non-Symbolised subject adopts.    
 
Dionysus as symptom  
When we read The Bacchae as an exposition of two registers that clash due to the 
(perceived or created) incompatibility of their underlying structuring elements, we see 
that the tragic result of this clash is widespread madness, the dissolution of individuality 
and the destruction of a social order, all potentiated by the web of kinship that contains 
the events. To keep madness and destruction at bay, one register represses the other, 
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absorbing and neutralising it. It is therefore possible that the psychic register that 
represses the other experiences neurotic symptoms caused by the effort of keeping the 
repression hidden in the depths of the unconscious—or, in this case, outside (or inside, 
if we think of Zeus and Metis) of the space of representation, and into the Real.  
When understanding the play in such a way, Dionysus becomes a neurotic symptom of 
the male imaginary (which is represented universally by Zeus), generated by the 
obliteration and disavowal of the mother and the systematic cover-up of the matricidal 
law. If a symptom, Dionysus’ existence can only lead to the un-structuring of the 
Symbolic law, through its repeated and aggressive permeation by repressed elements. 
In being the non-Symbolic subject carried forward into the Symbolic, Dionysus also 
becomes a product of the male imaginary, a symptom of the act of repressing the 
mother, which has now sublimated into a different, potent and destructive form, and 
has resurfaced as symptom amid the Symbolic. As the mother has been ingested and 
incorporated by the male imaginary, Dionysus can transgress boundaries and move 
freely in the phallic psyche, a manifestation of the maternal law itself, not expelled, but 
contained. He is born of the male imaginary in the Symbolic, but governed by none of 
its laws; like a neurotic symptom, he follows no rules (or follows dream-logic), and 
appears as a discordant element that eventually leads to the collapse of rationality, the 
destruction of the phallic law, and the (re)affirmation of the mother—not as a presence 
that replicates the image of the father, but as indeterminate absence. 
Once the play reaches a climax and ends in tragedy, Dionysus also disappears, like a 
symptom whose root cause has been exposed and accepted by the analysand. The 
product of this repression—the social organisation structured on the systematic erasure 
of the mother—can no longer exist, once repression has proved incapable of covering 
up the absence of the mother; as a result, the product (the socio-political organisation) 
is destroyed.  
The non-Symbolic subject becomes a breaking-through of the pre-Symbolic subject in 
a setting created by and for the male imaginary. A remnant of pre-sexual difference 
that resulted in a different model of subjectification, the non-Symbolic subject is carried 
over in the phallic social structure. Its incompatibility with the social setting comes as a 
result of the lack of synchronisation between the two registers, the male and female 
imaginaries, and the attempted exorcism of the feminine from the social sphere. 
Through Dionysus, Zeus has created the type of femininity he has attempted to 
eradicate with Metis: a cunning, destructive mother who has the potential to upturn the 
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social order from within.227 When allowed to become manifest, it does so through the 
figure of Dionysus, who, as a clandestine element in the middle of the Symbolic, can 
demonstrate the full range of traits denied to the mother: it can empower women to 
display maternal jouissance and structuring power. The non-Symbolic subject is, 
therefore, the testimony of incongruence between a preferred social order based 
entirely on the structuring function of the phallus, and broader, more inclusive space of 
subjectification that contains both maternal and paternal elements and opens the 
possibility for multiple forms of subjectivity to exist. When these collide, and one 
represses the other, a discordant element is born, a monstrous subject, which cannot 
exist in either setting, but brings chaos to both.  
 
The generative mother 
Mother-goddess figurines have been found across the world, their abundance pointing 
to the potential existence of several mother-goddess cults and exciting the interest of 
contemporary theorists.228 The emphasis placed by modernity on the part the mother 
plays in the life of the infant, and the subsequent inference that ancient civilisations 
must have also revered the mother offers us an important insight into modern thought 
itself: it tells us that there is something that prompts the male imaginary to return to the 
image of the mother, and to go to great lengths to unearth her (literally, through digging 
up artefacts and displaying them in museums) and imbue her with meaning, in perhaps 
a figurative form of reparation for past erasure.229 For the purpose of this chapter, I will 
refer only to figures that pertain to Classical Antiquity, but this is not to say that the cult 
of the mother-goddess is not also prominent in other parts of the world; on the contrary, 
evidence points to the existence of such cults in Norse, Celtic and Incan societies, as 
well as contemporary religions such as Hinduism and Christianity, cultures in the 
Pacific, and modern cults.  
Clay figurines of mother-goddesses date from the Palaeolithic, and have been 
excavated in Anatolia in the Neolithic, and in neighbouring Thrace (in the Cucuteni-
Trypillian culture) in the Neolithic-Eneolithic. The cult of Kybele dates from the 
                                                          
227 After all, patriarchy had been tricked before by Zeus’ own mother, Rhea, who had managed to preserve the element 
that would destroy patriarchy (Zeus) and hide it from the male imaginary’s watchful eye (Kronos).  
228 See Motz, The Faces of the Goddess, (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) for a detailed discussion 
of the cult of the mother goddess and the significance of different forms of worshipping her.  
229 I will return to the idea of reparation for a past wrong (in this case, the attempt to annihilate the mother by erasing her 
from the social space). With a view to the act of digging up figurines of women and creating complex narratives around 
their potential roles as objects of worship, it is interesting to note that the way these figurines are treated in modern 
culture can also be interpreted as attempted reparation. Artefacts are displayed in museums, usually protected by 
durable glass, catalogued rigorously and labelled clearly. It is questionable whether the figure of the mother is protected 
this way, or, indeed, further isolated and ‘contained’. 
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Neolithic, but her figure is not stable, in the sense that she is frequently associated 
(and at times amalgamated) with mother-goddesses in Ancient Antiquity, such as 
Demeter and Rhea, but also varying hypostases of Aphrodite.  
Kybele represents the figure of the mother, and is revered as the mother of all gods, 
much like Rhea and Demeter. She is occasionally referred to as “The Phrygian 
Aphrodite of Mount Ida”, but, interestingly, also as “the queen bee”.230 Although the 
figure of Kybele has numerous sexual elements and is especially graphic in terms of 
sexual violence, particularly self-mutilation, there are not many explicit sexual 
references to Kybele herself. While centred on sexual practices, her cult has more to 
do with the removal of sexual traces than with their perpetuation: her priests 
emasculate themselves in ecstatic revelry, in the hope of being closer to unity with the 
goddess. Unity with Kybele, in this context, becomes possible only once male sexuality 
has been denied, and emasculation becomes the only way to achieve union with the 
goddess; this practice also translates in an interpretation of the goddess as a primordial 
element that not only precedes, but also rejects male phantasy and the male 
imaginary. Much like the generative mother the male imaginary fears, the Mother 
Goddess is incompatible with the male imaginary, and her proximity, especially when it 
also implies (sexual) unity, can only lead to the destruction of the male (subject). The 
figure of Kybele appears to be interpreted as one that precedes and is antagonistic to 
male figures. But it is too simplistic to argue that one structuring element precedes the 
other, and more productive to investigate the reason her figure has become associated 
with traits that are threatening to the male imaginary: what is it about the mother that 
prompted the male imaginary to create and proliferate an image of her that is 
incompatible with the Symbolic? 
The cult of Kybele can be read as a return to matriarchy, as the ideas of androgyny, 
castration and the effeminate male feature prominently, both in myths, as outlined in 
the previous chapter, and in Euripides’ The Bacchae. The hermaphrodite, Graves 
writes, originated as a religious concept in the transition from a patriarchal system to a 
matriarchal one: Hermaphroditus “is the sacred king deputising for the Queen...and 
wearing artificial breasts”, while “Androgyne is the mother of a pre-Hellenic clan which 
has avoided being patriarchalized.”231 By this token, gods such as the Cyprian 
Aphrodite (the Bearded goddess), and Dionysus (the effeminate god), can be read as 
facilitating social transitions from one form of organisation (patriarchal) to the other 
(matriarchal), or as a momentary bridge between the feminine and the masculine. 
Ultimately, they represent the rejection and subsequent subversion of patriarchy by the 
                                                          
230 Graves, The Greek Myths, 18.3. 
231 Graves, The Greek Myths, 18.8. 
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matriarchal, elevating the hermaphrodite to the status of a sacred figure that can 
belong to any social organisation by virtue of its transitional nature.   
If hermaphrodite gods are transitional figures that help shift social perception, it is 
interesting that from the union of two gods affiliated with the matriarchal (Dionysus, in 
his effeminacy, and Aphrodite, in her abundant fertility) a monstrous creature is 
produced, a creature that, through its appearance, pays homage to masculinity. The 
son Aphrodite bore Dionysus, Priapus, was “an ugly child with enormous genitals”,232 a 
deformity that allegedly resulted from Hera’s interference, who disapproved of 
Aphrodite’s promiscuity.233 Aphrodite’s fertility and sexuality exert a powerful pull on 
patriarchy, attracting not only Hera’s wrath (who, much like Athena, acts as an enforcer 
and guardian of patriarchy), but also Zeus’.234 Although he never has sexual relations 
with Aphrodite (possibly because it would have been incestuous), Zeus was consumed 
with lust for her.235 As a punishment, he made her fall in love with a mortal, Anchises. 
She “visited him [Anchises] in the guise of a Phrygian princess, clad in a dazzlingly red 
robe, and lay with him on a couch spread with the skins of bears and lions, while bees 
buzzed drowsily about them.”236 Yet the transition to matriarchy is not always 
successful, even when facilitated by those who display overabundant sexuality. In 
Euripides’ play, Dionysus becomes an enabler of the cult of Kybele; however, the 
repression of the mother’s generative force by the male imaginary makes her figure un-
representable in the Symbolic, and the transition fails. 
The image of honey is a returning trope in The Bacchae, which, in the context of the 
play, stands for life, sensuality and lust, which nonetheless runs the risk of becoming 
cannibalism and death when consumed excessively. Kybele herself is revered as the 
Queen bee, and associated with honey, and, like Aphrodite, with fertility and bees. The 
reference to honey runs throughout Greek myth, and appears time and again as a 
poignant warning against the excessive consumption of honey, in the form of the 
excessive honeymoon and the decomposition of honey, followed by its turning into 
excrement. In his essay, Between Beasts and Gods, Marcel Detienne makes a clear 
association between the excess of honey, or the excessive honeymoon (understood in 
this context as overabundant sexuality), and its degeneration into rape and 
cannibalism. Giving the example of Tereus and Polytechnos, Detienne argues that 
                                                          
232 Ibid. 
233 Graves, The Greek Myths, 18.e. 
234 In some versions of the myth, Rhea (Hera’s mother) is associated with Kybele, and both are considered Dionysus’ 
mother. This means Hera is Dionysus’ sibling to the same degree as Athena – and, indeed, they both fulfil similar 
functions and are presented as enforcers of patriarchy: Athena as the goddess of (phallic) wisdom, and Hera as the 
goddess of marriage.  
235 Most commonly, Aphrodite is depicted as older than Zeus, having been born of the frothing of the sea when Ouranos’ 
severed testicles touched the water; Homer, however, depicts Aphrodite as Zeus and Dione’s daughter. Theoi, 
“Aphrodite myths”. 
236 Graves, The Greek Myths, 18.f, g. 
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sexual excess, and the act of taking more pleasure than is proper in the honeymoon or 
the relation with a lover, transforms honey from a nourishing substance into decay, rot 
and excrement. Both husbands (Tereus and Polytechnos) are guilty of being overly 
sexual, and end up being killed by honey: they both succumb to rape and cannibalism, 
followed by death. Tereus eats his son, and is finally changed into a hoopoe, a bird that 
feeds on human excrement, while Polytechnos, the master of bees and honey, is rolled 
in honey and left to be stung by bees. As he abandons the balanced consumption of 
honey (as the master of bees), and indulges excessively in honey, the excess kills him, 
and he is left to rot.  
The transition between the nourishing, life-giving qualities of honey and its excess is 
facilitated by what Detienne calls a “cannibalistic phase”, which in other myths is 
defined as “the state prior to the discovery of honey”. In the myths Detienne quotes, 
“men ate each other until the Bee-Woman taught them how to feed off honey gathered 
in the forest.”237 The Bee-Woman (or Queen Bee, as Kybele is depicted) was the first 
civilising influence, the one that ended the cannibalism of men and initiated the first 
taboos. The possession of honey is solely the prerogative of the Bee Woman; an 
equivalent Bee Man does not appear to exist, and the task to regulate society, impose 
boundaries and delineate the limits of subjecthood falls to the Bee Woman. Yet she is 
not akin to a male god: she does not impose limits, but rather effects a change within 
men that enables them to set their own boundaries. After the Bee Woman ‘civilizes’ 
men, the way subjects relate to each other becomes regulated by their access (or lack 
thereof) to honey: those who know how to consume it live in civilised societies, while 
those who do not live in fear of being murdered and eaten by the other. The Bee 
Woman seems to be a catalyst, an enabler of society, not an unbreakable rule. In this 
particular myth, we see at play a similar process to the one Lacan captures in his 
theorisation of the mirror stage: unlike the Father, who, through bloody mutilation, 
effects change within a child’s psychic makeup, generating the creation of structures 
within the subject, the mother’s generative influence is different, and operates from 
without. Like in the mirror stage, the mother (or the Bee Woman) guides the subject 
(child/man) in his process of subjectification, precipitating within him a change—the first 
step towards subjecthood. In other words, if the Father forces a child’s impulses into 
acceptable avenues, the mother (Bee Woman) helps the child recognise himself as 
receptacle of these impulses—in the mirror stage, she does so through reassurance 
(‘yes, it is really you in the mirror’), while in the myth she teaches the child how and 
what to eat, regulating his relation with food, sexuality and the limits of selfhood.  
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156 
 
The men of the myth Detienne presents live in a period before the institution of rules 
and rationality, one that is characterised by the constant threat of complete 
annihilation—represented by cannibalism. The first rules that protect the self from 
being destroyed by an Other are instituted not by a representative of patriarchy, but by 
the Bee Woman, who is the first structuring presence in the life of the subject. What we 
see in the story of the Bee Woman is the theoretical framework that underpins the 
creation of the male child. Once she has brought to the fore the structures within the 
child’s psyche, the Bee Woman retreats, leaving the child to structure his own life, in 
accordance with the rules whose emergence she encouraged. The Bee Woman calls 
the subject into being, only to then disappear from his life, becoming an indeterminate 
absence that may return if the proper rules of consumption are forgotten.  
It is interesting to note that, while the Bacchic orgies initiated by Dionysus do involve 
flowing rivers of milk and honey, they do not require the worshippers to engage in 
cannibalism-proper, in the sense that there is no mention of the consumption of 
another human’s flesh. The politico-religious system of Ancient Greece was such that it 
structured itself around eating habits and sacrifice: sacrifice was the practice that 
codified rules about eating, and assigned men and gods their proper places. After a 
sacrifice, men were allowed the meat, the perishable substance that would allow them 
to continue living; the gods, on the other hand, were allowed the incense, the smoke 
and the perfume of the rite, the “incorruptible substances which constitute the superior 
foods reserved for the immortals.”238 From this perspective, man is closer to animals in 
its eating habits and needs than he is to gods. However, this closeness also translates 
into the necessity for clear rules of sovereignty: due to his ability to reason and impose 
restrictions on his eating habits (i.e.: not to eat other men), man is superior to animals. 
This superiority translates into man’s ability to divide animals into groups he 
protects/eats, such as livestock, and animals he hunts and/or eats. The act of eating 
the other, therefore, becomes a way of asserting domination, of establishing a 
hierarchical relation and the rules of patriarchal sovereignty.  
Yet the act of cannibalism itself can be divided into two: firstly, the taboo act of actually 
eating and digesting another person. Secondly, the act of swallowing a person, in an 
attempt to assert domination over them, absorb their powers, and contain the threat 
they may pose should they continue to exist. The latter was the case of both Kronos 
and Zeus, who swallowed those that could either jeopardise or further their rule. 
Cannibalism, in this context, becomes the way for patriarchy to assert its legitimacy by 
(literally, on occasion) consuming that which deviates from the norms set forth by the 
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male imaginary; under these circumstances, the cannibalistic act becomes acceptable. 
This form of cannibalism is what befalls the figure of the mother: as her structuring 
function becomes subsumed into the role of the Father, her image is hollowed out and 
split into acceptable elements (which are brought into the Symbolic), and undesirable 
ones (which are relegated to the Real).  
The type of cannibalism that remains taboo is associated, in Plato’s Republic, with the 
behaviour of the tyrant: “the tyrant’s behaviour is seen as the naked irruption into the 
world of primitive lusts which ordinarily are aroused in us only in sleep, when under the 
influence of alcohol the animal part of the soul...dreams that it commits incest with the 
mother, rapes god, man or beast, murders the father or devours its own children.”239 
These are, thus, the primitive fears of the male imaginary, and they are closely 
associated with tyranny, with illegitimacy, and with usurped sovereignty—in other 
words, with the impossibility of ruling without fear, or of living in a social system without 
fearing its dissolution.240 The boundaries of the city, the rules and logic that govern the 
polis serve to prevent such a return of man to his bestial nature. “Outside the frame of 
the city and the hierarchical structure with which it is linked, man, god and beast are 
merely interchangeable objects of the tyrant’s desire, which compel him to incest and 
parricide and finally to auto-cannibalism.”, Detienne writes. “In eating his own flesh and 
blood, the tyrant proclaims that he is outside the rules, a social outcast—just as the 
scapegoat [that] was expelled from the city...”241 
From this perspective, cannibalism is an enforcer of sovereignty, as it serves to 
‘swallow’ erratic elements, contain them, and prevent them from endangering the 
integrity of the polis/male imaginary. Yet cannibalism can also be read as a form of 
rejection of sovereignty, especially when it is used to eliminate the hierarchical 
structures set in place by the male imaginary. Such is the case of Dionysus and 
Kybele, who pertain to this latter category due to the specific nature of their religious 
rituals. Detienne writes: 
“in utter contempt of the rules for polis-sacrifice, an animal is hunted in the 
mountains, torn to pieces while still alive and consumed raw...[T]he boundaries 
between animals and men are effaced, human and animal interpenetrate, 
become indistinguishable...It is as if, in an attempt to become more utterly ‘wild’, 
the worshippers of Dionysus had first to soften the creatures of the wild, make 
friends with them even to the point of self-identification. But Dionysus the wild 
hunter is not simply an ‘eater of raw flesh’. The practice of eating raw flesh 
which he demands of his followers leads them to imitate wild animals in 
                                                          
239 Detienne, Myth, Religion and Society, 220. 
240 Similar fears can be traced in literature centuries later, in Edmund Spenser’s The Faerie Queene, a work which is as 
much a praise of Queen Elizabeth I, as it is an attempt to legitimate her rule by tracing her lineage back to King Arthur, 
and thus prevent accusations of tyranny.  
241 Detienne, Myth, Religion and Society, 220. 
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performing the cruellest acts of cannibalism...On Chios, Tenedos and Lesbos, 
Dionysus hungers for human flesh.”242 
In certain Greek contexts, the cult of Dionysus incites the pinnacle of the savagery he 
demands from his followers. Nonetheless, Detienne continues by arguing that 
cannibalism as presented here is, in fact, scorned by even Dionysus: Agave is sent into 
exile, and her deed is seen as a form of pollution of the polis. Similarly, the act of 
doubling of the self (as seen in the Pentheus-Dionysus relationship), of taking on the 
characteristics of the other, thus ‘swallowing’ the other and destroying them, is equally 
scorned. These types of cannibalism are reserved as a punishment for those that 
choose not to follow Dionysus. Although Dionysus appears to promote utmost 
savagery as his preferred path, his followers who actually commit acts of cannibalism 
end up consuming themselves. Cannibalism, Detienne explains, cannot reach a peak 
without turning onto itself. “In its pure form, cannibalism is impossible.”243 Agave’s 
violence, by this token, is a form of failed violence, which turns onto itself and not only 
destroys the polis, but forces her into exile. The overlapping forms of cannibalism and 
their cumulative effect destabilise the polis, leading to its ultimate collapse. The 
cannibalism presented here is, in fact, violence at the heart of kinship, a type that 
breaks taboos and threatens the fabric of the Symbolic. 
Cannibalism exists in the Dionysian cult as a form of subverting and even overthrowing 
male sovereignty: the cannibalistic act resides in Dionysus and Kybele (by association) 
‘absorbing’ their followers, and allowing them to transform into images of the god 
him/herself. The Maenads, in their crazed frenzy, succumb to savagery, becoming like 
animals. Their sexual frenzy creates an overabundance of libidinal energy (shown in 
the play in the form of rivers of milk and honey, continuously flowing), and trespasses 
social taboos. Kybele’s priests castrate themselves, so as to sever any links they may 
have with patriarchy and return to a time before differentiation, before the baby’s unity 
with the mother is given up for integration into the Symbolic. The cult of the two gods 
revolves around overthrowing the three basic taboos of patriarchy, incest, parricide and 
cannibalism, subverting patriarchy from within—from the place of the ‘swallowed’, 
absorbed mother (Metis). The way the followers of the two gods become the deities 
they worship, taking on their characteristics and ‘translating’ them into the polis, leads 
to a form of doubling that is essentially cannibalistic in nature. The doubling of the self 
in The Bacchae invariably also involves the destruction of the self: the ingestion of the 
other, whether by doing what the other does, or by dressing, singing, dancing or 
looking like the other, proves too much for the self to withstand, and as a result it is 
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destroyed. Both Pentheus and the Maenads imitate the god and take part in his rites 
and orgies to partake of him, shed their old identities and eventually become him;244 yet 
the process ends in their demise—the Maenads, after a period of Bacchic madness, 
are presumably returned to their original captor(s) (the stifling polis, with fixed gender 
roles and expectations). Pentheus is beheaded, and Agave is exiled, both thus being 
denied access to and control over the polis. As Detienne points out, the cult of 
Dionysus was never fully separate from the polis; although not accepted outwardly, it 
always took place inside, and only acted as a subversive force because of its intimate 
ties with patriarchy. The overlapping forms of cannibalism and their effect destabilise 
the polis and lead to its collapse. Cannibalism in The Bacchae underlines a pre-
existent violence in the midst of kinship, the type that is able to break the taboos that 
hold the fabric of the Symbolic woven together. 
When considering cannibalism in the play, it is critical to remember that cannibalism is 
a modern term, which emerged in response to racial difference and carries within it a 
complex and rich colonial baggage.245 The Greeks refer to eating other human beings 
and to eating one’s children through the descriptive terms ‘anthropophagy’ and 
‘teknophagy’; in this thesis, I use the more flexible term ‘cannibalism’ to denote the fluid 
boundaries of assimilation by the patriarchal, and point to a practice of violently 
incorporating bodies and subjectivities, whose pervasiveness ‘anthropophagy’ cannot 
capture. However, it is also essential to note that the imagery surrounding cannibalism 
is historically determined, and intimately interwoven with the colonial events that 
produced the word. Cannibalism, then, should be treated first and foremost as a trope 
that contains patriarchal structures, and testifies to the male imaginary’s fear of 
undifferentiatedness and of potential annihilation by the Other. By this token, 
discussing cannibalism must always entail assuming the (white) male subject position 
and excluding subjectivities that are marked by difference (sexual, racial, cultural). 
The Bacchae can only be read through the lens of cannibalism by modern subjects, for 
whom the term makes historical sense; yet such a reading has the potential to 
illuminate psychoanalytic tropes that have endured in the male imaginary, and analyse 
their underlying structure. The cannibalism depicted in The Bacchae is simultaneously 
maternal and phallic: it re-enacts the deepest fears of the male imaginary, those of 
being absorbed by the mother, of having one’s subjectivity subsumed by that of the 
mother and reduced to undifferentiatedness, madness and non-Being. At the same 
                                                          
244 As D’Angour notes, these initiation rituals sought to strip the initiand of their old identity so that they could become 
like the god. The select few could thus bypass mortality, while those who did not have access to the initiations could 
enjoy a similarly transformative experience in the theatre. D’Angour, The Greeks and the New, 158-160.  
245 For a discussion of colonial fantasies in psychoanalytic discourse, see Marita Vyrgioti, The Cannibal Trope, (PhD 
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time, the taking-in of the other is foundational for patriarchy, the cornerstone of 
patriarchal sovereignty and an affirmation of the phallic law. Cannibalism in the play, 
therefore, is a practice that has dual meaning: on the one hand, it affirms the male 
imaginary, while on the other it forces it to face its certain death. To absorb, to become 
one with the other, is both a highly revered practice within the patriarchal society, 
especially when employed by men and most evident in the idealised forms of romantic 
love; when employed by women, the same practice becomes excessive, resulting in 
death and despair, as is the case with Agave’s beheading of Pentheus.  
There is value in exploring in more depth the idea of the cult of mother ‘absorbing’ its 
followers, or having certain rituals that seek to help followers achieve unity with the 
mother, become one with her, return to some form of metaphorical womb, to a state of 
undifferentiatedness or even reject the phallic from within, by operating and subverting 
it from within phallic confines. According to Richard Caldwell, the relationship between 
the mother and the baby can be regarded as triangular, the third object that enters the 
picture being the phallus.246 In other words, the baby in the preoedipal triad seeks not 
to possess the mother, but rather to become the phallus, and thus reside in the 
mother’s body and achieve unity with her. The cult of Kybele enables its followers to 
become the phallus: by castrating themselves, they deny their masculinity and put an 
end to their oedipal strivings. They do not possess the phallus, but instead regress to a 
preoedipal state in which they can become it, and return to the mother’s body, which, in 
Kleinian theory, is regarded as containing the father’s penis and all potential rival 
babies. The move in this context, then, is to reject the phallic structure that comes into 
place after the oedipal stage and return to a preoedipal organisation that allows the 
subject to exist as the phallus, and, being in a pre-phallic state, not depend on phallic 
organisation. This is a mechanism we see at play in fairy tales and myths, when certain 
characters are allowed to mediate between men and women in the tale and move 
freely between two seemingly incompatible sides: for example, in Snow White and the 
Seven Dwarves, the dwarves are pre-phallic elements that have full, unrestricted 
access to Snow White in virtue of their not being part of the phallic structure. They 
reside with her inside the tiny hut, effectively becoming manifestations of the phallus 
that the mother possesses and are non-threatening enough to allow her to go through 
some form of secondary gestation and emerge ‘fully formed’, ready for marriage with 
the prince. Similarly, in Boorman’s Excalibur, a modern reworking of the Arthurian 
legend, the wizard Merlin is presented as a pre-phallic character playing no other role 
than to grant men access to women (or advise them on how to win wars that would 
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gain them such access). He becomes the phallus, the character who understands 
power and politics, yet knows nothing of courtly love, of love-as-appropriation, and 
exists on the fringes of phallic society. He enjoys unrestricted access to the bodies of 
women, not as a sexual partner, but as privy to their lives and destinies. 
In this and previous chapters, I proposed the idea that the mother has a dual aspect, as 
both a generative force, the mother who holds the phallus and rival babies and 
precipitates the process of subjectification in the baby, but also a terrifying entity that 
threatens to annihilate the baby even when gone from his life, a looming presence that 
can return without notice. It is this duality of the mother that is generative of psychic 
structures. Through the mirror stage, the mother calls the subject into Being, helping 
the baby become self-aware and differentiate himself from the body of the mother; the 
baby becomes not only self-aware, but also envious of its place in relation to the 
mother and possessed by the desire to return to unity with her. As shown in Chapter 3, 
the love-envy/hate relationship the baby has with the mother and the desire to distance 
himself from the mother and be(come) the phallus so as to return within her give rise to 
intra-subjective tension, to an oscillation between the two positions (of love or envy).247 
This oscillation, along with the dual, combined aspect of the body of the mother 
precipitates the genesis of the ability to become structured, and, with the intervention of 
the Father, eventually pushes the non-Symbolic subject into Symbolic structures. In 
other words, the mother creates the conditions for the ability to become structured and, 
in instilling this ability into the non-Symbolic subject, generates a type of structure that 
predates the phallic one.248 The mother’s relationship with the child becomes crucial for 
the child to be able to respond to structure (including the phallic one) and adopt it.  
At the same time, the mother’s absence can un-structure the subject’s psyche and 
threaten the integrity of the Symbolic, a capacity which, as I suggested previously, 
underlines her structuring power. The centrality of the mother in the structuring and un-
structuring of the infant’s psyche, and her role in the forming of any type of subjectivity 
place her in a privileged position in relation to the infant and point to the existence of a 
type of link with subjectivity and the possibility of structure itself that precedes oedipal 
organisation. Whether we speak of the existence of the subject in the pre-oedipal or in 
the phenomenological field that opens after the oedipal stage, the mother remains a 
constant presence (or absence), a pivotal element without which the transition to the 
phenomenological field would not be possible. As the Symbolic crumbles in periods of 
                                                          
247 Klein, Envy and gratitude: a study of unconscious sources, 1957. 
248 Of course, I am not suggesting here that the mother’s influence is the only thing that ‘calls’ the subject into Being. 
Rather, she activates the potential for subjectification that already exists in the child, through reassurance (as shown in 
the theorisation of the mirror stage) and gradual delineation of boundaries (as in the case of the Bee Woman). It is also 
important to emphasise once again that the role of catalyst needs not be played by the biological mother, or by only one 
(female) actor; indeed, my argument revolves not around the mother as a person, but around her as a position.  
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great crisis and its constitutive layers fall away, the mother is revealed once again, the 
core around which psychic life revolves. As we have seen in The Bacchae, the 
absence of the Symbolic ‘lifeline’ does not translate straightforwardly into death and 
destruction: the Bacchants, with Agave at their centre, are neither dead, nor in distress, 
and instead display modes of Being that had been denied to them heretofore. They 
exist in a different mode of subjectification (albeit briefly) outside the Symbolic, until the 
Symbolic itself infiltrates this space, bringing about the collapse of both registers. 
When together with the mother, the subject is allowed to develop and go through the 
process of subjectification, yet only insofar as it does not spill into Symbolisation. In the 
context of the Lacanian understanding of structure, particularly of the idea of repetition 
as essential for the subject to constitute itself, coupled with this repetition not being of 
sameness, but of the unconscious ‘mark’, we can infer that the subject that exists 
alongside the mother outside the Symbolic is the original subject, the one that is lost 
the moment it is repeated and Symbolised. From this, it can further be inferred that the 
relationship of the non-Symbolic subject with the mother is a relationship between the 
lost subject that can only be created on the basis of some commonality, perhaps a link 
between the lost subject and the mother herself. In other words, the non-Symbolic 
subject is brought into Being by the generative mother, who shares some common 
ground with the non-Symbolic subject (the potential for Being, for positivity in Being). 
The mother’s ability to ‘call the subject into Being’ can be taken to suggest that the 
structuring capacity of the mother lies in her having more in common with the lost 
subject than the structuring Father. 
Yet the question that arises is whether the subsequent fading (not disappearance) of 
the non-Symbolic subject, and the dimming of its traits up to the point of sufficient 
vagueness so that it can be repeated into the Symbolic and enter it as loss (a rendition 
of the lost object), is also facilitated by the mother, or, indeed, by the threatening 
aspect of her dual nature. Even more importantly, at this point it becomes interesting to 
examine how the mother is carried by the Symbolised subject into the Symbolic—and 
this is where the analysis of generative figures such as Kybele, Rhea and others 
comes into play. My argument thus far has been that the generative mother cannot be 
adequately represented in the Symbolic, precisely because her generative aspect is 
threatening to the male imaginary; yet an image of the mother, albeit a faded one, does 
exist in the Symbolic, and it can, potentially, carry within residual traces of her 
(repressed) generative force. I would like to propose that cultural products such as the 
mother-goddesses mentioned above allow us to examine in more depth what the 
carrying-forward of the mother into the Symbolic can tell us about the working of the 
process of structuring and the place the non-Symbolic subject occupies in the 
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Symbolic. The figure of the mother, as she is brought into the Symbolic, carries within 
the potential for the repressed figure of the mother to resurface, in, at times, destructive 
guises, and belies an underlying self-destructive instinct of the male imaginary. As 
shown in previous chapters, the male imaginary whitewashes the image of the mother 
in order to make it non-threatening, but is not successful in neutralising it fully. In 
bringing with it into the Symbolic images that are not neutral, the male imaginary 
sabotages its own repression of the mother, perhaps as unconscious reparation for her 
almost complete erasure from the social sphere, and opens the way for the repressed 
figure of the generative mother to come to the fore. However, whilst confronting the 
repression is a form of working through, the aforementioned self-sabotage is 
unconscious, and thus not the work of analysis, but a guilt-ridden response of one 
element that is actively repressing another.  
The Bacchae makes frequent, subtle references to the figure of the mother, who 
appears as various deities. However, these are but veiled references, and the mother 
herself remains conspicuously absent. The only mother present in the play remains 
Agave, who only partially and unwittingly displays the destructive nature of the 
generative mother and in so doing also destroys herself. When we consider the role the 
mother plays in the structuring of the child’s psyche, it is unusual for her to be 
completely absent. The question that arises, then, is whether her absence does not, in 
fact, conceal the attempt of the male imaginary to repress her image. 
 
The repression of the mother 
There are textual elements in The Bacchae that prompt me to argue the figure of the 
mother in the play is not an actual presence, but, through her looming absence, 
suggests she is in fact a resurfaced repression.  
Firstly, the mother is conspicuously absent, and stripped of her generative force. The 
only mother-figures we encounter in the play are failed or incomplete examples of 
motherhood that appear sterile and direct their mothering wrongly—for example, we 
see one of the Maenads suckling a calf, a misguided form of mothering. There is little 
to no reference to generative mothers, aside from fleeting comments that are, 
occasionally, lost in translation, such as the mentioning of the mother goddess and the 
qualities of honey. When mothers mother, they do so by adopting phallic forms of 
mothering (love as appropriation), thereby spoiling the loved object. Nourishing 
substances in the play also seem to only be presented in their poisonous guises. 
Breast milk, and the act of breastfeeding, becomes a form of complete identification 
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with an animal, which opens the way for cannibalistic practices to infiltrate the polis; 
similarly, honey is associated with excess, transgression of taboos and death, and 
serves to make forced transitions between pastoral and savage scenes; the Maenads 
are shown at rest in nature, amid rivers of milk and honey, only to suddenly transform 
into savage creatures when startled by the male shepherds.  
Secondly, whatever residue of the mother is carried forward into the Symbolic appears 
sterile: either by virtue of her absence, or by being grotesquely (mis)represented, the 
mother is shown to hold little to no power. From Kybele, who is absent, to Agave, who 
is more or less ignored until she beheads Pentheus, and, finally, the Maenads, who are 
returned to their rightful ‘owners’, the vengeful female figure is suspiciously tame. Even 
the savagery of the Bacchants’ actions (the tearing apart of cattle and babies) is 
lessened by being attributed to a god who is imposing his will by proxy, justifying their 
actions by implying the women are fundamentally domesticated, but act strangely due 
to the influence of the stranger. The act of attributing female agency to an external 
ailment that needs to be cured is by no means restricted to The Bacchae: female 
violence, particularly when coupled with overabundant sexuality, is frequently depicted 
in literature as driven by forces beyond the woman’s control—vampires, demons, 
strange, inhuman powers.  
Finally, the juxtaposition of male/female elements in the play lends itself to a clean 
opposition, which nonetheless crumbles under scrutiny. In fact, dyadic opposites in the 
play appear to be misguided, most notably the mother as non-generative of psychic 
structures, and the Father as generative. As shown above, the mother’s proximity to 
the lost subject and her ability to call it into Being and enable it to respond to structure, 
as well as her capacity to un-structure the subject, makes it more likely that she has a 
structuring, generative function; at the opposite end of the spectrum, the part the 
Father plays into replicating loss at the level of the Symbolic would indicate he is non-
generative. Of course, I am not suggesting the problem of subjectification and of 
structuring and non-structuring roles can be solved by reversing the binary, and 
arguing the mother is generative, while the Father is sterile. Nonetheless, it is important 
to note that a reversal of the binary is possible to entertain.  
In order to analyse the way the figure of the mother is potentially repressed, I propose 
to look first at the way in which the dual aspect of the mother, as both generative and 
threatening, is carried forward into the Symbolic. If, as I argued before, the non-
Symbolic subject depends on the mother to come into Being, then it inadvertently 
incorporates aspect of her image, of the mother-as-generative-force (with both female 
and male elements, with both generative and threatening sides). Nonetheless, as I 
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have argued in this and previous chapters, the non-Symbolic subject, with its 
incorporated maternal baggage, is not erased, but merely tamed for the Symbolic 
subject to exist. It follows, therefore, that whatever the Symbolic subject carries with it 
from the period before subjectification will necessarily be threatening to the Symbolised 
subject himself. If the Symbolised subject retains traces of the non-Symbolic subject, 
and the non-Symbolic subject, in turn, carries within the image of the generative yet 
threatening mother, then we can infer that the Symbolised subject himself ‘remembers’ 
and carries within the image of the mother.  
In entering the Symbolic with this aforementioned maternal baggage, the Symbolised 
subject is essentially introducing non-Symbolised Being into the Symbolic, into a 
structure that functions through the replication of loss, and is thus a negative form of 
Being. The incompatibility of the baggage carried forward in the Symbolic with the 
nature of the Symbolic itself is, therefore, bound to be registered as threatening, and 
neutralised. As demonstrated in this and previous chapters, the easiest way to 
neutralise the threateningly generative force of the mother is to render it sterile—that is, 
to repress it, deny its nature, and translate it into the Symbolic as impotence. Whilst the 
generative capacities of the mother are repressed, loss continues to be replicated at 
the core of the Symbolic by the Father, generating endless iterations of subject 
typologies founded on loss, and perpetuating a single version of subjectivity that is 
compatible with the Symbolic and sympathetic to the needs of the male imaginary. The 
Father thus becomes the condition of possibility for the existence of the subject.  
Yet for the mother-as-destructive, Father-as-generative binary to be maintained, it is 
not enough to merely render the residual image of the mother sterile; it must also be 
understood by the subject to be destructive, so that attempts to probe into this residue 
can be avoided. As the image of the mother is associated with the constant threat of 
annihilation and the destruction of the possibility of Being in the Symbolic, it becomes 
imperative for the subject to repress her to safeguard his own subjecthood. It appears, 
then, that the repression of the mother as displayed in cultural products such as The 
Bacchae is a multi-faceted one, in which the figure of the mother is harmed twice—
once through the subject’s attempt to render her sterile, and once through her erasure 
from the social space. By this token, it becomes easier to see why the mother in The 
Bacchae is a constant presence, but hidden directly and indirectly. Her existence is 
hinted at through Agave, who functions as a failed symbol of motherhood, and through 
the conspicuous absence of any ‘viable’, well-functioning mother figures in the play. 
The problems that arise in this context concern how this multi-faceted repression of the 
mother behaves, in what guises it resurfaces in the male imaginary, and how the male 
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imaginary copes with the invasion. In The Bacchae, the male imaginary and the edifice 
of the Symbolic crumble when the presence of the mother becomes manifest, and can 
only restore itself once it reinstates the original repression—that it, once the figure of 
the generative mother is once again banished: Agave is sent into exile, and the other 
Maenads are reassigned to their domestic roles.  
Nonetheless, the repression of the mother does not stop with her exclusion from the 
Symbolic. In The Bacchae, we also see the male imaginary staging an attack on itself, 
in the form of the murder of Pentheus. Pentheus’ death does not simply symbolise the 
death of the subject and the collapse of the male imaginary—as I have shown in 
previous chapters, his murder comes as a result of a complex web of events, and is 
carried out almost simultaneously by his mother and his double, who kill Pentheus by 
bewildering, bewitching and beheading him, in an effective act of castration of the male 
imaginary. The role Dionysus plays in this process is of paramount significance, 
particularly because, to a great extent, Dionysus is Pentheus: he is his double, much 
like the non-Symbolic subject serves as the double of the Symbolised subject. It is 
important to note that Dionysus enables Agave (the manifestation of the repression of 
the image of the mother) to destroy Pentheus, her son and the Symbolised subject. 
Although the social order collapses, neither Agave nor Dionysus are worse off. 
Dionysus leaves out of his own volition, while Agave is exiled, retaining the same 
status of token motherhood, allowed only a fragmentary existence in the Symbolic. 
I would like to propose that what we see in The Bacchae with the murder of Pentheus 
is, in fact, an attack the guilt-ridden subject mounts on himself in an unconscious 
attempt at reparation, with the purpose of ‘freeing’ the repressed image of the mother. 
Under the influence of the non-Symbolic subject, the fragile equilibrium of the Symbolic 
is jeopardised, and the subject attacks himself, by seeking to undo the original 
repression of the mother, that is, the act of stripping her of her generative quality. As 
the attack restores the mother’s generative function, it also renders the male imaginary 
itself non-generative, in this case, of psychic structures, which in turn leads to the 
collapse of the Symbolic. In the play, this becomes apparent through the layering of the 
figure of the mother through the absent Kybele, the impotent, absent mother, and 
Agave, the destructive mother. The attack on Pentheus becomes a form of self-harm 
(harm directed towards the Symbolic), whose purpose is to restore the mother her 
generative function. With the collapse of the Symbolic, the non-Symbolic subject is no 
longer constrained, and can escape the structure of the quasi-transcendental elements.  
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Repression and the death drive 
If we speak of a multi-layered repression that seeks to ward off an external force that 
poses a threat to the male imaginary, it is worth looking more closely into the reasons 
this force is registered as something to be resisted. It is important to ask what it is that 
Kybele is or does that weakens the hold that the male imaginary has on the Symbolic, 
or, otherwise phrased, what it is that the figure of Kybele is capable of doing and the 
male imaginary desires, but is incapable of doing itself.  
Kybele has numerous elements that make her threatening to the male imaginary: she 
has immense creative power and is exceptionally fertile, being able to not only beget all 
the gods, but engage in what essentially is parthenogenesis by proxy in her creation of 
her lover Attis. Her association with bees and honey reinforce her creative powers, but 
situate her in a unique position, of both giver of life and enforcer of rules. In other 
words, if Kybele / the Queen Bee gives the gift of honey (to be read as structure, 
civilisation, reason), she also appears to regulate her subjects’ consumption of honey, 
and is capable of taking life away when consumption is found to be inappropriate. From 
this perspective, Kybele is in an interesting position, of begetter of life and bringer of 
death. 
In addition to her great generative powers, Kybele’s cult is dangerous to the phallic: 
through it, she denies not only the foundations of patriarchy by systematically breaking 
the taboos against incest, infanticide, and castration, but also the possibility of males of 
existing within a patriarchal system. Adherence to her cult requires self-mutilation, 
renunciation of sexuality, and blind and complete acceptance of her demands, 
especially in relation to sexual abstinence, or, as argued before, sexual regression. 
Patriarchy as a construct is presented as dependent on, and younger than, Kybele 
herself, which explains why it is infantilised in its relation to the mother-goddess, and 
why men must return to a pre-phallic state to attain unity with the goddess. By virtue of 
her being the Queen Bee and the Mother of the Gods, precededing and, in her 
hypostasis as Rhea, birthing patriarchy itself (Zeus), Kybele becomes to the institution 
of patriarchy what the gradual withdrawal of the mother is to the baby: an 
overwhelmingly frightening presence, eternally absent yet forever threatening to return. 
Under these circumstances, the male imaginary must fight the potentially annihilating 
presence of the mother, and can only do so by means of projective identification, by 
imbuing the mother with its own impotence, and attributing to her its own destructive 
tendencies. 
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We see at least three instances in which the phallic is threatened by Kybele:  
Firstly, in the manifestation of the matriarchal cult of the goddess: her cult becomes 
manifest as a counter-cult, which, much like a Dionysian cult, can only begin in the 
midst of the city. For the orgiastic celebrations to mean anything, the renunciation of 
the Symbolic, followed by the transition to the primordial and animalistic, must come as 
a form of deviation from the set rules of the patriarchal. Yet for this to be possible, the 
revolt against the phallic must start from within, from the phallic itself; by this token, the 
matriarchal counter-cult appears to reside within the phallic, a self-subversive presence 
that the phallic can neither see nor eradicate.  
Secondly, the matriarchal appears to exist in a cannibalistic relationship with the male 
imaginary: Kybele’s cult relies heavily on cannibalism, on the renunciation of one’s 
morality and the adoption of animalistic traits and habits. It is not relevant for the 
purpose of this discussion whether the cannibalism that Kybele demands is the actual 
ingestion of human flesh,249 but it is interesting to note the way in which the cult of the 
goddess requires renunciation of the traits that define the phallic. In so doing, the cult 
of Kybele overtakes the phallic, taking in its defining qualities, particularly its claim to 
sovereignty, and redefines the phallic as illegitimate. The move is essentially the same 
as Zeus’ ingestion of Metis, but reversed.  
Thirdly, the cult of Kybele plays with deeply rooted desires and transgresses the space 
of taboo: in the myth, we see incest enacted by the subject/the male imaginary (Zeus) 
resulting in castration (Agdistis). Even more interestingly, we see attempted 
Symbolisation ending tragically: when Attis (Kybele’s son and lover) attempts to 
distance himself from Kybele by entering a sexual union (i.e.: marriage) with another 
woman, he is punished by Kybele with the dissolution of the self. He is murdered, but 
does not remain dead—instead, he is confined to an eternity of immobility, trapped 
inside a coffin. In the relationship between Kybele and Attis we see clearly how the 
infantile fear might play out: the infant (Attis) exists as the phallus, in blissful union with 
the mother (Kybele), as both son and lover, in a deeply sexual, but pre-phallic, non-
copulative relation.250 It is indicated in the myth that Attis and Kybele might not even 
live together, a separation which may be hinting at the mother’s withdrawal. Yet once 
the infant attempts to stop being the phallus and move to possessing the phallus, we 
witness the mother’s terrifying return and the extent of her destructive power: she 
                                                          
249 It most likely is not: as shown above, cannibalism-proper is bound to fail, and as a result cannot be directly required 
by the cult of the mother goddess; a self-destructive, unstable construction should not pose enough of a threat to the 
male imaginary to cause its collapse. The idea of cannibalism in the context of Kybele seems to be a failed pairing: a 
practice that essentially shows illegitimacy is paired with the enforcer of legitimacy itself, yet leads only to suffering and 
loss, and reveals itself ultimately as an ill-fated attempt.  
250 The relation between Attis and Kybele may also incorporate maternal phantasies of remaining united with her child. 
169 
 
crushes any possibility for the infant to either be or have the phallus, and condemns 
him to death, to Being in (not towards) Death, in a somewhat Heideggerean sense. The 
question, then, is whether this Being in Death, the state of being eternally dead, cut off 
from the possibility to either be or have the phallus is indeed frightening for the male 
imaginary, and, if it is frightening, if it is also something the male imaginary fights to 
avoid. The alternative I would like to propose is that this state of Being in Death is 
frightening, but also is as close as the subject can get to recapturing the originary, 
which means that it is a both dreaded and coveted experience, driven by the subject’s 
death drive. 
When considering the threat the figure of Kybele poses to the male imaginary, I would 
argue it is only natural to also see instances of retributive violence aimed at reducing 
her impact, in effect part of the process of repression. If the repression is multi-layered, 
as proposed earlier in this chapter, then the retributive violence would become manifest 
either through the demonization of the figure of Kybele, or through rendering her sterile 
and tame. In fact, I would go as far as to suggest that the violence against the figure of 
the goddess will become apparent in the (mis)interpretation of the very attributes that 
define her power, which will become failed pairs of opposites.  
The association between Kybele and an excess of honey, and, implicitly, her being 
linked with cannibalism, sovereignty and legitimacy, becomes ostracizing, and pushes 
her to the limits of society. The transformation of the goddess into an outcast becomes 
evident in the way her rituals are constructed: although revered as a goddess, Kybele’s 
involvement with others is only minimal, at least in comparison with that of other gods. 
She exists on the outskirts of the gods’ world, as a liminal and thus sacrificeable 
character, and is too far removed from society to pose a real threat. Furthermore, the 
desexualisation and re-sexualisation of her cult is telling: although she punishes 
severely any sexual transgression, her cult is, in fact, associated with sexuality, and 
revolves around traces of sexuality on the body (i.e.: genitals), orgies, ecstatic union 
with the goddess, and cannibalism. The image of the goddess becomes hyper-
sexualised, yet the sexual overtones themselves are contained by the dangers 
associated with acting onto such erotic desires. She becomes an alluring sexual 
presence, yet one that is too far removed from subjects to be attainable. Instead of a 
goddess that is revered for her ability to contain the phallus, and is thus worshipped by 
her adepts through attempts at becoming the phallus, the layers of repression present 
a distant goddess, who punishes attempts at unity with death through castration. From 
this perspective, the myth of Kybele and the way it is registered by the male imaginary 
is similar to the way the incest prohibition is enforced by the Father, and the fear of 
castration is aroused in the infant.  
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Perhaps what is most interesting, however, is the difficulty of finding traces of Kybele in 
myths, non-specialist books and literary works: the near extinction of her myth is 
surprising, given her popularity in the Neolithic period, and the geographic reach of her 
cult. Although there are some references to her cult, details of her as a goddess are 
scarce. She is “the mother of the gods” and “the Queen Bee”, but the reason she 
attained these titles is difficult to identify. Her confusion with other goddesses also 
points to a dilution of her figure, tantamount to the killing of the mother, albeit not 
overtly. While famous mothers, like Jocasta or Clytemnestra, are murdered, Kybele 
simply ceases to be there, in a way like the mother as a structuring element herself. 
She never dies, but withdraws from the world, her departure remaining nonetheless 
subject to a potential return. In the few myths where she does appear, she is 
desexualised, and seems more like a maternal figure that comes to punish 
transgression, only to swiftly leave again. Moreover, she does not communicate with 
her disciples and priests in temples, but lives apparently secluded, on Mount Ida, from 
where she imparts sterile, desexualised and decontextualized punishments. Thus, 
rather than retaining her dual nature, both creative and destructive, both structuring 
and subversive, she has become an icon, with a limited but convoluted and not totally 
clear background story. She is disavowed of her role in laying the foundations of 
patriarchy, as well as of her ability to subvert patriarchy at will. Kybele is mirrored in this 
sense by Agave, who is portrayed only through the prism of her monstrous crime (the 
killing of Pentheus) and not as instrumental in both the creation and destruction of a 
Symbolic system, paralleling the split of the maternal from its erotic components.  
The figure of the mother in the play is exceptionally difficult to capture, possibly due to 
the strict yet fluid delineation between masculine and feminine, between the polis and 
nature, between reason and instinct. This extremely structured approach gives rise to 
complex issues, especially in terms of the portrayal of characters, and of opposite or 
complementary terms, and results in a series of failed binaries: there is no 
Semele/Dionysus, as Semele is dead; there is no Kybele/Dionysus, as Kybele is 
absent; there is no Agave/Pentheus, as Pentheus is dead; there is no mother with a 
child. The one woman who is shown in her mothering function is the maddened 
Theban woman who is suckling a wolf cub—although a perversion of motherhood, this 
is in fact the only instance where mothering works, perhaps due to its being situated 
outside the Symbolic. This begs the question as to whether the series of failed 
portrayals, incidentally all of them of the mother in one of her functions, is to show a 
fundamentally impaired mothering function in the play, and to say mothering is only 
possible outside the Symbolic. The failed binaries point to a sustained destructive 
attack on (m)othering, mounted by the male imaginary, who refuses to allow anything 
more than a stunted mother figure within the Symbolic.  
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The impossibility of mothering becomes, to an extent, a form of monstrosity in the play, 
and, at least apparently, what generates monstrosity in others, or in the situation itself. 
Yet it is not the impossibility of mothering that reveals monstrosity, but the repression of 
the mother, the act of rendering her sterile and demonising her, which leads to failed 
binaries. If the binary opposition between two apparently different terms is meant to 
reveal not opposition, but dependence and cyclical succession of the positions terms 
occupy in the power relation, a failed binary would only reveal the opposition, without 
allowing the common ground to be explored. The failed binary, in other words, only 
allows subjects to occupy fixed positions, which often ends in tragedy.251  
The successive transformations of the mother, coupled with the impossibility of 
retaining some fluidity in the way one positions oneself in relation to the Other, makes it 
difficult for the ego to maintain the repression of the mother, while still keeping the 
Symbolic intact and functioning within its constraints, particularly, as elaborated above, 
given the non-Symbolic subject’s pull towards death, towards recapturing the originary. 
The mother’s generative function appears to allow some fluidity to seep into the 
Symbolic, into binaries and, implicitly, into the subject’s understanding of himself, and it 
is therefore logical that the repression that hinders this function should be attacked. If I 
am correct in saying that the non-Symbolic subject represents a pre-phallic, yet 
structured subject, that belongs to a different type of Being and opens the possibility for 
different modes of subjectification, then it follows that it would be the non-Symbolic 
subject that would enable the attack on the repression. The attack onto the repressed 
image of the mother would necessarily translate into an attack onto the Symbolic. 
In The Bacchae, we see this as an attack mounted by Dionysus against Pentheus, 
which culminates with the destruction of the Symbolic and the annihilation of the 
(phallic) ego. Through this generalised destruction, the subject comes as close as it 
can to a potential return to the originary, and to recapturing the lost subject. The 
dissolution of the self and the failure of the Symbolic order help, therefore, position the 
subject (even if only fleetingly) towards experiencing Being in Death. The non-Symbolic 
subject becomes indispensable in locating the mother and demonstrating that the fear 
of what lies outside the Symbolic comes as a response to anxieties of the male 
imaginary, not to a transcendental truth. Yet this is not to say that the non-Symbolic 
subject should be reduced to the figure of the mother or treated as its extension. 
Rather, what the existence of a type of subjectivity that operates independently of 
oedipal constraints reveals is an artificial insistence on the part of the male imaginary to 
prescribe a unique model for subjectification, which results in forced fixity at the heart 
                                                          
251 This is not the case in this tragedy alone; other examples include “Titus Andronicus” or “Antigone”. 
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of the process of subjectification itself. What is crucial is that this subjectification model 
is not universal, but bound up within the subject’s lifeworld, dependent on the same 
quasi-transcendental elements as the subject himself. Through the non-Symbolic 
subject, we can propose a more flexible conception of subjectification that embraces its 
historicity and looks beyond the oedipal not with apprehension, but with anticipation. 
The possibility of arguing for the existence of a non-Symbolic subject shows existence 
is possible in the post-oedipal—although the task of exploring it remains ahead.  
Through the influence of the non-Symbolic subject, the tenuous hold the Symbolic has 
onto its repression of the mother is broken, and the mother herself is revealed as a 
presence at the core of the Symbolic, instrumental in subjectification, but stripped of 
her structuring function. Yet the existence of the non-Symbolic subject points to more 
than the fact that the mother has been repressed and hidden within the depths of the 
phallic unconscious. Through its proximity to the mother, and more importantly, through 
its being a structured subject, as opposed to an excess that seeps from the gaping hole 
the erasure of the mother leaves behind, the non-Symbolic subject opens the 
possibility of thinking other modes of subjectification that go beyond the oedipal 
paradigm. The unique nature of the non-Symbolic subject suggests that different 
modes of subjectification that do not revolve around the Father and do not rest on the 
murder of the mother are within reach, and need not result in psychosis and madness. 
Furthermore, the brief coexistence of two modes of subjectification in the play implies 
that a structural intervention in the male imaginary and its relation to the mother, with 
the purpose of helping the male imaginary work through the repression of the mother, 
may pave the way towards allowing different models of psychic organisation to evolve 
and coexist. Ultimately, the theorisation of the non-Symbolic subject and of the space it 
occupies in relation to structuring elements can enable a more fluid approach to 
subjectification, one perhaps more faithful to subjects’ initial polymorphous perversity.  
 
Summary of Chapter 5 
In this chapter I have looked at the space the mother occupies in The Bacchae, and 
have suggested that her presence is not an instance of the mother herself, but the 
repression of the male imaginary that resurfaces and threatens the phallic. By 
analysing the way the figure of the mother has been repressed, I have argued that the 
erasure conceals an attempt of the male imaginary to exact some reparation from the 
harm enacted on the body of the mother. In atoning for the violence done to the mother 
by rendering her sterile and exorcising her from the space of representation, the male 
imaginary necessarily attacks itself, identifying itself as the original oppressor of the 
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mother. I have shown the non-Symbolic subject to be key for the repression of the 
mother to be identified and attacked, and have suggested that, through the non-
Symbolic subject as a theoretical construct, a more fluid understanding of 
subjectification can emerge, one that allows for the plurality of identities inherent in the 
subject to find expression beyond the exacting requirements of the oedipal model.  
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Conclusion 
 
Summary of the argument  
The main argument of this thesis has been that a previously unidentified and un-
theorised psychic structure operates at the level of the pre-oedipal; my aim was to 
articulate the makeup of this structure, and show that it goes beyond the traditional 
theoretical conceptualisation of excess at the heart of the psyche. I have argued that 
this un-theorised entity, which I have called ‘the non-Symbolic subject’, is more than 
psychic excess, and is in fact a fully-fledged subject, with the capacity for 
transcendental introspection and an understanding of the self as separate from the 
other, yet dependent on it for self-constitution. The purpose of choosing this line of 
reasoning was to argue that the conceptualisation of the subject with which Lacanian 
psychoanalysis has hitherto operated is historically bound, dependent on the quasi-
transcendental elements that shape an individual’s lifeworld at specific points in time, 
and cannot therefore claim universal value; by positing the existence of the non-
Symbolic subject, I sought to show that the not-yet subject has the possibility of 
emerging into subjecthood through a variety of modes of subjectification, and that 
subjectivity itself need not be restricted to the replication of the image of the Father. 
Using the non-Symbolic subject as a critical tool, I attempted to expand the 
psychoanalytical theoretical language and provide the means through which theory can 
move beyond the oedipal, towards a space where subjectification around the Father 
becomes a historical occurrence, rather than a condition that must be met for existence 
as a subject to be possible. My primary goal was to use the non-Symbolic subject as a 
methodological tool to demonstrate that the project of conceptualising alternative 
models of subjectification is possible, and has, in some sense, already started. 
To argue for the existence of such a subject, I began by interrogating the status of 
representation and the place the subject occupies in history. In Chapter 1, I aimed to 
demonstrate that, rather than giving a universal account of subjectification and 
irrefutably answering the question as to what it means to be human, language, and the 
language of psychoanalysis by extension, is a historical construct, dependent on 
changes in épistéme. Once the subject and the language that helps ‘translate’ the 
subject into the accepted terms of the phenomenological field in which he lives are 
revealed to be non-static, we can begin to explore further the fluidity at the heart of the 
psyche and the possibilities it opens up in what concerns subjectification.  
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In my second chapter, I started my analysis of an ancient Greek tragedy, The Bacchae, 
which I used as the framework within which the existence of a non-Symbolic subject 
can be explored. Following other psychoanalytic thinkers, most notably Freud and 
Irigaray, I returned to Greek myth and have treated this tragedy as capable of capturing 
the status of representation and the structure of the (male) psyche. My argument has 
been that, if totalising, universalising accounts of the psyche do not work because the 
psyche itself is fluid, then it follows that attempts to unify the subject’s potential 
avenues of psychic development will necessarily give rise to tension. Using theories of 
violence and sacrifice, I have articulated a model of the non-Symbolic subject, and 
have argued it is at the same time a liminal presence that threatens the integrity of the 
Symbolic, and a double of a Symbolic entity that can serve as its most prominent 
representative. The purpose of this theoretical turn was to show that the non-Symbolic 
subject possesses the necessary psychic apparatus to exist qua subject in the absence 
of the Father as a structuring element.  
Once the possibility of existing as a subject without the Father was opened up, I started 
to explore an alternative to the oedipal paradigm, and have looked towards the mother 
as a potential structuring element in the psychic life of the infant. However, the mother 
has a tense existence in the Symbolic, made difficult by her exclusion from the space 
of representation, which means that she cannot, and she should not simply substitute 
for the Father in the process of subjectification. In Chapter 3, I proposed a different 
understanding of ‘structure’ that allows for the theorisation of the mother’s structuring 
capacity, and have shown that it is possible to bring together different models of 
subjectification in the same theoretical framework. 
Yet if the mother can occupy a structuring position, then it becomes especially 
problematic that she is almost entirely absent from the space of representation, an 
absence which I explore through The Bacchae. In my fourth chapter, I analysed the 
role of women in the play, and in particular their objectification and subsequent 
inscription in rigid binaries, and have suggested that the complex nature of the 
relationships between women, men and divinity makes binaries self-subversive and too 
rigid to maintain. In showing binaries to be untenable, I opened up the possibility of 
reintroducing the mother in the space of representation, not as a clearly defined 
presence, but as absence, and have suggested that the centrality of her absence and 
its ability to threaten the Symbolic belie her structuring capacity.  
While theorising the mother back in the space of representation opens the way for 
understanding her structuring capacity, it does not explain why she had been excluded 
in the first place. In my final chapter, I looked at the space the mother occupies in The 
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Bacchae, and suggested that she appears not as herself, but as a repression that 
resurfaces in the male imaginary. I showed that the male imaginary seeks to repair the 
harm enacted on the body of the mother by rendering her sterile and exorcising her 
from the space of representation, but that this reparation necessarily entails self-harm, 
the male imaginary attacking itself as the oppressor of the mother. In Chapter 5, I 
concluded that the non-Symbolic subject is instrumental in identifying the repressed 
image of the mother and enabling a more fluid understanding of subjectification. 
My thesis charts the development of the psyche and argues that the forcing of the 
subject into oedipal structures is not necessary, and not the only way in which the 
subject can exist. I show that existence around the mother as an absent structuring 
element is possible by virtue of the non-Symbolic subject, but also argue that the 
imposed, yet false rigidity of the process of subjectification makes the psyche 
vulnerable to breakage. Overall, my argument is that other modes of subjectification 
are possible, but that, for these to emerge, it is necessary to interrogate and analyse 
the male imaginary, and help it work through the consequences of its actions towards 
the body of the mother. My argument at this stage is purely theoretical, but I believe it 
can find applicability in psychoanalytic, feminist and literary theory and help shed new 
light on the current status of representation, the place of the individual, and the 
question as to what it means to be a subject.  
 
The drivers of the argument 
The reason for positing the existence of a non-Symbolic subject was to argue that the 
oedipal model, which has been hitherto hailed in Lacanian psychoanalysis as more or 
less the only viable model of subjectification, need not be the end (or the beginning) of 
the psychic life of the subject, as there is a plurality of modes of subjectification that the 
subject can access. The argument is by no means new—in fact, feminist theory has 
long critiqued the Freudian and Lacanian insistence on the primacy of the phallus in 
self-constitution and has argued for the need to go beyond the oedipal. Yet the current 
theoretical framework leaves little room for this transition, as it is such that attempts to 
move beyond the phallus necessarily land in a space of non-representation, where only 
madness and psychosis are possible. Transgressing in a space where there is no 
phallus, the classic theory goes, is tantamount to entering a space of non-Being - for to 
exist is to exist around the phallus.  
In its attempts to circumvent the totalising and universalising account of subjectification 
proposed by phallocentric theories, feminism has provided proof of the existence of 
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excess, of some form or residual femininity at the heart of the psyche, and has shown 
this excess continuously influences and destabilizes the male imaginary. Yet my 
argument is that feminist theory does not go far enough: rather than positing some form 
of excess in the psyche exists, I propose that this excess is, in fact, a pre-oedipal, non-
Symbolised subject, that has the same capacities as a ‘traditional’ subject, but is not 
confined by the structures that are dictated and shaped by the male imaginary.  
To advance this line of reasoning, however, I first needed to show that the not-yet-
subject has the ability to become a subject and encounters the necessary conditions to 
make the transition to subjecthood before coming into contact with the Father. To this 
end, I argued that self-sustained subjectivity can congeal around the mother as a 
structuring element and need not end in psychosis. This point constitutes a radical 
departure from the idea that the mother cannot serve a structuring function because 
she is not separated from the infant through bloody mutilation (castration). Yet such a 
move is not without its problems, and to substantiate it I also needed to find the 
theoretical framework that could support my argument.  
To present a cohesive picture, I started from Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis. 
Using Foucault’s and Irigaray’s theories, I argued that psychoanalysis is a meta-
language that reflects the conditions imposed by quasi-transcendental elements upon 
the psyche, and which can be studied to understand what it can reveal about the 
structure of the psyche at a given time. The argument revolves around the idea of 
historicity, more specifically the historicity of thought, of quasi-transcendental elements, 
and of the status of representation itself. In beginning my argument with thought and 
language, I positioned myself in relation to the quasi-transcendental elements that 
make up the lifeworld of the subject (life, language and labour) and the way they have 
been translated into a framework that upholds the male imaginary; in doing so, I paid 
particular attention to language-as-Dasein and suggested that it can be deconstructed 
to show its constituent parts, and, more importantly, its pauses, silences and 
omissions. Throughout this thesis, I have worked mostly in an Irigarayan framework, 
but borrowed heavily from Klein and Foucault. The purpose of my methodology was to 
intervene in the meta-language that establishes the mode of functioning of quasi-
transcendental elements, thus claiming universality, and show it to be historical and 
revealing of the phantasies that underpin the psyche of its creator: the male imaginary.  
Throughout my thesis, I have sought to show that, if quasi-transcendental elements are 
historical and fluctuate in line with changes in épistéme, then an analysis of the meta-
language that governs, and in a sense orders these quasi-transcendental elements can 
reveal important insights about the constitution of the male-imaginary (as the speaker 
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of the meta-language), and the reasons this meta-language cannot be translated in any 
other way; in other words, an analysis can show why the speaker must necessarily be 
male. I have turned to The Bacchae to undertake this analysis due to the play’s 
remoteness from current quasi-transcendental elements, which meant that a modern 
reading, which is what I was interested in, would not be influenced by any textual 
elements that could veer too closely to the contemporary understanding of what it is to 
be a subject. The play therefore readily lends itself to close reading from a 
contemporary perspective, and allows us to probe the way we think about subjectivity 
now. Yet it is important to reemphasise that I am not a Classicist, and as such do not 
work in a classical framework. In working with an ancient text, I have only sought to see 
what it can tell us about the way we are conceptualising subjectivity and what it means 
to become a subject in the current socio-historical context; I have not attempted to 
uncover universal psychic structures that transcend historical specificity, primarily 
because, as I have argued throughout this thesis, I am not convinced that such 
structures can exist. For this reason, I have, in a way, neglected the historical 
specificity of masculinity and femininity, and have concentrated on how we refer to 
subjective positions now. I chose not to delve into the way femininity has changed in 
line with shifts in quasi-transcendental elements, and have employed primarily 
contemporary readings of the text, from the 20th and 21st centuries. Indeed, my 
argument has been throughout that subjectivity and the quasi-transcendental elements 
that shape the life of the subject constitute each other and are caught in a reciprocal 
fluidity, which means that any account of subjectivity can only be a contemporary one, 
regardless of when it is formulated, as it relies on a very particular and unique 
conglomerate of factors that are inexorably embroiled with history.  
As I mentioned in the introduction, my choice of text to expand the vocabulary of 
subjectivity is not accidental. I find The Bacchae enormously significant in the current 
socio-political context, as it allows us to use myth to work through anxieties that plague 
modern society: from the struggles between religion and secularism, between the order 
of the West and the chaos of the East, to the pull of tradition, the inescapability of 
change, the threat of migration from the outside and the search for meaning in an 
undeniably contingent world, the play becomes almost transhistorical—not in the sense 
that it transcends time and space, but in that it can reflect society back onto itself in 
more than one historical context. Thus, the non-Symbolic subject becomes a 
(necessarily contemporary) tool to interrogate the present, to probe subjectivity, and 
ask why: why now, why the male imaginary alone, why not difference as well.   
The fundamental problem with my approach is that the meta-language functions as a 
closed-system and does not allow for much fluidity; as a result, I needed to borrow from 
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different, at times incompatible systems of thought and theoretical frameworks to 
underline the gaps in the meta-language and propose an alternative. While the 
theoretical frameworks I employed are not always compatible (such as Kleinian and 
Lacanian, or Foucauldian and Lacanian theories), it is important to note that my work 
does not seek to make them fit together, nor paint a cohesive picture of the psyche. I 
have deliberately worked at the junction of theories that do not flow smoothly from one 
another, and have attempted to find ways to employ conflicting theoretical frameworks 
to reveal different aspects of the process of subjectification. The reasoning 
underpinning such a methodological approach is similar to psychoanalytic practice: if 
we follow the lead of the analysand and do not concentrate on the points of tension, the 
pauses, parapraxes and omissions s/he makes, then we circumvent the root of the 
problem, and navigate chartered, almost harmless waters, but without making much 
progress. On the other hand, if we analyse the difficult and at times painful knots in the 
language the analysand employs, we come closer to unearthing interesting insights, 
even if in the beginning these may not be entirely cohesive or conflict-free. My 
methodological approach, in broad terms, was to ask what the male imaginary says, 
and then probe into the things that are left unsaid. This strategy had led me to look into 
the spaces that are un-representable, un-theorisable, characterised by lack, by non-
being and by the impossibility of existence, and ask whether this ‘unrepresentability’ is, 
indeed, the end of the story, or if it conceals something else.  
Yet probing deeply, pushing and testing the meta-language and taking the male 
imaginary in places that it would rather avoid almost inevitably causes damage, and 
some things, such as psychic structures or orders, are broken. In such scenarios, it is 
not only that which remains after breakage that should interest us, but also that which 
was (apparently) never there. Thus, in a play like The Bacchae, the generalised death, 
despair and destruction at the end should not serve as moralising tales of the dangers 
of questioning the male imaginary, but should raise questions regarding that which is 
left unsaid, unexplored, that which destroys by virtue of not being there. I employ The 
Bacchae precisely to this purpose and ask what it is that the male imaginary fears so 
much that it feels the need to create cautionary tales that force subjects to also fear it—
even when they do not understand or know the object of fear. From this perspective, 
the question that drove my inquiry into a play like The Bacchae centres on what it can 
reveal about the status of representation now, the translatability of the meta-language, 
and the fixity of registers of psychic functioning.  
My most important methodological tool has been the concept of fluidity: throughout this 
thesis, I have considered fluidity to be at the heart of all psychic structures, driving the 
fluctuations of the meta-language and forcing the male imaginary to morph to 
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accommodate this fluidity. At the same time, I have sought to show that the insistence 
of raising the meta-language to the status of universal law imbues the process of 
subjectification with unnecessary rigidity, which makes it vulnerable and breakable in 
the face of ever-shifting paradigms.    
Throughout the thesis, I used a mimetic approach to interrogate the binary oppositions 
that are perpetuated by the male imaginary and reflect them back onto themselves—
much like the project Irigaray proposes, the purpose of exaggerated mimesis is to show 
binary oppositions to be untenable. This move was essential in demonstrating that, 
from the pauses in the meta-language and the fears of the male imaginary these 
conceal, emerges the possibility of a new form of subjectivity already at the centre of 
the psyche. The value of positing this subjectivity as something that already exists and 
not as something that needs to be created and somehow embedded in the fabric of the 
meta-language lies in the fact that it shows the project of going beyond the oedipal is 
not only possible, but within reach.   
 
The achievements of this thesis 
Through positing the existence of the non-Symbolic subject and arguing that this form 
of subjectivity already exists at the centre of the psyche, I have sought to demonstrate 
that the feminist project can be taken forward with tools within its remit. One of the 
issues with attempting to go beyond the oedipal model is that the existing theoretical 
framework does not allow for theorisation beyond it, and any attempts to disavow 
oneself from Oedipus necessarily return to its paradigmatic proposition by virtue of 
there being no ‘hook’ onto which other subjectivities can latch themselves. Yet by 
demonstrating that subjectivity proper already exists before the infant undergoes the 
oedipal stage, it is possible to begin to theorise new models of subjectification that do 
not replicate the oedipal paradigm, but build on the existing fluidity of the psyche.  
In arguing that infants enter the world in a state of polymorphous perversity, Freud 
liberated subjectivity and identity and demonstrated that a plurality of modes of 
subjectification are open to subjects, making, perhaps unwittingly, an exceptionally bold 
feminist claim. Yet the value of this insight has been undermined by the insistence of 
psychoanalysts, and of psychoanalysis as a meta-language, to gloss over the plurality 
of subjectivity and impose a model in the absence of which subjectivity would not be 
possible. Rather than being the liberating force it could have been, psychoanalysis 
became a restrictive discourse that closed itself off to the possibility of expansion.  
181 
 
Despite its flaws, however, I think it is still premature to ‘do away’ with psychoanalysis, 
as this would risk not recognising its immense potential for interrogating the structure of 
the (dominant) male imaginary. If psychoanalysis is the instrument through which the 
male imaginary has been given primacy and the mother has been erased from the 
space of representation, then it is only by looking back to psychoanalysis that we can 
unearth the reasons behind this move. As Frosh writes, psychoanalysis “is this hateful 
thing,…which refuses to allow its subjects to escape their ghostly remainders, the 
things that are left over from past happenings, or left out of conscious recognition.”252 
From this perspective, psychoanalysis becomes a crucial critical tool, whose value 
rests precisely in that it “refuses to stay silent about trouble and pain;”253 however, for it 
to be used constructively, it must be able to capture more of the subject’s experience 
than just the male subject-position. If used as a meta-language, a reform of 
psychoanalysis is perhaps the easiest way in which the space of representation can be 
widened enough to allow for a plurality of modes of subjectification to become manifest.  
My thesis is a step in this direction: by demonstrating the subject can exist 
independently from the oedipal, not just as residue, but as self-sustained subjectivity, I 
hope to take the theoretical framework one step closer to becoming representative of 
the plurality of subjectivities that are open to the subject. My proposed theoretical 
construct, the non-Symbolic subject, allows for a new entity to be inserted in the 
theoretical framework, opening up new possibilities for theorising subjectification with 
different structuring elements at its core. In theorising this psychic entity, however, I did 
not seek to replace the oedipal or to eliminate the Father from the psychic life of the 
infant; rather, I have sought to show that to be a subject does not have to mean to be a 
‘male’ subject. Through the non-Symbolic subject as a methodological tool, I have tried 
to expand the space of subjectification to demonstrate that femininity can occupy a 
position in the process of subjectification that is more complex and sophisticated than 
the previously theorised function of the mother. In so doing, I have not tried to reduce 
the non-Symbolic subject to the figure of the mother, but rather demonstrate that the 
existence of the non-Symbolic subject points to the possibility of a plurality of modes of 
subjectification to exist—and subjectification around the mother as structuring element 
is one of these modes. 
The implications of my thesis for psychoanalysis and for feminist theory, from this 
perspective, are profound, in the sense that they pave the way for moving towards a 
new conceptualisation of subjectification, one that gives the figure of the mother more 
centrality than before. Yet proposing the existence of a new psychic entity also poses 
                                                          
252 Frosh, Hauntings, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 3. 
253 Ibid. 
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problems, especially in what concerns established psychoanalytic theories that 
demonstrate subjectivity outside the oedipal is impossible. Thus, if the concept of the 
non-Symbolic subject is to be valuable for psychoanalytic theory, then psychoanalytic 
frameworks need to be revised—not in order to help the non-Symbolic subject find a 
comfortable fit within the nexus of theoretical threads, but precisely to ensure it disrupts 
the order of psychoanalysis and prevents it from becoming static. The value of the 
concept of the non-Symbolic subject lies in the fact that it injects fluidity and uncertainty 
within psychoanalysis, and seeks to expose its universality as flawed. Through this 
concept, theoretical frameworks such as Freudian or Lacanian theories can be read as 
expressions of the male imaginary that seek to preserve a Symbolic order that is 
sympathetic to the phallic organisation; the non-Symbolic subject thus makes a 
language that had hitherto been impervious to scrutiny transparent and intelligible.  
In what concerns feminist theory, I hope the concept of the non-Symbolic subject can 
help unblock the feminist project, and push theory towards conceptualising new modes 
of subjectification, not instead of, but in addition to the oedipal paradigm. Through the 
non-Symbolic subject, the question of going beyond the oedipal model need not remain 
stuck in the problematic of what lies beyond the oedipal, or if anything lies there at all 
aside from psychosis and non-Being. The theorisation of a new entity at the heart of 
the psyche, of a structured subject that has the potential to evolve in various ways, can, 
I believe, further feminism’s aims to go beyond the oedipal and create a space where 
the manifestation of a plurality of subjectivities becomes possible.  
Finally, from a literary perspective, I hope my reading of The Bacchae sheds new light 
on the play itself, and on the way modern understanding of an ancient tragedy can be 
used to reveal new insights into contemporary fears and anxieties. In a time when the 
idea of divinity-as-ego-ideal has morphed to show divine figures as extensions of the 
self, benevolent, rational and immensely powerful,254 it is important to interrogate the 
fascination older forms of divinity hold on the modern imagination. Returning to ancient 
texts and rereading them through modern lenses is not merely a literary exercise; 
rather, looking at texts that pertain to a different épistéme can prompt us to ask crucial 
questions about the status of representation today, the forces that shape our psyches, 
and the working of the modern (male) imaginary. What is it about the malevolence, 
violence, and almost animalistic savagery of this ancient text that captivates the 
attention of some of the most important critical theorists today?255 And if the insights 
such a text can reveal about our society and the power structures that shape it are so 
                                                          
254 I am referring here to the plethora of superhero films produced in the last decade that invariably portray godlike 
beings (superheroes) as exemplary versions of the self. Superheroes rarely display violence of the kind attributed to 
ancient gods and appear instead to be perfect images of the male superego.  
255 Such as Judith Butler. 
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poignant, why is it that we see no similar texts produced today? The non-Symbolic 
subject in this context can be used as a tool to read texts structurally, and analyse the 
fluidity of power relations, gender binaries and modes of existing as subjects.  
 
The limitations of this thesis 
While the concept of the non-Symbolic subject can be useful in psychoanalysis, 
feminist theory and literature, and can unearth hitherto hidden meanings and 
interrogate the modern psyche, my thesis is limited in several crucial ways, underlining 
the need for further work in this area.  
Firstly, despite the theorisation of an entity that allows us to go beyond the oedipal 
model, I am not able to actually make the move beyond the oedipal in this thesis. In 
Chapters 4 and 5, I show that two different modes of subjectification do coexist, but 
only briefly, and this coexistence ends in death, destruction and despair. The tragic 
ending of the play, particularly when considering the fact that feminine jouissance and 
activity directly contribute to it, may run the risk of suggesting that going beyond the 
oedipal model is impossible. If this is the case, is there ever a good enough reason to 
attempt to go beyond the oedipal? Or, even more worryingly, is the tragic ending of the 
play proof that subjectification around the figure of the mother is doomed to end in 
death and destruction, suggesting irrefutably that the mother is unsuited to serve as a 
structuring element?  
Both questions are valid, but my project is not one of pessimism. As I have suggested 
in Chapter 5, while the play does end in despair and destruction, precipitated, in part, 
by the feminine assuming agency, the tragic ending is not the crux of the play. What is 
more important is the fact that two different modes of subjectification do coexist, albeit 
briefly. It is only when the male imaginary is faced with its own repressed memories 
and seeks to repair the damage done to the mother that the integrity of the Symbolic 
falters, suggesting that the problem does not lie with the mother’s ability to function as 
a structuring element, but with the male imaginary’s ability to withhold probing that 
brings to the fore fears and anxieties buried deep in its unconscious. My rereading of 
the play, therefore, may serve as an act of forcing the male imaginary to face 
repressed elements, as the only way of moving towards enabling meaningful change to 
occur. Through alternative rereadings that carve out ever increasing spaces for 
different modes of subjectification, the male imaginary can begin to work through the 
traumatic murder of the mother and the generalised cultural entrenchment of psychic 
structures to which this gave rise.  
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The value of my project, then, lies not in going beyond the oedipal and unequivocally 
solving the problem of subjectification, but in opening up a space for theorising 
alternative non-psychotic subjectivities. It would be regressive, I would argue, to 
provide totalising alternatives to the oedipal model and suggest that subjectification 
follows one of a number of routes. If we are to remain faithful to Freud’s contention that 
a plurality of identities is possible within each subject, proposing a static 
reinterpretation of the psyche, radical as it may be, would only reinscribe the problem in 
a different framework, thus recreating the problems of the oedipal model and trapping 
subjectivity in an unproductive circularity. Through the concept of the non-Symbolic 
subject, I have sought to demonstrate that fluidity is a sine qua non consideration when 
discussing subjectification and that it is only by working with fluid concepts that 
Oedipus’ rigidity can be challenged.  
Secondly, despite my insistence on the need for injecting fluidity in the conversation 
about subjectification, I am forced by the nature of the meta-language I employ to work 
within its confines, thus running the risk of replicating binaries and static structures. 
One of the most difficult problems I encountered in this sense is the male-female binary 
and the way these terms are used theoretically: when discussing subjectification, we 
speak of the Father and the mother as structuring elements, of the maternal and the 
paternal as registers, painting a misleading picture of subjectification as a stream that 
can be dammed and directed in one of two possible ways. The problem is, to an extent, 
a linguistic one: it’s the mother or the Father, the Phallus or the breast, the Symbolic or 
nothing else. I have tried to circumvent this impasse by emphasising throughout the 
thesis that, when I speak of ‘feminine’ or ‘masculine’, I speak of positions that can be 
occupied fully or partially for any length of time by individuals or groups of individuals. 
This compromise seems to help avoid some of the more difficult aspects of binaries for 
the time being, but it is not a sustainable distinction in the long term.  
The gendered nature of language extends to the non-Symbolic subject: throughout this 
work, I have referred to the non-Symbolic subject as ‘it’, or ‘he’ if I spoke of Dionysus 
specifically, but inscription in a gendered binary is restrictive and risks suggesting the 
non-Symbolic subject is always already gendered, when in fact gender, as a 
construction, can only function in the Symbolic. I have tried to clarify this point by 
emphasising the androgynous nature of the non-Symbolic subject, and have dwelled at 
length on the difficulty of pinpointing Dionysus to a specific nature: he is male, female, 
androgynous, divine, human, animal and all at once. I have also considered using an 
abbreviation for the non-Symbolic subject (S0 or N-SS), but have decided against the 
formulaic approach for fear it would imply the process of subjectification is like a code 
that has only one ‘correct’ version, and it needs to be debugged until it works. While I 
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am not convinced that using a pronoun laden with cultural symbolism is indeed the best 
solution (after all, it is reserved for objects and animals, for the definitely-not-a-subject), 
I have opted for ‘it’ for now, until a more appropriate term emerges.  
My hope is that the concept of the non-Symbolic subject grows to be understood as a 
knot in the psychic life of the subject from which a plurality of modes of subjectification 
and entry into the phenomenological field can spring. Calling these ‘oedipal’ and 
‘Dionysian’ may prove workable, and would allow for the theorisation of new modes of 
subjectification in the future, based on other cultural products that capture the status of 
representation in a given épistéme.256  
Nonetheless, the problem of the limited number of structuring elements remains, 
pointing to the need for further work to unpack the fluid nature of the structuring 
elements themselves, and of the plurality of modes of structuring that are undoubtedly 
possible. My use of ‘mother’ and ‘Father’ illustrates the problematic nature of 
structuring elements, and the rigidity inherent in the concept of structuring element 
itself: I refer to the Father in his structuring capacity, and spell it with a capital letter to 
differentiate from the everyday ‘father’. At the same time, I refer to the everyday mother 
and to the structuring mother using the more generic ‘mother’ written in lowercase 
letters. I had initially considered using ‘Mother’ to refer to the structuring element, but 
eventually decided against it: the capitalisation of the word, together with its use in a 
specific context (that of a structuring element) draws a definitive distinction between 
Mothers and mothers. While, as Irigaray shows, hierarchical structures are inherent in 
the way the male ego relates to its ego ideal, to divinity and to structuring elements, I 
wanted to avoid replicating this hierarchy in the theorisation of the mother as a 
structuring element. If fluidity is indeed constitutional, then it goes against my argument 
to argue the Mother can only be a structuring presence and never a mother.  
Finally, there is the problem of the use of different and at times conflicting theoretical 
frameworks. As I mentioned earlier, I have borrowed from several thinkers that have 
interrogated the problem of subjectification, and have employed theoretical frameworks 
that are occasionally in conflict with each other. I explained throughout this thesis that I 
did not intend to make the theoretical frameworks fit together, that I worked 
deliberatively at the junction of theories and that I used each to illuminate varied 
aspects of the process of subjectification. In the context of my insistence on fluidity, the 
question that arises is whether it would not have been preferable to veer away from 
                                                          
256 Even if I returned, following Freud, to ancient Greek tragedy and have argued it can help us see the blueprint of the 
psyche, this is not meant to say that only ancient tragedies are suited for the task of interrogating the status of 
representation. Foucault, for example, used Velázquez’s Las Meninas for this purpose, while Heidegger used van 
Gogh’s A Pair of Shoes.  
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theoretical junctures altogether, especially given the incompatibility of my preferred 
theories’ static character and my proposed methodology.  
One of the most important theoretical points of tension that I worked with was the 
notion of structure in Kleinian and Lacanian theories, and indeed the ‘sticking point’ of 
my thesis: I have used both Klein and Lacan to discuss structure and the roles of 
structuring elements in the life of the infant (the mother and the Father), but was only 
able to do so by using slightly different understandings of structure, and of the ‘stage’ of 
the process of subjectification with which each thinker engages. My circumventing the 
problem by redefining the meaning of structure is not intended to harmonise Klein and 
Lacan; on the contrary, it is meant to reveal the historicity of quasi-transcendental 
elements, on which the definition of structure itself is based. 
While not entirely orthodox and definitely not unambiguous, I would argue there is merit 
to this approach: for an intervention in the body of psychoanalysis to be successful, the 
way the intervention is structured must work within the parameters of the body for 
which it is meant, remaining attuned to its particularities and idiosyncrasies. Thus, in 
my work I have sought not to propose an alternative to the process of subjectification, 
but create a space within current theory to expand the understanding of the process, 
allowing it to become more malleable. Given the complex nature of the psyche, the 
fears and anxieties of the male imaginary and the repressions and pauses these give 
rise to, and, most importantly, the historical nature of the forces that impact on the 
subject, it is at best unlikely that a unifying, cohesive narrative of the process of 
subjectification can emerge. It was therefore important to intervene in the meta-
language, concentrate on its pauses and test these against different theoretical 
frameworks to understand what they can reveal about the status of the male imaginary 
and of the quasi-transcendental elements by which it is shaped.  
 
Future steps 
Considering the limitations of this thesis, I would argue the steps I need to take next 
can be classed in three broad areas: one is to do with using the concept to read other 
cultural products; one with the uncovering of new models of subjectification; and finally, 
one with the need for an expanded language that allows for the existence of a plurality 
of subjectivities that are not always already gendered and inscribed into hierarchical 
structures.  
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a) Rereadings 
Throughout this work, I have highlighted that my intention for the concept of the non-
Symbolic subject is for it to be used as a tool to ‘unlock’ psychoanalytic and feminist 
theory, and help explore hitherto hidden meanings. In this work, I have used the 
concept to explore a cultural product that belongs to a different épistéme, and have 
argued this choice by explaining the benefits of returning to ancient tragedy: on the one 
hand, the text is sufficiently removed from current cultural sensitivities for us to conduct 
an analysis as objective as possible, while on the other it is sufficiently close to our 
current understanding of life, language and labour to allow us to comprehend the 
events described.  
Yet the non-Symbolic subject as a theoretical construct can be used to understand the 
status of representation and the place the subject occupies in the current épistéme, as 
well as the way he is shaped by quasi-transcendental elements. For this reason, it is 
important to interrogate the way the concept applies to modern texts, and how it can be 
used to understand the fears and anxieties that underpin the creation of contemporary 
cultural products. The challenge with such an analysis is to remain sufficiently divorced 
from the text itself to understand and analyse it in as detached a fashion as possible, 
lest one replicates through such an analysis the fears of the male imaginary.  
One of the questions I am interested in exploring relates to what the concept of the 
non-Symbolic subject can help us understand about cultural reactions today, whether 
these become manifest as artistic representation or socio-political movements. In 
particular, I believe it would be productive to use the idea of the non-Symbolic subject 
to analyse the shift in the nature of cultural products—to be understood to an extent as 
neurotic expressions of the collective male imaginary—and trace the emergence and 
development of different modes of subjectification throughout modernism and post-
modernism, and interrogate the current status of the self and the Other in 
neoliberalism.  
 
b) Uncovering new models of subjectification 
One of the main drivers of this thesis was to propose an alternative that would allow us 
to go beyond the oedipal model and conceptualise new modes of subjectification that 
eschew the phallus. Yet this thesis only allowed for the theorisation of one alternative 
mode of subjectification, and for a brief exploration of what the Dionysian model looks 
like in practice. For the subject to develop into a plurality of subjectivities, it is 
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imperative that new paradigmatic models are theorised, and that the language of 
psychoanalysis is not allowed again to crystallise into immovable forms around 
established patterns.  
The difficulty with theorising new models lies in the closed nature of the meta-language 
of the male imaginary: if, as I suggested throughout this thesis, the male imaginary 
seeks to cover up the erasure of the (m)Other from the space of representation and 
impose a unique pattern for subjectification onto all emerging subjectivities, then the 
language it employs will be constructed in such a way so as to discourage attempts to 
step outside it. New models of subjectification are dependent, I would argue, on 
identifying the pauses, slippages and omissions of cultural products, and probing 
deeply to understand what had caused these in the first place.   
By rereading cultural manifestation through the prism of the non-Symbolic subject, it 
may be possible to identity these aforementioned caesuras, and move a step closer to 
widening the space in which subjectivity is allowed to exist. In particular, it could be 
productive to use the concept of the non-Symbolic subject to explore how it can inform 
queer theory’s intervention in psychoanalysis. Through her work on kinship in The 
Bacchae, Butler is already rereading the tragedy to question normativity; employing the 
non-Symbolic subject to this end, especially as embodied by Dionysus, may help 
further this timely intervention into the language of psychoanalysis. 
 
c) Reframing the problem 
Finally, for the project of moving beyond the oedipal paradigm to be successful, it is 
important to reframe the discussion in terms that do not presuppose the assumption of 
a particular subject position. Although it is perhaps the most difficult aspect of moving 
beyond the oedipal, I would argue that the development of a language, or at least of a 
theoretical framework that allows subjectivities other than the male to occupy a subject 
position, is critical.  
The development of a new language may be problematic, however, as it could run the 
risk of reproducing the binary structures that characterise the current organisation, 
thereby not moving beyond, but rather deeper into the oedipal. Nonetheless, it can only 
be through a sustained intellectual effort that the theoretical body can be expanded, 
that appropriate modes of naming can be developed, and that models that serve the 
deep-seated unconscious interests of a certain mode of Being (e.g.: the male 
imaginary) can be questioned and exposed.  
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In Chapters 3 and 4, I have begun to reframe the way in which we refer to the 
phenomenological field by discussing the idea of the Symbolic and kin ties in the same 
context, yet understanding kin ties to go beyond the Symbolic. I believe this argument 
needs to be expanded, and used to probe whether the Symbolic/Real/Imaginary triad is 
sufficient to accommodate subjectivity in its plurality, or whether the Symbolic itself can 
only accommodate the male subject position.  
Ultimately, my thesis remains exploratory: through it, I have tried to move one step 
closer to allowing a plurality of modes of subjectification to become manifest by 
suggesting that subjectification proper need not necessarily occur within the confines of 
the phallic. The complicated nature of the process of becoming a subject remains as 
complex as before, and change is unlikely to occur swiftly. Yet I hope that, by 
proposing the concept of a non-Symbolic subject, I have been able to reframe the 
question; instead of asking whether going beyond the oedipal is possible, we can now 
move towards exploring the varied models of subjectification open to the subject and 
their historicity.  
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